751G.00/12–351: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
1129. I attended fourth graduation ceremony Viets Army’s officer school at Dalat over weekend, Bao Dai having sent word he particularly wished speak to me.
Bao Dai started off by saying he had heard from De Lattre, but not from Huu, that I had made some oral representations to Huu against latter’s retaining key portfolios govt in his own hands instead of appointing efficient mins. I confirmed that I had done so and under instrs (Deptel 612, Paris 256, October 31)1 and in addition had expressed our concern over failure Viets Govt to produce budget.
[Page 553]Bao Dai said in view our massive support US not only had right but duty criticize and counsel with respect Viet Govt operations. We did not of course have right intervention in purely internal polit affairs but we certainly shld be heard as regards govt operations, admin and aims.
He was gravely concerned over deficiencies Huu Govt and wld apprec our making rather detailed representations persuade Huu correct these deficiencies. He had had Nguyen De, Imperial Cab Dir, prepare for the confidential info of US Govt and myself, paper setting forth accomplishments and weaknesses Viet Govt and the reforms which shld be actively undertaken. He hoped we wld agree with his analysis and representations wld be made in gen accordance paper which he asked not be disclosed to Huu.
Paper (text will be pouched December 5) is unsigned “note”2 stating that present Vietnam Govt under aegis Bao Dai had not only restored sovereign attributes lost nearly century ago but had given country in internatl position unknown in its history. It was understandable that govt faced with initial structural tasks had been unable give sufficient attention to operations, institutions and solution natl functional problems. It was now necessary complete “structures” with efficient men and plans of action. Failure do so wld result in public disorder and impotence. Need was for fewer men but more competency; for less govt expenditure and more action. There were too many ministerial “gen staffs”; too much personnel in ministries and not enough in provinces. The “doctrines” set forth in Bao Dai’s “msg program” on February 6, 1951 shld be put into practical effect.
Problems requiring immed attention were fol:
- 1.
- Govt. Number ministries and secretariats must be greatly reduced thus concentrating admin action and reducing expenditure and because of favorable effect such action on public opinion.
- 2.
- Viets Army. While satisfactory results had been obtained, Viets were not playing sufficient role in formation of army.
- 3.
- Pacification. Milit action wld have no polit result unless areas freed from communism were immed given efficient and respected admin. Hitherto “exploitation” of liberated areas had been considered police matter. Problem must be in hands of a min who shld have full police and admin powers.
- 4.
- Economic policy. There was no clearly defined and coherently executed econ policy an essential plank of which wld be an energetic struggle versus rise in prices and salaries. Latter depended entirely on price rice and which shld be held firm by limiting rice exports.
- 5.
- Social policy. Agrarian reform was logical sequence of “pacification” and wld help draw peasant masses from communism. This reform must be undertaken with prudence and respect for legitimate property rights.
- There must be an effective labor policy insuring progress for workers; taking into acct however the social characteristics Vietnam and facilities which trade-unions offered for expansion communism. There shld be energetic Ministry Social Action absorbing functions present Ministries of Public Health, Youth and Sports and Labor.
- 6.
- Fiscal policy. Absence of any budget for 1951 harmed Vietnam’s reputation abroad. Budget was in effect basis natl life and measure aptitude for self-govt. Exaggerated salary expenditures was principal obstacle. Energy which govt wld bring to bear through simplification admin machine and reduction unnecessary functionaries, particularly in ministerial categories, wld give exact picture to friendly states of esteem and aid which Vietnam deserves.
Bao Dai said Huu cld remain provided he executed necessary reforms though if Huu failed or refused he must be replaced. Bao Dai observed personality of Prime Min was less important than having the right men in key ministries. He asked me to have talk with Nguyen De, Dir Imperial Cabinet, who wld give details re governmental deficiencies and necessary reforms. In conclusion he repeated his entire confidence in good faith of Gen De Lattre. The latter was, however, surrounded by functionaries of the old regime who simply cld not change their point of view that prime aim was maintenance of Fr influence and control in Vietnam. They had and always wld subtly undercut clear commitments of De Lattre and the Fr Govt with regard to Viet independence. Thus shortly after de Lattre’s speech extolling the necessity of the rule of Bao Dai as chief of state and in effect recommending monarchical government for Vietnam, Gautier had sent word to Huu and Bao Dai that this statement “exceeded” Fr Govt policy. In a second interview when I presented Robt A. Smith member edit board New York Times and Larry Allen, new AP correspondent, Bao Dai expressed conditional optimism over the fairly rapid defeat of Viet Minh whose morale was decaying provided China did not send in actual combat troops. The Viet Minh “govt” in the north had very effectively concealed from Viet Minh forces in the south that Communists had taken over. If and when southern adherents learned that Viet Minh was now a Communist show they wld quickly “rally” to the legit govt.
Following talk with Bao Dai, had conversation with Nguyen De account of which given my desp No. 281 of December 3.3 De felt sure Huu wld agree undertake governmental changes and reforms, particularly if US made effective representations to that end. Huu wld, however, endeavor subtly to delay and thwart such reforms in the interest of retaining and increasing his personal power. Huu was a [Page 555] difficult man to replace. He was a dignified figure, of irreproachable private life, immense persistence and industry. While thirsty for inceased power and autocratic, he was really more of a democrat than men like Nguyen Van Tri and other Vietnamese of mandarin backgrounds. Huu came from the people and was fundamentally anti-monarchist. Another difficulty in replacing Huu was Bao Dai’s conviction that in present stage Prime Min must come from Cochin China. There was no other Cochin Chinese available at present except Tran Van Kha who had reputations being “affairiste” (someone looking for government graft) although he had ability and certain good qualities. Neither Bao Dai nor De confirmed Gen De Lattre’s accusations of Huu’s dishonesty in office. Bao Dai said that was not the issue and if necessary reorganization of govt made wld be little opportunity for any substantial misapplication of “secret funds”. At end of the conversation De fairly subtly intimated, I thought, that he might meet the requirements as successor to Huu. Although he was from Annam he remarked he had many ties in the south and so many friendships and associations in Cochin China that he was practically regarded there as a fellow Cochin Chinese. He also intimated that Bao Dai himself must set the example of governmental economy.
In conversation with Acting High Comm Gautier4 upon my return from Dalat I mentioned I had had some gen conversation with Bao Dai regarding reorganization and improvement of efficiency of Vietnam Govt; that Bao Dai had expressed approval of my oral observations to Huu regarding over-concentration of key portfolios in his hands and that there had been some intimation that further and more detailed representations from Leg along this line wld be helpful and agreeable to Bao Dai. Gautier said he thought for time being my previous remarks to Huu were all that was required; that the next step shld be taken by Bao Dai himself without Fr or Amer help. Bao Dai shld call in Huu and summon him to institute the necessary reforms which were indeed urgent. He remarked that Bao Dai naturally preferred to avoid directly taking Huu to task but that it was his duty as chief of state and not to be delegated to outsiders. There wld be no objection to Bao Dai’s mentioning the Fr and Amer concurrence as to the necessity of certain reform measures.
Leg will comment in near future with respect to Bao Dai’s paper and means of possible approach to Fr and Vietnamese.
Sent Dept 1129, Paris unnumbered, Bangkok unnumbered.