751G.5–MSP/12–951: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
1156. Re Singapore tels 618 and 621, Nov 30.1
1. As Dept aware, I have for some time been concerned re inadequacies Huu Govt and I welcome Griffin corroborations. I am also pleased register my concurrence with his finding that present STEM programs fundamentally sound in this trying situation.
2. I am not sure, however, when Griffin speaks of govt with grass roots he means Cabinet nominated by present methods but including agrarian and popular leaders or whether he has in mind govt clothed with some popular mandate based on development forms of popular consultation. As to former, I doubt that much can be done at this time outside possible Catholic participation and acceptance of post by Tri, even this wld be limited advance since Catholics are minority sometimes suspected of too much western orientation and Tri, in entering govt, wld have to swallow disgrace and suppression his Dai Viet backers, who altho in sense “grass roots” have Asiatic fascistic, exotic, secret society aspects.
3. Fact is that no leaders with “grass roots” support presently known who wld join govt constituted on basis existing Franco-Viet relations and if there were such persons, doubtful if Fr wld accept them or that they wld be proof against Asiatic neutralism or Viet Minh infiltration. Fr know this which accounts for their quandary about replacement for Huu.
4. If by new govt Griffin means Cabinet emerging from some kind of popular suffrage, this difficult so long as polit life circumscribed by polit emergency. Time may be approaching for emergence parliamentary forms but it wld have been premature to force this development before beginning Natl Army, before armature govt machinery created at Pau, and before Fr adequately conditioned to idea they fighting in IC for something more than Fr supremacy. Process cannot be accelerated at cost threatening line of communications or weakening efficacy Fr forces. For example of process by which polit institutions may now be developed, I may cite interrelation of pacification, census, mobilization and elections: In pacified areas new census brings govt and people together in non-controversial relationship; helps accustom masses to central govt hegemony; prepares mind for mobilization; conscription (in very limited form) further develops relationship; its admin establishes which are as amenable to govt auth, develops local [Page 559] govt machinery, helps provide security within which elections can eventually take place.
5. I believe it at least incomplete to imply that Fr appreciate predicament of govt as crisis of popular support which they never expected. Their criticisms govt have been directed almost exclusively to Huu, his misuse funds, concentration of Ministries, and alleged intriguing in France against De Lattre and Mar 8 framework.
6. Huu Govt has some solid accomplishments to its credit in addition to deficiencies accurately observed by Griffin. It has created beginnings Viet public admin, has improved security and public order, has survived first mobilization in country’s history, and has made various plans for econ and social reforms. With respect to land reform, reftels do not credit efforts already made by Huu Govt (see Legdesps 691 and 128 June 7 and Aug 31, 1951).2 Govt decrees now fol policy of letting displaced persons and squatters remain on liberated land, holds out hope of compensation landlords. Problem here not land redistribution so much as agrarian credit for acquisition land, financing crop, shaking off usurer. Govt has plans which like all else here depend on increasing revenues. US econ aid might help rebuild farm credit institutions.
7. I entirely agree our aid entitles us to special role in IC and govt performance can be improved by our representations to Viets and Fr. We can ask or require Viets to produce budget, increase govt revenues, curb graft, fol through on land reform, and display more energy. Our approach can be coordinated with Fr on all these matters. We may also wish ask Fr for measures to curb IC disinvestment, to admit Viets to greater measure ownership their crops, to increase area polit liberties, and to accelerate native command staffing natl armies. Entire process must be worked out among three of us with patience and forbearance.
8. Re De Lattre’s alleged anti-Americanism, Dept and Leg aware Gen’s irascibilities which spring perhaps in part from his immense concern for Amer opinion and support. Infinite tolerance required and justified in view of contributions De Lattre has made and can still make. Leg has not and will not refrain from demanding proper treatment for Amers and recognition our position in IC. His trip to Washington has resulted in De Lattre’s better understanding our programs and intentions. I believe we now have measure Gen’s fears and misapprehensions and that we need not be too worried about them.
Sent Dept 1156, rptd info Bangkok for Griffin 46, Paris unn.