694.001/2–251
Memorandum Concerning a Conversation Between the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) and the Chief of the British Liaison Mission in Tokyo (Gascoigne)1
Remarks of Sir Alvary Gascoigne at Meeting With Ambassador Dulles February 2, 1951 at 11:00 A.M.
The following are United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff’s comments on proposals made by Ambassador Dulles for Pacific defense.
First of all, dealing with the peace treaty:
United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their preference for having defense pact separate from peace treaty. They consider that the United States proposal to include security provisions in the peace treaty would be likely to give the impression that such provisions have been imposed and this might imply that any subsequent defense pact had not been freely entered into. Chiefs of Staff welcome the intention to include a supplementary bi-lateral agreement between the United States and Japan, but they consider that this agreement should be the appropriate instrument for providing for all main aspects of Japanese security and rearmament and that it should not be restricted to matters of detail.
I now pass to the Pacific Defense Proposal for Pacific Defense Council.
Mr. Ambassador, have you any comments to make to me at this time?
Mr. Dulles: I think you will find in the memorandum I just gave you2 … [reading]3 “agree on bi-lateral U.S. Pact, etc.” But that we have in mind that the peace treaty should affirm the possession by Japan of what the United Nations Charter refers to as the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense and contain an authorization to Japan to exercise that right in the form of regional or collective pacts with one or more of the signatories purely for defense purposes. But that it would not, in itself, specify any terms of such a pact or even parties to such a pact, leaving that entirely for Japan in the exercise of its inherent right of collective self-defense. I think that meets the point of view which was expressed by you at the earlier meeting we had,4 and the informal views that your Government expressed, [Page 843] and which are now in substance reaffirmed as being the continuing views of your Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Alvary: Therefore really you agree that there should not be any mention in the treaty itself?
Mr. Dulles: That’s right.
Sir Alvary: Thank you very much.
Mr. Dulles: We agree in deference to the views which your Government expresses. Our point of view in this had been to include the substance of provisions for United States stationing of troops in Japan in the main treaty, but as I say, in deference to the views which your Government has expressed, we are reconsidering that matter and are now disposed. …5 It seems to us that it may be feasible to handle it along the lines your Government suggests.
Sir Alvary: Thank you very much.
[Here follows a portion of the conversation which is discussed in telegram 1492 from Tokyo, February 2, page 143.]
- The source text contains no indication of authorship.↩
- Reference uncertain.↩
- Ellipsis and brackets in the source text.↩
- According to what is apparently a transcript of the conversation held between Sir Alvary and Mr. Dulles January 29, the former had stated in part: “the Secretary of State [for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin] thinks that all defense provisions should be embodied in a defense pact negotiated separately from the peace treaty. He agrees that the peace treaty itself should neither, prohibit nor permit Japan’s rearmament.” (320.1 Peace Treaty) Another part of this transcript is quoted in the editorial note, p. 825.↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩