Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty

Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] March 19, 1951.

Subject: Meeting with Far East Sub-Committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty

Ambassador Dulles, accompanied by Mr. McFall,¹ Col. Babcock and Mr. Fearey, met with the Far East Sub-Committee on the morning of March 19 to go over with it the latest draft² of a Japanese peace treaty prior to the anticipated circulation of the draft to the 12 other Far Eastern Commission nations and Indonesia, Korea and Ceylon. The senators present—Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Sub-Committee,³ and Senators Alexander Smith and Hickenlooper⁴—appeared to appreciate the opportunity afforded to to go over the draft with Ambassador Dulles and to ask questions and offer suggestions regarding it.

Ambassador Dulles first handed the Senators copies of the United States–Japan bilateral security agreement⁵ drawn up by the Presidential Peace Mission and the Japanese Government. He explained that the draft was tentative and subject to change but that he wanted the Sub-Committee to have copies for its information. Mr. Dulles then went through the treaty article by article explaining the reasoning behind the various provisions. The principal points raised by the Senators and Mr. Dulles’ replies thereto were as follows:

Formosa

Senator Smith noted that Article 3 left the disposition of Formosa undetermined. Ambassador Dulles said that provision for the disposition of Formosa by decision of the General Assembly if the Far Eastern Big Four failed to reach agreement had been made in the United States seven-point statement of principles but that this idea had since been abandoned. He recalled that the United States had secured the postponement of the question of Formosa during the General Assembly because there appeared to be a real possibility that the Assembly would recommend turning the island over to the Chinese Communists. This still seemed a likely possibility if the Assembly were given jurisdiction over the problem and it had accordingly been thought advisable to leave the status of Formosa undecided.

United Nations Jurisdiction

Senator Hickenlooper inquired whether the United Nations would have any jurisdiction over the treaty, and whether there was any way in which the United Nations or a member thereof could take us to task for anything we might include in the treaty. Ambassador Dulles referred to Article 107 of the Charter, and said that were the Assembly to consider that any provision of the treaty might tend to impair peace and security it would be empowered to discuss it, but that otherwise the United Nations would have no jurisdiction over the treaty. The United Nations would come in only if the treaty brought it in, as in the case of the former Italian colonies under the Italian Treaty.

Ryukyus

In response to questions regarding the Article on the Ryukyus Ambassaor Dulles said that it was thought that the treaty should give the United States the right to apply for a trusteeship if it desired. What we should ultimately do with the Ryukyus, he suggested, should be made the subject of a special inquiry, probably including sending someone out there. The United States should not commit itself in the treaty but should simply obtain an option to seek a trusteeship if it desired. Senator Smith noted that the draft would permit the United States to retain control of the Ryukyus indefinitely if a trusteeship were not secured, and inquired whether this would not lay us open to charges of imperialism. Ambassador Dulles suggested that the provision be allowed to stand until the attitude of other countries could be ascertained. Senator Sparkman said that the least we could do would be to let Japan retain the Ryukyus, with the United States receiving the same military rights there that it will in Japan proper.

South Sakhalin and the Kuriles

Senator Smith inquired whether any concessions we might hope to get from the Soviets justified our giving them title to South Sakhalin and the Kuriles in the treaty. Ambassador Dulles pointed out that Article 19 would deny the USSR any benefits under this provision if it were not a party to the treaty.⁶ He said that the Defense Department wanted the Soviets to make peace with Japan and thereby terminate their belligerent rights. It had therefore been thought worthwhile to hang out a certain amount of bait, though it did not amount to much in view of the fact that the Soviets now occupy South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The issue of exactly what constitutes the Kuriles was a further detracting factor. Senator Sparkman inquired exactly what the Soviets’ belligerent rights would be if the USSR were not a party to the treaty. Ambassador Dulles’ replied that technically speaking the Soviets could not under existing agreements place forces in Japan except under the direction of a United States commander, which would of course be unacceptable to them. When Senator Sparkman asked whether this fact was likely to influence the Soviets Ambassador Dulles replied that it was only a technical barrier. The USSR could of course provoke a war at any time if it wished.

Bilateral Treaties

Senator Smith noted that the provision regarding prewar bilateral treaties with Japan did not specifically stipulate that the treaties which the Allies indicated they wished to have remain in force should be kept in force by Japan. It also did not specifically provide that treaties not so notified by the Allies were to be regarded as abrogated. It was agreed that the provision should be amended to take account of these points.

Chinese Participation

Senator Hickenlooper asked how it was proposed to handle the question of Chinese participation. Mr. Dulles said that this was a big problem to which no final answer had been reached. In answer to a question by Senator Sparkman, Ambassador Dulles confirmed that the draft would be circulated only to the Chinese National Government and not to Peking.

War Crimes Sentences

At the Senators’ suggestion it was agreed that the provision regarding the fulfillment of war crimes sentences should be revised to make it clear that the power to grant clemency should not be exercised except jointly by Japan and the Government or Governments (or in the case of the major criminals, a majority of the Governments) which imposed the sentence in each instance.

GARIOA Claim

Senator Smith inquired where in the draft the priority of our GARIOA claim was preserved. Ambassador Dulles replied that this was automatic with the renunciation of further reparations. Certain other governments would probably be unwilling to accept our position on this question, but it was to be noted that Britain and France had accepted the priority of relief and economic assistance claims against Germany. Ambassador Dulles said that he did not have the remotest idea whether we would ever collect the GARIOA claim but it served as a good buffer against any claims the Soviets might submit if they did not sign the treaty. He said that while the United States might not get away with the proposed treaty provisions on this point it seemed worthwhile to try.

Adherence

Ambassador Dulles raised the question of whether it might not be advisable to set a time limit after which states at war with Japan which had not signed the treaty would no longer be able to adhere to it. He pointed out that if there were no such limit a nation could defer its adherence almost indefinitely. He said that he was inclined to favor a limit which would put a certain amount of pressure on the various nations to sign the treaty without prolonged delay, even though they would still be able to conclude a treaty as favorable, but no more favorable, after the limit had expired. It was decided that the draft should be amended to limit the right of adherence to three years.

Inspection

Senator Hickenlooper raised the question of whether the treaty should not accord the Allies the right to inspect Japanese industrial activity if need arose after the treaty. If there were no such provision and word were received 10 or 15 years hence that the Japanese were producing, for example, large naval vessels the Allies would be unable to investigate the matter. Ambassador Dulles replied that the underlying theory of the treaty was to avoid imposing on Japan conditions not accepted by other sovereign nations. The effective way to ensure against secret activities of the type described was not to write prohibitions or inspection provisions into the treaty but to develop cooperative relations with Japan which would ensure that we would automatically know about any such ulterior moves. United States forces remaining in Japan in intimate contact with the Japanese would seem an adequate safeguard. Ambassador Dulles said that he was absolutely convinced that treaty restrictions would not work and that this conviction was basic to his whole approach to the treaty.

Senator Hickenlooper said that while it appeared to him that Ambassador Dulles was following the right line, this was the first time that he had seen the treaty draft and he wished it understood that his position in the matter was reserved. Ambassador Dulles said that this was fully understood and that his purpose had been simply to acquaint the Senators with the draft and to obtain their suggestions. He emphasized that the text was only suggestive and that he was not seeking approval of any sort at this stage.

1. Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
2. Presumably the draft of March 16, not printed.
3. John J. Sparkman of Alabama.
4. H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa.
5. Draft of February 9. See Annex II to the letter of February 10 from Mr. Dulles to the Secretary, p. 875.
6. Article 19 in the draft of March 16 is identical to Article 19 in the draft of March 23, p. 944.