Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/3–2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Marvin)¹

secret

[London,] March 21, 1951.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants:	John M. Allison, Deputy to Ambassador Dulles
	Arthur R. Ringwalt, First Secretary of Embassy
	David K. Marvin, Second Secretary of Embassy
	Robert H. Scott, Undersecretary, Foreign Office
	Charles Johnston, Head, Japan and Pacific Department, Foreign Office
	Peter Scott, Japan and Pacific Department, Foreign Office

Mr. Allison arrived in London on March 20th and met with Mr. Robert Scott and the others named above at the Foreign Office at noon March 21st to discuss the matter of a Japanese Peace Treaty.²

Mr. Robert Scott opened the conversation, observing that the negotiations on the proposed treaty were progressing fairly satisfactorily. There appeared to him to be no great difficulty between the United Kingdom and the United States over substantive points, but some disagreement did exist regarding questions of procedure. The group then proceeded to discuss the various substantive points which seem to be at issue between the two countries.

With regard to the question of including a war guilt clause in the treaty, Mr. Scott pointed out that the Foreign Office was bound by a Cabinet ruling on the matter. The Foreign Office itself did not feel strongly on the question, but of course had to follow the Cabinet decision until it changed its position. Mr. Allison remarked that the question was not an urgent one. The Cabinet’s position in favor of a war guilt clause could be reconsidered at the time the draft treaty proposed by the United States was examined by the United Kingdom Government. Mr. Scott agreed with this.

The question of ship-building capacity was discussed at some length. Mr. Allison reviewed the American position, pointing out that a punitive policy of destruction of such facilities would give rise to resentment of the treaty by the Japanese, and that from the practical point of view destruction of this capacity was not especially necessary. It might be needed later because of the worldwide shipping shortage, and meanwhile, the raw materials shortage would limit its use. It had been suggested that an objective study be made of other uses to which excess capacity might be put. We were willing to make such a study but had no ideas as to other uses which might be made of it. We thought that the Japanese might readily agree to the idea. Mr. Allison noted that both governments agreed that from the security point of view destruction was not necessary.

Mr. Robert Scott said the Japanese shipbuilding question had domestic political significance for the United Kingdom, as well as long-range security aspects. The present capacity had been built for war purposes, and after some years might again be so used. The innate characteristics of the Japanese had not changed since the war, and a restrictive clause of this nature in the treaty might be valuable in preventing a future buildup of naval power, which to Japan had been more essential than army or air force as an instrument of aggression. However, Mr. Scott said he agreed basically with the point of view expressed by Mr. Allison, that treaty restrictions might harm our interests by giving an opening for Japanese demagogues. Mr. Allison and Mr. Scott agreed that for the moment the two governments must agree to disagree on this question.

On the matter of Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries, Mr. Peter Scott remarked that, although the amount Was negligible, as Mr. Allison said, the question was hot politically, especially as regards the money remitted through the Swiss to prisoners of war in Japan, and never received. Mr. Allison suggested that some sort of arrangement could be made on the side to get such funds back, but Mr. Peter Scott pointed out that in many places, such as Sweden and Switzerland, assets were under four power control, which meant that Soviet agreement must be obtained. Mr. Robert Scott suggested that the Japanese might renounce such assets in the treaty, which would leave their disposition to later action by the United Kingdom and the United States in such places as they had sole control. This would of course not solve the problem where the Chinese or the Soviet Union were involved. Mr. Allison thought there was a possibility that the United States might be able to accept this suggestion.

Mr. Peter Scott said, with regard to Western Germany, that the not very large amount of Japanese assets there could be touched immediately if some method of disposition were decided upon.

In so far as Japanese Government property abroad was concerned, Mr. Peter Scott responded to Mr. Allison’s statement that the United States was thinking in terms of a treaty provision similar to that in the Italian treaty by remarking that the Germans, whose property had already been sold, would not be particularly happy if the Japanese were allowed to have theirs back. He thought it would be necessary to take into consideration the German precedent.

On the problem of the gold stocks in Tokyo, Mr. Allison and Mr. Robert Scott again concluded that they must agree to disagree. Countering the argument that distribution of these stocks as reparations could not be considered by the United States Government for domestic political reasons, Mr. Scott noted the British had a similar problem, in that there was pressure to obtain service on pre-war Japanese loans, and reparations or war compensation payments. He expected that the British Government would be attacked at home on the ground that the Japanese treaty was too liberal. Referring to the pre-war debt, Mr. Allison said he understood Mr. Dulles thought a clause in the treaty specifying that it did not wipe out pre-war obligations was perhaps necessary. The Japanese themselves, he remarked, seemed to want to honor their pre-war obligations.

No conclusion was reached on the matter of compensation for Allied property in Japan. Mr. Allison noted that the United States was studying the matter of a clause in the treaty providing for such payment. At various times there had been considered proposals that compensation to a certain percentage of total loss, or up to a certain amount, with pro rata compensation for claims over that amount, should be given. Another proposal was that the Japanese should be required to restore such property as still existed and compensate for non-recoverable property, through domestic legislation. This last alternative was now under consideration in Washington. The problem for us was that compensation for losses in Japan would place the United States in an invidious moral position, in so far as nations claiming reparations were concerned. If compensation were made, we would be in the position of getting something ourselves, while opposing reparations to nations which suffered war losses due to the Japanese. Mr. Robert Scott remarked that the British position was that property should either be restored or that one hundred percent compensation in yen should be paid.

Procedural Points

Mr. Robert Scott advised strongly against publication of the United States-proposed draft treaty after it is given to members of the FEC and other nations. With so many countries involved some would not be able to digest it before publication, and there would be a reaction to publication which would make opposition more difficult. Lobbies would be given an opportunity to build up. It generally would make it look as if the United States were jumping the gun, and would serve as a focus for anti-American feeling. In answer to Mr. Allison’s argument that publication is advisable because of certain leakages, the possibility that the Soviets would repeat their performance of last autumn and publish the draft treaty for propaganda purposes, and the possibility of deliberate leakages, perhaps in the Philippines, to stimulate lobbies, Mr. Robert Scott pointed out that there would still be opportunity to try to correct leakages without publication. Mr. Allison noted that a feeling that the United States was jumping the gun would not be justified, since negotiations have continued since last September, and Mr. Scott agreed that this was a valid answer to that charge. Mr. Allison also remarked that the draft treaty would be accompanied by a memorandum explaining that these were the tentative views of the United States Government, and referring to previous consultations. This, he thought, would help in allaying fears about United States intentions and minimize resentments. Mr. Johnston brought up the Australian fears over security and the consequent effect of publication of the draft treaty on the Australian elections. Mr. Allison replied that he had explained our intentions to Mr. Spender, and had not yet received a reply. He expected the same reaction as from the British. In closing this part of the discussion, Mr. Allison promised to re-examine the question of publication.

The question of Soviet participation, both sides thought, might solve itself, since the Soviets probably would refuse to consider the present proposals. Mr. Robert Scott agreed with Mr. Allison’s suggestion that an accession clause in the treaty, with perhaps a three year limit, might be a good idea, as it would permit the Soviets to accept the treaty later if they wished. Mr. Scott brought up the matter of the 1942 United Nations agreement, binding signatories to conclude no separate peace. He agreed with Mr. Allison’s reply that a reasonable construction of that provision was that it really referred to an armistice, and was not intended to bind for eternity. Mr. Scott also agreed with Mr. Allison that what was really necessary was to decide what was right, and do it, since the Soviets would take whatever action pleased them, regardless of their their international obligations. The USSR should not find anything to object to in the treaty, Mr. Allison remarked. They would, for instance, get the Kuriles, although there was a suspending clause in the draft treaty which affected non-signatories. Mr. Scott noted with some satisfaction that suspension of legal transfer of the Kuriles until Soviet acceptance of the treaty would leave the Kuriles an open point of friction between the USSR and Japan.

Mr. Allison stated that any reference to bi-lateral security arrangements had been taken out of the draft treaty, and a clause permitting Japan to make security arrangements with other powers, under the authority of Article Two of the United Nations Charter, had been inserted. Our bi-lateral treaty with the Japanese, concluded after the peace treaty was signed, would refer to this “enabling” clause. Mr. Robert Scott thought this a satisfactory answer to the Sino-Soviet treaty.

Both sides agreed that the question of Chinese participation was a difficult one. Mr. Robert Scott pointed out that bringing in only one of the two Chinese governments would pre-judge Japanese recognition. To include only the Nationalist government would incur Japanese resentment, since the Japanese would not like the prospect of being cut off from the Chinese mainland indefinitely. In addition, he said, the participation of the Nationalists might legally bring in the Sino-Soviet treaty. Of course, the USSR would come in anyway if it suited her purposes.

The Cabinet thought that the Peiping government was the one which should participate in the treaty, Mr. Scott said. However, because there was international disagreement over this question, it had been proposed that an accession clause should be included in the treaty, which would leave open the question of which China should participate. Under this proposal, neither Chinese government would sign, and, in effect, the question would be left to the Japanese to decide. However, the Cabinet had not agreed to this as yet. Mr. Allison replied that he had no opinion on this proposal, but remarked that it was realized in the United States that any attempt to bring the Nationalists in would encounter strong British opposition.

The next question was that of how, when and where the Allies would deal with the Japanese regarding a treaty. The British, Mr. Scott remarked, did not like the idea of some thirty or forty powers talking with the Japanese, since it gave the Japanese a chance to bargain. However, this would be all right once substantial agreement had been reached through diplomatic channels.

In response to Mr. Allison’s suggestion that there might be a “signing” conference in Tokyo, Mr. Scott stated that the British had no definite position on this question, but mentioned that the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Tokyo had recommended against holding any such function in Tokyo, on the ground that it would arouse Japanese resentment against the peace treaty. Mr. Allison did not think that there would be any bad reaction, and added that the United States Government had no firm views on the question of the site of a conference.

With regard to immediate steps, Mr. Allison said that the United States Government intended shortly to tender a draft treaty to member governments of the FEC, and to certain other governments. Mr. Scott approved distribution to “members” of the FEC, as opposed to the FEC itself, because this meant that the question of China as such did not enter in. However, he objected to the distribution of the draft treaty to Korea (one of the non-FEC states receiving copies of the draft), because Korea occupied a different legal position. Mr. Allison replied that it was his view that for political reasons it was better to do so. Mr. Scott also brought up the question of consulting other belligerents at this time, saying that they should be brought in now. To this, Mr. Allison answered that there had not been much thought about this, but that the United States might like to bring them in as suggested.

The question of the disposition of the Ryukyu islands was discussed by Mr. Allison. He stated that the United States of course did not want to annex the islands, and regarded a United Nations trusteeship as a headache. It was thought that some time sovereignty might be returned to the Japanese. Therefore the suggested phraseology in the treaty was “may” rather than “shall” hold a trusteeship. Mr. Scott cautioned against leaving points of friction with the Japanese, and secondly against trusting them too much.

Mr. Charles Johnston telephoned Mr. Allison later on March 21st, and gave him certain additional information about British views and intentions regarding the treaty. It appears that the Foreign Office is now preparing its own draft treaty, as an informal working document. It will probably be forwarded to the United States Government, the Commonwealth Governments, and to certain others, quite soon. The Foreign Office does not intend to publish its draft, but feels that it might be compelled to if the United States Government goes ahead with its plan to publish the draft it has prepared.

Mr. Johnston also mentioned to Mr. Allison the possibility that it might be worth while if Mr. Dulles could make a trip to London to discuss the treaty. He received the impression that Mr. Allison thought this suggestion should be considered. However, there was no commitment on either side.

1. This memorandum forms the enclosure to despatch No. 4586 from London, March 28, not printed.
2. In telegram 242 to Canberra, March 17, marked “From Dulles” and drafted by him, the Department stated: “Please inform [Mr. Percy] Spender, [Australian Minister for External Affairs and External Territories] Allison flying to London 19th returning 21st merely to acquaint AmEmbassy London with full facts regarding present status Japanese Peace Treaty and related subjects. We do not contemplate any London discussions with UK at this time.” (694.001/3–1751)