Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 55 D 598

Memorandum by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the Intelligence Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Peake)

top secret

[Washington,] April 2, 1951.

Subject: NIE–19

I have read with interest NIE–19,¹ and in general concur with its conclusions. However, there are a few matters which I believe should receive further attention. I should say that I have read Mr. Johnson’s memorandum on this paper and concur fully with it.²

In connection with the first point raised by Mr. Johnson, namely, degree to which present non-communist Governments in the Far East are “reconciled to the necessity of Japanese defensive rearmament”, I suggest that the paper might give some consideration to methods by which these non-communist Governments in the Far East could be made to give active support to any Japanese defensive rearmament. While it may be true that the Governments themselves are “reconciled”, that is certainly not true of large bodies of the peoples in those lands and the attitude of the Governments will necessarily be affected by their public opinion problem. In this connection, the paper might make some mention of the influence which public knoweldge of the willingness of the United States to enter into mutual security arrangements with the Pacific island powers might play.

While considerable attention is given in the paper to the necessity of the United States providing continued economic support for Japan in order to make possible a program for rearmament, there does not seem to be any adequate discussion of the effect of a full, or partial, pay-as-you-go plan for American forces retained in Japan after a treaty. Presumably the initial steps toward rearmament might, in some degree, and perhaps in large degree, be financed out of the foreign exchange received by Japan as the result of having U.S. troops on some sort of a pay-as-you-go basis.

I note that the paper contends that a Japanese army “theoretically” could be created within six months or a year after Japan had agreed to rearmament, equipment and supplies had become available, and a training program had begun. In this connection the statement is made that there still exists enough veteran officers at all command and staff levels for any size of army required. While this is true, we found in Japan and in discussions with the Japanese, that one of their chief fears about engaging in any form of rearmament was the necessity of bringing back into active service high-ranking Japanese officers, i.e. colonels and above, as it is this group which the present political leaders of Japan fear most as being potentially able to get government control away from civilians and back into their hands. It may well be, therefore, that there will be great reluctance on the part of the Japanese Government to make use of their trained officer reserve in the high ranks, and that this will be a limiting factor upon their ability to develop quickly an armed force. I do not claim to know whether or not this would be so, but I believe this problem should be mentioned and perhaps further study made of this aspect of the matter.

I was disturbed to see several places in the paper the phrase “United States decision to rearm Japan”. I do not think we can look upon this matter purely as a U.S. decision. In the final analysis, it will have to be a Japanese decision to rearm, which will receive the support of the United States. But I do not believe we should delude ourselves into thinking that we, alone, are making that decision.

1. The draft of NIE–19 discussed here and in the document partially summarized in the footnote 2 below has not been found in Department of State files. For the final version of April 20, see p. 993.

2. In his memorandum of March 31 to Mr. Peake, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson had said in part: “I question whether an attempt to seize Japan before re-armament could become effective would or could be carried out by the USSR except as part of a pattern of global war. … I suggest that the paper should examine the merits from a US and international political viewpoint of at least initially confining Japanese re-armament to ground forces, the US to furnish air and naval components of a defense force.”

   Mr. Johnson had also stated that he questioned whether Southeast Asia sources of iron ore were sufficient for Japanese needs, (Lot 55 D 598)