Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

The Papers of John Foster Dulles, Princeton University

Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)

[Washington,] April 12, 1951.

A little after 11 p. m. Tuesday, April 10th, Secretary Acheson phoned me at my house saying that he wanted to see me on an important matter. I told him that I had just gone to bed but that I would get dressed and come over to see him. I did so and met with him at his Georgetown residence at about 11:30. Secretary Acheson told me that the President had decided to relieve General MacArthur of all of his commands, that it had not been intended to announce this until the next day, but that the story had leaked, making it necessary to make an immediate announcement now set for 1 a. m. Wednesday, April 11th.

This information came as a complete shock and surprise to me. I had not been consulted in any manner nor had I received any intimation that this decision would be taken.

I expressed to Secretary Acheson my great regret and my feeling that even though the present strains and lack of confidence made the action inevitable in the interest of good government, I felt that the responsibility for bringing this situation to pass lay very largely with the Administration and particularly with the Joint Chiefs as they had not found a way to give General MacArthur or the public the impression that General MacArthur’s thinking was a factor in decisions. I was sure that General MacArthur himself doubted this, as he told me he generally received only terse instructions and he probably felt that the only way to make his thinking an element in policy making was through indirect channels. I said that where General MacArthur had been fully consulted, as in relation to the Japanese Peace Treaty, there was complete harmony and not the slightest evidence of disposition on General MacArthur’s part to make private utterances through correspondence or through newspaper correspondents.

I said that the abrupt dismissal of General MacArthur would undoubtedly have a very serious effect upon Japanese public opinion and upon the major objective which I had been seeking, namely the committal of the Japanese nation to the cause of the free world.

Secretary Acheson said that he realized this very serious aspect of the matter and that was why he had gotten in touch with me at this midnight hour, so that I would begin to think of how that phase of the matter could be dealt with. He himself thought it imperative, as did the President, that I should promptly go to Tokyo to confer with General Ridgway who was quite unfamiliar with the Japanese Peace Treaty problem and to confer with and reassure Japanese leaders of our intentions. He said that as regards the Japanese Peace Treaty and related matters the President was more than ever determined to proceed strongly and vigorously and he felt that from now on it would be more and more a matter of civilian direction and that we would have less difficulties with the Pentagon.

I told Secretary Acheson that I would want to think this over and also talk it over with some of the Republican leaders. Secretary Acheson said that he wished I would make up my mind first before talking as he was afraid I might be dissuaded. I said I felt I must first get other counsel and advise [advice], although in the last analysis I would make up my own mind in the light of what I conceived to be my particular duty in the matter.

I returned home a little after midnight.

On Wednesday morning, April 11th, on arriving at my office at the State Department, I promptly called Governor Dewey at Albany. I told him what the situation was and what my problem was. He expressed very strongly the view that I was the only person who could perhaps salvage the situation in Japan and that this was of such paramount importance that I should make the effort even though there might not be a very good chance of success. He suggested, however, that it might be better for me to wait a day or two to announce any decision so that, in the first wave of popular resentment against the President’s action, I would not seem to be too much identified with that action or to be trying to pull the President’s chestnuts out of the fire.

I thanked the Governor for this advice, saying that in the end I would have to be guided to some extent by the urgency of letting it be known in Japan that I was promptly coming there.

At 10 a. m. I met in Senator Smith’s office with him and Senator Wiley.¹ Senators Taft² and Millikin³ had expected to attend but had gone over to the House to a meeting called by Representative Martin. Senators Wiley and Smith themselves left shortly to attend this same meeting saying that one of the resolutions suggested for adoption was one calling upon Senator Cooper⁴ and me to resign from any association with the Administration.

I pointed out that my present relationship to the Administration was not of a general character but related to the negotiation of a Japanese Peace Treaty and related Pacific matters; that I felt that the situation created by the MacArthur action was very precarious; that I was perhaps the only person who had sufficient prestige in Japan to hold the situation in line and the question was whether or not it was my duty to try to do so. Both Senators Wiley and Smith indicated that they felt I should follow what I felt to be my duty in the matter.

From 11 a. m. to 1 p. m. I was in conference at the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Bradley, General Collins, Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg) and their advisers, in relation to the Japanese Peace Treaty and related security pacts.

At 2 p. m. I met at Senator Alex Smith’s office with Senators Taft, Millikin and Smith. I reported, in answer to questions put by the Senators, my own lack of knowledge or consultation until the decision had been made and communicated to me at midnight the night before. I expressed my views as to the incapacity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work with a high-strung person of great moral stature and sense of the dramatic such as General MacArthur was and I felt this was the root of the trouble. We discussed the vital position which Japan could play in the Pacific and the danger if it fell under hostile communist control, since it would mean that the communist power would no longer be land-bound but would be coupled with a great sea-faring power which would carry danger to all the Pacific islands and close to our western shores. We discussed the risk that relations with Japan might deteriorate and Japan elect to attempt to play the role of “neutral” which would mean a vacuum into which Soviet Communism would almost surely move.

In further answer to questions, I stated that I thought there was a chance that my own personal position in Japan, gained as a result of my two recent trips, and my position in relation to the Peace Treaty, was such that I could give some reassurance to the Japanese that the withdrawal of General MacArthur would not mean a weakening in the determination of the United States to stand strong against communism in Asia and to hold the off-shore island chain.

Senator Taft asked whether I was there merely to inform them or whether I was seeking advice. I said that primarily I was reporting to them what the situation was and what my problem was, but that I always welcomed advice from responsible persons.

Senator Millikin then said that he saw that the situation permitted me to make a dramatic move which would be greatly to the advantage of the Republican Party. He felt that it was an outrage that, in view of the importance of the Japanese situation and my responsibility in regard to it, action gravely jeopardizing the desired result had been taken without any prior consultation with me. He said, however, that what had happened had happened and the problem now was what to do about it and that in this connection he felt that partisan consideration must be ignored and that the stakes were so vital that only the welfare of the nation should be considered. He felt that this welfare required that I should make at least the best effort I could to retrieve the situation in Japan, provided, however, I was assured in the most positive terms that it was in fact the determination of the United States not to adopt a policy of appeasement in Asia but to proceed vigorously with the Japanese Peace Treaty along the lines concurred in which [with?] General MacArthur and to attempt to hold Japan and the other Pacific island countries against the spread of communism. I must not, he said, in this respect become a “fall guy”.

Senator Taft then said, “I agree” and Senator Smith also expressed his concurrence.

I thanked them for their advice and for the broad, patriotic nature of their standpoint. I said that I had been deferring response to a request from the President to see him until after I had their advice; that I would now go to see the President and, if I obtained from him positive assurances as to our general policy in Japan, and the Pacific, I would indicate my willingness to go to Japan for the purposes indicated.

At 4:30 p. m. April 11th I met with President Truman and Secretary Acheson at the White House. The President urged me very strongly to go at once to Tokyo to reassure the Japanese leaders as to our intentions regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty and to confer with General Ridgway in this respect.

I told the President that Secretary Acheson had led me to anticipate this request and that I had accordingly conferred with several Republican leaders and, while they all deeply deplored the action taken with reference to General MacArthur and felt that it greatly jeopardized our position in Japan and the Far East generally, nevertheless their disposition was to feel that the Japanese position was so critical and vital from the standpoint of the United States and the free world that if there were any chance that I could help salvage something out of the situation, I Should be prepared to do so. It was, however, their feeling, which I fully shared, that I should not lend myself to this mission unless I was satisfied that it was in fact the determination of the Administration to proceed with the Japanese Peace and related matters vigorously and strongly along the lines already shaped in consultation with General MacArthur, and that it was not our intention to appease the communist aggressors or to abandon the Asiatic off-shore island chain. I said to the President that I would not, if I could help it, be a “fall guy” in this matter.

The President asserted in the most emphatic way that there was absolutely no intention to alter our policy toward appeasement and that so far as related to the Japanese Peace Treaty and the related matters of defense of the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, etc., he was prepared to back me up one hundred percent. He was most emphatic in both words and manner. Secretary Acheson strongly concurred.

After some further elaboration I said that under the circumstances I would be prepared promptly to go to Tokyo; that I had no confidence that it would be possible to repair the damage that had been done, but I would do the best I could as a matter of patriotic duty.

The President and Secretary Acheson expressed most warmly their appreciation of my willingness to go and praised the patriotic attitude of my Republican friends whose views, I made clear, weighed very strongly with me.

Thereupon, I produced a brief draft of a statement that might be issued from the White House. A few minor changes were interlined by the President and by the Secretary of State and it was given to Mr. Short⁵ for immediate issuance. A copy is attached.⁶

At about 5 p. m. Wednesday, April 11th, I telephoned Governor Dewey for the second time, reporting to him my talk with Senators Taft, Millikin, and Wiley and Smith and my White House talk. I said that in view of the concurring advice received from the Senators and in view of the critical state of affairs in Japan, I had authorized an immediate release of the statement that I was going to Japan. The Governor said that, while he thought from my personal standpoint it would have been better to have waited 24 hours, he agreed that the decision was probably wise.

John Foster Dulles

1. Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin.
2. Robert A. Taft of Ohio.
3. Eugene Millikin of Colorado.
4. Former Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, then a consultant to the Secretary of State.
5. Joseph Short, a secretary to the President.

6. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 23, 1951, p. 654.

   The text of Ambassador Dulles’ statement, issued upon his departure for Tokyo, April 13, is printed ibid.