357.AB/3–851: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
priority
1245. Re Kashmir. At Muniz’s1 (Brazil) request a talk was arranged in his office this morning to discuss amended draft he has tentatively drawn up as consequence of conversations he had yesterday with Rau and Zafrullah. (See immediately following telegram for text).2 Meyers (UNP), Collins (SOA) and Maffitt3 (USUN) accompanied me. Muniz had Ouro-Preto4 and Araujo Castro5 with him.
Muniz said Rau had sought him out in delegates’ lounge yesterday and had indicated India’s preoccupation over its partition problems [Page 1745] and its desire to get Kashmir question off its mind. Muniz said Rau had appeared worried, had given impression that GOI was feeling weight of adverse opinion on its Kashmir stand and was also feeling weight of Pakistani military strength along cease-fire line. Rau had almost seemed “as if he were putting himself in my hands”, Muniz said. In view of Rau’s demeanor, Muniz rather thought that time might be propitious for action at long last to resolve Kashmir problem.
Rau’s main point with Muniz had been that if India and Pakistan were left alone to settle dispute, India felt sure agreement would be reached. During his conversation with Rau, Muniz said he had brought up point of constituent assembly. Rau had reacted against any mention being made of it in resolution, as offensive to India. His remarks at table March 1st had been sufficient assurance on that score. Muniz then had idea of proposing to Rau that if certain features unacceptable to India were struck from resolution, Nehru might make statement to effect India would negotiate with another UNRep. Rau had not rejected this. Question of whether arbitration would be left in resolution had not been mentioned.
Muniz said that after council meeting Zafrullah had sought him out to discuss Kashmir and had appeared receptive to his general ideas for amending resolution, which were developing from Rau talk. Muniz told Zafrullah Rau had shown anxiety over situation created by dispute, with India “bleeding” from partition and emotions running high. Muniz felt Rau had a point there.
Muniz seemed to us very interested in possibility of his getting something done with this new lead and was optimistic over prospects. While encouraging him and commending his statesmanship in taking this initiative, we sought to point out some of gopher holes ahead of him. Commenting on his tentative draft, I said two main points seem to emerge in connection with it: Constituent assembly and arbitration. I said that Pakistanis had asked SC take action to prevent establishment of constituent assembly and that to date Rau’s assurances that assembly would not deal with accession were not clear. Much depended, of course, on what Rau would say Friday on this score, but in any case something had to go into record through resolution showing council’s feelings on subject. As for arbitration, this was one of principal points in resolution that constituted an advance over previous three years negotiations and should remain, as Brazilian draft contemplated. We pointed out year and half ago when India rejected President Truman’s and Prime Minister Attlee’s arbitration suggestion, it had said that disarming and disbanding of Azad forces was matter not for arbitration but had to be settled as prior condition and that India, while subscribing to principle of arbitration which was in charter, could not agree to step without knowing in advance what points would be arbitrated. In this connection, we said India’s [Page 1746] position on Azads was based on their thesis that accession had been completed and Kashmir was part of India. We said US does not subscribe to this, but feels that accession to either party will not be completed until fair and impartial plebiscite carried out. We cautioned that Muniz bear this in mind when talking again to Rau on subject.
We also said that statement from Nehru simply that GOI would negotiate with UNRep would not be sufficient for Pakistanis, since it would permit Indians to adopt same position on arbitration as it had in 1949. We felt that another exercise of mediation without this further step provided for would be little more than a fourth round of activity which had three times failed.
As an indication of what the Brazilians were thinking, Ouro-Preto, in an aside, said that it was “as plain as nose on your face” that India knew plebiscite would give state to Pakistan and therefore had sabotaged all efforts to implement over-all commitment.
In summing up I added that members of SC should keep in close touch and try to work out constructive proposal, but that it would seem unwise to get into negotiations here with parties. This should be task of UNRep on the spot.
I further said that question of Communism entered into the matter, since Russians had indicated they were thinking of independence as solution and since Yugoslavs who were friendly to India had their own interest in matter and were thinking of making some suggestions for SC mediation in NY. I said UK had strong Commonwealth interest in case and was taking lead in present round. We were naturally endeavoring to assist them and Commonwealth and were keeping in mind that this could to some degree become Commonwealth-Communist issue.
Muniz indicated he would be talking further with two parties and would keep us informed of results.
- João Carlos Muniz, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.↩
- Telegram 1246 from New York, March 8, not printed. Details of discussions on amendments to the U.S.-U.K. draft resolution are in file 357.AB.↩
- Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.↩
- C. S. de Ouro-Preto, Adviser, Brazilian Delegation to the United Nations.↩
- J. A. de Araujo Castro, Adviser, Brazilian Delegation to the United Nations.↩