357.AB/3–1251: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
1264. Re Kashmir. Zafrullah and Mohamed Ali called this morning at former’s request to discuss substance and procedure of SC action now that both parties have been heard from. Their main points were the constituent assembly called for by the Kashmir national conference, and the problem of implementing the details of UNCIP resolutions.
Re constituent assembly, Zafrullah said he hoped SC would make clear that assembly should not be called. He feared that GOI would claim afterward that it was freely elected, UN not having objected to its creation, and that therefore nothing further regarding a plebiscite was necessary to enable people to express will regarding accession. I remarked that undesirability of such development was quite obvious. Mohamed Ali thought constituent assembly would, if necessary, later claim right to pass on accession. I said this point could be [Page 1748] taken up in re-framing of resolution, which action we believe will be necessary. The thing was to determine whether this point was among items of “irreducible minimum” beyond which present draft resolution could not be cut. I pointed out, however, that I had had no time to talk with Jebb and I expressed hope Zafrullah would understand. I could say nothing further at this time regarding possible future action on this point.
Zafrullah’s principal argument with regard to implementation problems was that the points in disagreement were political, or technical, not legal. GOP therefore felt that outstanding figure as UN representative would furnish more effective pressure in interpreting how resolutions should be carried out than would judicial person or tribunal. Mohamed Ali said that if questions were of legal character ICJ would carry much greater weight, but since they were of political nature, pronouncement of eminent figure such as Nimitz would have more weight than court or other legal body. I pointed out that Nimitz is not available for UN representative job and further that interpretation of contract is traditionally left to courts. Nimitz being unavailable, I said there might be difficulty in getting man with all qualifications required and it might be better to have tribunal as second string if US representative failed.
Zafrullah said that remedy is needed for what has become “clear GOI pattern of obstruction” of details of implementation and that US representative must have arbitration or interpretation powers, otherwise he would be back in June or July with no result, as in the past UNCIP Dixon returned to report failure. If this happened Zafrullah said, he did not know what else GOP could say to its people to justify lack of solution of Kashmir problem.
Emphasizing that I was merely discussing and not advocating any view at this time, I asked whether there was any advantage in treating UN representative as SC executive and reserving judicial role to some sort of tribunal. Wouldn’t ICJ under the circumstance have more authority than UN representative under Pakistan’s suggestion? Zafrullah admitted that in some cases perhaps this would be true, but returned to argument that questions over Kashmir being political, UN representative would be in better position to make interpretation. Furthermore, since Indian agreement was called for in resolutions, progress would be stymied at once, whereas if UN representative might interpret points at issue we would at least get to show-down without delay necessitated by his going through exercise of seeking agreement. Mohamed Ali added that while this process would delay UN action, matters would nonetheless be marching (Kashmir constituent assembly, Pakistan restiveness, et cetera) and anyway final court decision might be so lengthy and intricate as to confuse clear issue of Indian obstructionism.
[Page 1749]I inquired whether Pakistanis agreed to deletion of details, which I did not specify, up to irreducible minimum. Mohamed Ali replied in affirmative.
Zafrullah then asked what our over-all timetable or procedure was. We replied UK and we are not thinking of negotiations with parties or rapporteur, but rather of proceeding with resolution, suitably amended. We thought that if we agreed with British today or tomorrow on amendments, we could seek usual member’s support thereafter and possibly present amendments Thursday.1 However, since other members seem to have ideas, we did not know whether such tentative deadline could be made or who might be putting in amendments. We were only speaking for ourselves and for what we knew of British position. Zafrullah indicated satisfaction with this and counselled care in proceeding to presentation of amendments. If more time was needed in order to work out greater support and best resolution, Pakistanis would not mind few more days delay after so many years.
- March 15.↩