690D.91/4–351
Memorandum by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs1
Subject: Kashmir: Future Policy
1. Sir B. N. Rau’s recent statements in the Security Council during discussions on the resolution adopted by the Council March 30, coupled with statements by Prime Minister Nehru, indicate quite clearly that India’s minimum goal in Kashmir is to make the present cease-fire line a political boundary. It may be surmised that the GOI’s median policy is to keep alive the Kashmir issue, as a means of weakening the position of the Government of Pakistan and threatening Pakistan’s security; that India’s maximum objective might be to use the Kashmir issue, among other disputes, as an excuse for an attempt to bring Pakistan territory within a Greater India. If this analysis is correct, the United Nations Representative, to be appointed by the March 30 Resolution, will be unsuccessful in accomplishing his task of effecting demilitarization or, at least, securing the parties’ agreement to a demilitarization program within three months from the time he arrives on the subcontinent. The problem, then, is what should be our action after the UN Representative reports the failure of his mission.
2. The UK Delegation believes that the Security Council, at this stage, should develop a detailed statement of the exact way in which the Council believes demilitarization and a plebiscite should be carried out. The device which might be employed to work out this detailed statement was not suggested. Following adoption of the statement, the Council would cease suggesting other solutions or methods for arriving at a solution, on the basis that a detailed declaration of such Security Council ideas would provide maximum pressure on the Government of India to take a more temperate line and explore reasonable solutions. (See my conversation with Robert Fowler, US/S/1706, 20 March 1951).2
3. To my mind, implicit in this British suggestion is the possibility that the UK will be able, following such detailed statement, to turn to Pakistan and say that the UK has carried out its maximum responsibility as Senior Commonwealth Member to provide aid and guidance in attempts at settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The UK will also be able to give up its role of initiator in attempting to find [Page 1763] solutions for the Kashmir dispute in the United Nations. The dispute will continue; relations between India and Pakistan will worsen; and the United States will then be faced with the problem of deciding whether to adopt a different policy than the present one, including as a possibility the assumption of initiative hitherto exercised, however reluctantly, by the United Kingdom.
4. From the viewpoint of our national interest, as opposed to our international obligations, the Kashmir dispute is only one element in the greater problem of our relationship with India and Pakistan. In many ways, it provides the point at which our obligations as a Member of the United Nations, plus our honest evaluation of just solutions, affect most adversely our relations with India. I do not believe that we should abjure our international obligations in order to bring about better diplomatic relations with India. Moreover, bowing to Indian intransigence would materially harm our relations with Pakistan and with the Moslem world. In the long run, we must hope that the overwhelming Security Council support of UN Charter principles as the bases for solving the Kashmir dispute will cause India to realize that her actions in Kashmir are a short-term gain but a long-disability, in the light of loss of moral standing, continued Pakistan hostility, and diverting of attention from India’s basic internal and external problems.
5. In the light of the analysis in the previous paragraph, I believe that we should accept in general the UK Delegation concept of the proper Security Council action at the next stage of the Kashmir dispute. However, I do not believe the Council should wash its hands of the dispute, after having presented in detail to the parties the Council’s concept of the manner in which demilitarization and a plebiscite should be carried out. I think that we should provide some form of continuing mediatory machinery to take advantage of any weakening in India’s adamant intransigence, and to be available for use by the parties in case either or both wishes to approach the other through UN means. This machinery could take the form of a United Nations Representative, with an indefinite term of office, who would report progress or lack of progress to the Security Council at specified periods. The very existence of such a representative of the Security Council would provide additional pressure upon the Government of India.
I do not believe that the United States should assume in the UN the initiative in proposing future action in this dispute. We have received very definite political benefits through the fact that the UK, ostensibly, is exercising the lead in the Security Council, and I think that we should exert as much pressure as possible to induce the United [Page 1764] Kingdom to retain this initiative. For the immediate future, once the Security Council has adopted the detailed statement envisaged and once the general mediatory machinery has been set up, there is not much initiative which would be exercised by either the United Kingdom or ourselves, except the initiative of patience.