357.AB/7–1851
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil)
Subject: Indo–Pakistan Tension: Extraordinary Troop Movements
| Participants: | R. H. Belcher, First Secretary, British Embassy |
| T. E. Weil, Acting Deputy Director, SOA |
Mr. Belcher called at my office at 3:00 p. m. and read excerpts from a telegram reporting a conversation between the Acting UK High Commissioner in Delhi, Mr. Garner, and the Acting Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Dutt, on July 17. Mr. Belcher indicated that the conversation really produced nothing new but revealed that the decision to move Indian troops to forward positions had apparently been taken by the Indian Cabinet. It appears that Mr. Dutt reviewed the arguments already given to the public, to the effect that India was compelled to move the troops in the face of war talk in Pakistan, but that in response to Mr. Garner’s request for information regarding the disposition of troops Mr. Dutt said he would have to consult with Mr. Nehru who was due to return to Delhi from Bangalore on July 18.
Mr. Belcher also read from a telegram which he stated had been sent by the UKUN Delegation to London setting forth points summarized in USUN’s telegram 100, July 17. In this message the UK Delegation suggested that if the Security Council took up the question of sending UN military observers to India and Pakistan, the whole Kashmir debate would be renewed and Dr. Graham’s chances of succeeding in his mission would be destroyed. The UK Delegation therefore suggested that Dr. Graham take up the question of troop movements with GOI and GOP as part of the Kashmir problem and that one of the co-sponsors of the resolution under which Dr. Graham is working bring this suggestion to Dr. Graham’s attention without bringing the question into the Security Council.
Speaking informally, Mr. Weil suggested to Mr. Belcher that while it was obvious that the current tension over troop movements in India and Pakistan would affect Dr. Graham’s chances of succeeding in his demilitarization project, it might be borne in mind that if Dr. Graham were asked to desert his present task in order to attempt mediation between India and Pakistan he might not be in a position to complete [Page 1779] his demilitarization assignment within the allotted time. Mr. Weil remarked that if some other means could be found to resolve the current tension and Dr. Graham could be allowed to proceed with his current assignment, there would be obvious advantages in Dr. Graham’s being fully prepared to go ahead with his demilitarization proposal after the tension had died down in India and Pakistan. Mr. Weil further suggested that since GOI had not accepted the UN resolution under which Dr. Graham was working, it seemed doubtful that the Indians would accept him as a qualified mediator unless he were given new terms of reference by the Security Council; and that this would probably precipitate the very sort of debate in the Security Council which the UKUN Delegation apparently wished to avoid. Mr. Belcher, also speaking informally, agreed that these points were valid.
Mr. Weil told Mr. Belcher that we wished to continue (see memorandum for the files dated July 17, 1951)1 consultation with the UK and were looking forward to learning the results of the expected Cabinet consideration of the problem. He also told Mr. Belcher that we were consulting with our missions in London, Delhi and at the UN as to the desirability of expressing concern over developments at an early date to GOI and GOP through our Embassies.
Mr. Belcher said that by the morning of the twentieth he hoped to have a report on action taken by the Cabinet.
- Not printed.↩