Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

690D.91/7–1951

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern. South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] July 19, 1951.

Subject: Tension Between India and Pakistan: Extraordinary Troop Movements

During the last two weeks tension between India and Pakistan has been seriously aggravated by the movement of substantial numbers of Indian troops toward the Pakistan border and by similar forward movements of Pakistan forces. Liaquat Ali Khan has publicly appealed to Mr. Nehru to cooperate in reducing tension and has filed a copy of his message to Mr. Nehru with the Security Council. On July 17 Mr. Nehru, in a reply to Liaquat Ali’s message, declared India’s intentions were peaceful but that war talk in Pakistan had compelled India to move troops to forward positions.¹

According to the British Embassy the British Cabinet is to decide on a course of action today. The Foreign Office has been considering the possibility of recommending to the Security Council that UN military observers be sent to the areas concerned, but in view of certain practical difficulties surrounding such an operation there are indications that the first step may take the form of a personal message from Mr. Attlee to the Indian and Pakistan Prime Ministers. The British Embassy expects to have a report on Cabinet action tomorrow morning.

The Australian Prime Minister has sent a message to Liaquat Ali and Mr. Nehru expressing his Government’s concern and tendering Ms Government’s good offices. The text of Mr. Menzies’ message is quoted in Mr. Spender’s letter to you of July 17 (attached).²

To date the Department has taken the position that the British should take the lead in this Commonwealth problem and that action by the United States should be coordinated with British action. Our missions in London, Karachi and Delhi have been instructed to consult fully with UK officials and have been asked for their views on the desirability of immediate expression of our concern to the Indian and Pakistan Governments. We have also, in conjunction with UNA, studied possible approaches to a solution and have reached the tentative conclusion that the most effective action might comprise a request by the Security Council for explanations from the Governments of India and Pakistan followed by a resolution expressing the hope that both Governments will create an atmosphere favorable to settlement of the current dispute. The Australians might then be encouraged to repeat their offer of good offices which, if accepted, could be used to propose utilization of the POC or of UN military observers to reduce the existing tension and to bring about eventual withdrawal of troops. We believe Dr. Graham should be informally apprised of all pertinent developments but do not favor, as certain British officials have suggested, taking him away from his present assignment in Kashmir to undertake mediation of the current critical tension in India and Pakistan.

While there is no evidence that either Government wants war, we believe there is a grave danger that an incident could lead to hostilities and to communal war throughout the subcontinent. The immediate problem therefore is to decide, in consultation with the British, ways and means of preventing an outbreak of hostilities.

1. The texts of messages exchanged between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan during the summer of 1951 are contained in two publications of their respective governments: India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indo-Pakistan Relations (Correspondence Between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan from 15 July to 9 August 1951) (New Delhi, 1951); Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India’s Threat to Pakistan: Correspondence Between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India, July 15–August 11, 1951 (Karachi, n.d.).
2. Not printed. The note from Prime Minister Menzies to Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, quoted in the note of July 17 from the Australian Ambassador President Truman and Secretary Acheson, indicated that the Australian government was greatly disturbed by reports of troop concentrations and possible frontier disturbances, and expressed the hope that differences between India and Pakistan might be settled peacefully. The note further stated that if the Prime Ministers believed the Australian government could help in removing causes of difference, its good offices were freely available. (690D.91/7–1751)