Office of the Historian

690D.91/8–651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations 1

secret
Washington, August 6, 1951—8 p. m.

76. Re Kashmir (Deptel 44 USUN, 458 London, July 19, rptd Delhi 169, Karachi 66, Canberra 23).

1. Dept agrees with FonOff objections to SC mtg at present as proposed Para 1 Dept reftel (London’s 590, July 30).

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2. Proposal contained para 2 reftel of course no longer feasible in view Nehru’s rejection Menzies’ good offices. However, we hope FonOff will follow up eventual possibility personal appeal by PriMin Attlee and also offer UK’s good offices made by Garner (Delhi’s 418, July 30, rptd London 24, Karachi 31). We wld be prepared support an appeal and encourage parties accept U.K. offer good offices if FonOff deems advisable.

3. (For para 3 reftel see Deptel 67 to USUN, Aug 2, rptd London 772, Delhi 282, Karachi 127, Canberra 35.)

4. We think there may still be advantages in using observers under POC or expanded Milob group (para 2 reftel) invited by both parties in border areas. However, we continue doubt advisability Graham becoming involved with troop movts in addition present task, and note Graham also reluctant (Delhi’s 321, July 23; London’s 470,2 July 24). Re possible use observers, cld FonOff estimate probable number needed on borders in danger areas, on basis Brit experience in subcontinent.

5. We believe wld be very helpful if Nehru and Liaquat brought together. Does UN have any suggestions? Perhaps offer good offices shld now be directed toward obtaining mtg PMs for specific purpose effecting withdrawal troops to old positions and cessation propaganda.

6. Dept greatly appreciates comments and suggestions all Embs.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to London as telegram 823 and for information to New Delhi as telegram 303, to Karachi as 144, and to Canberra as 38.↩
  2. Telegram 470 from London, July 24, not printed, reported in part that, as a result of a conversation between the U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi and Graham, the British were now well aware of Graham’s reluctance to become involved in the troop movements dispute (690D.91/7–2451).↩