Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Secretary’s Briefing Book

United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and United Kingdom¹

[Extract]

secret
U.S.–U.K. MIN–1

Washington, September 10, 1951—3: 30 p. m.

Present:	U.S.	Mr. Acheson	U.K.	Mr. Morrison3
		Mr. Harriman		Sir Oliver Franks4
		Mr. Gifford		Sir Pierson Dixon5
		Mr. Jessup2		Sir F. Hoyer Millar6

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(c) Kashmir

39. Mr. Acheson said that events were moving very rapidly toward a collision in this area. The question is whether to put forward any plan at this time. It appeared that the Pakistani would be willing to do anything to which India would agree to solve the problem. It was first necessary that the U.S. and U.K. should act together. In the UN it would be possible to muster an impressive vote against India. Outside of the UN attempts should be made to have the Asians take the initiative in intervening, especially such countries as Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon. Another possibility would be to postpone the disposition of Kashmir for an extended period such as ten years and make provision for UN administration of the area. The attempt should be made to remove the dispute from the political sphere and to concentrate on its technical aspects. If progress were made on water development, the whole economic basis for the dispute would disappear.

40. Mr. Morrison said that the more we could delay, the better the chances would be for a peaceful settlement. Perhaps this was wrong but at least there was no use to use force at this time. Both countries were in the British Commonwealth and the U.K. was trying to be impartial, but it made clear in the UN that the Indians were wrong. It was impossible for the U.K. or UN to intervene by force. Perhaps at the right time the British Commonwealth could collectively intervene. The Asian intervention which Mr. Acheson mentioned might be a strong influence. India was sensitive to any U.K. or U.S. interference with regard to Pakistan. Whether the UN would be a suasive force was not sure. Even though this was no time for bullying Nehru, a stalemate should be avoided. If the U.S. agreed to this general line details could be worked out by the respective UN delegations.

41. Mr. Acheson said that while Mr. Scott was here he would like to have the appropriate officials in the Department meet with him on this matter. Regarding taking this question up in the Security Council and especially in the General Assembly, it should be raised “more in sorrow than in anger”. Meanwhile, it would be most helpful to try to make progress on the Punjab development scheme which would help to remove the dispute from the political field.

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1. Complete text of the minutes of this meeting is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
3. Herbert Morrison, British Foreign Secretary.
4. British Ambassador to the United States.
5. Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
2. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large.
6. Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer Millar, U.K. Deputy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.