UNP Files: Lot 59D237
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hicherson)
Dear Jack: On Frank Graham’s invitation I spent last evening with him for a completely personal confidential talk on Kashmir. He is extremely anxious that his views be confided to the narrowest possible group and I told him that I agreed to take the following matters up only with you and George McGhee, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter.
Graham feels he was well received by Nehru and believes that although Nehru had originally intended to deal with Graham on a purely ceremonial basis, Graham was able to make a dent upon him in terms of appealing to his ego and sense of destiny. Graham spent three or four hours alone with Nehru, playing this theme and implanting in Nehru the germ of the idea that Nehru’s potential leadership position in Asia and the world would be thwarted so long as the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved.
Graham thinks that the time for a Security Council decision is at hand. He is willing (I should say even anxious) to remain in the picture but on a basis which he considers sound.
The plan that he unfolded which I outline below has been built up inductively and is to be regarded as an integrated whole, Graham and his immediate advisers (notably General Devers) made a painstaking survey of the history of the dispute, extracting every substantial point as to which questions have been raised or objections made by either party and their plan is deliberately drawn from the standpoint of meeting all of these objections. Therefore, at least so far as its method of preparation and concept is concerned, it seems to me that the plan is entitled to great respect. Graham has pretty well made up his mind and I would venture the guess that it would take the most cogent arguments to shake him. The only person other than myself in whom he has confided is Trygve Lie and Lie has apparently indicated his agreement. Graham is most anxious that it not be known that he has discussed the plan with me and feels, rightly or wrongly, that any leak would fatally injure his chances of success. He did not show me the report but outlined it orally. (I had the impression he wanted to be able to say in the future that he had not shown his report to anyone in advance of submitting it to the Security Council.) In view of the fact that he recited orally, I am not in a position to give you a text. The following is a summary I have prepared on the basis of my own recollection immediately after I got home last night. The points are not necessarily in order but I believe I have all of them.
[Page 1870]The Security Council would adopt a resolution, on the basis of recommendations in Graham’s report, which resolution would make substantive recommendations in the following sense:
- 1.
- Both governments would, as part of the plan, agree to a “no war” declaration.
- 2.
- Both governments would instruct their officials not to make warlike or inflammatory statements and would request all media of public information to refrain from such statements.
- 3.
- Each government would pledge not to permit its armies or irregular forces to make incursions, raids or warlike demonstrations or activities.
- 4.
- Both governments would reaffirm the cease-fire agreement.
- 5.
- Additional observers would be placed at strategic points throughout the state.
- 6.
- Both governments would reaffirm their determination to have a free and impartial plebiscite.
- 7.
- Both governments would agree that demilitarization will be a single, interdependent and continuous process.
- 8.
- Demilitarization would take place in such a way as not to endanger the cease-fire line.
- 9.
- At the end of demilitarization period there would be left on the Pakistan side 4,000 civil police and on the Indian side 8,000 troops, militia and state forces.
- 10.
- 4,000 U.N. troops would be stationed in Azad Kashmir within a period such as three months (or whatever period would be required for the recruitment or deployment of such troops).
- 11.
- Representatives of both governments would meet to draw up practical details of demilitarization.
- 12.
- At the end of the demilitarization period (to be completed in some fixed time, perhaps ninety days), the Government of India will cause a plebiscite administrator to be inducted into office.
- 13.
- Nothing in the agreement would be deemed to impair functions or authority of the U.N. Representative or the plebiscite administrator.
- 14.
- Any disagreements between the parties concerning implementation of the foregoing would be referred to the U.N. Representative, whose decision would be final.
Graham thinks it is of great importance to have the Security Council itself make these recommendations. I explored with him the possible alternative of having the Security Council adopt a resolution in broad form extending his term and enlarging his authority so that he might himself subsequently make specific suggestions, but he appears to be firmly convinced that the Council should itself make substantive recommendations at this stage. He thinks this would add greater force to them and strengthen his hand. He believes it would be very difficult for either government to reject these proposals since, as I have said above, they are based upon and reflect a distillation of points which have been raised in the past and which these proposals are designed to meet.
[Page 1871]You will note certain key points, which I have underscored.1 Graham is particularly taken with the idea of stationing U.N. troops in Azad Kashmir. Such a device, while meeting the Indian objections to “stationing foreign troops” on Indian soil would also deprive Nehru of the argument that India fears hostile action from across the frontier either by Pakistan regulars or tribesmen. He thinks that it should be acceptable from the Pakistan viewpoint because it would guarantee Pakistan against attacks by Indian forces of whom there were now upwards of 60,000 deployed in Kashmir. I made clear my feeling that the U.S. Government would not consent to U.S. contingents serving in such a force. Graham agrees.
You will note that the plan envisages the reduction of forces on the Indian side to 8,000, including troops, militia and state forces. This number would be balanced on the Azad side by adding to the 4,000 U.N. troops in Azad Kashmir, 4,000 civil police. These would be recruited by the Commander of the U.N. forces, in consultation with the Pakistan Government. The resolution might also provide for consultation by the U.N. Commander with the Indian Government, although in any case the recruitment of civil police would be by the U.N. Commander subject only to prior consultation but not clearance.
Graham realizes that Nehru might argue against stationing U.N. forces in Azad Kashmir on the theory of “sovereignty” of the Indian state over the Azad area. However, this would be such a patently sham and arbitrary position that Graham doubts that even Nehru would stoop to it.
Graham attaches importance to the other point I have underscored1 which would require the Government of India to take action necessary to install the plebiscite administrator. He feels the earlier agreement is weak in that it requires Sheik Abdullah’s voluntary action prior to the installation of the plebiscite administrator, thus leaving the way open for the Sheik and for the Government of India to play ring around the rosy. Graham’s suggestion would result in the Security Council pinning the rose on Nehru. Moreover, he thinks it important that the Security Council explicitly provide that such action would be taken at the end of the demilitarization period, which might be fixed in the resolution. Otherwise, he feels Nehru would simply not get around to taking this decisive step.
I sought Graham’s opinion concerning the significance and possible consequences of the convening of the Constituent Assembly and actions which the Assembly might take. Somewhat to my surprise, he tended to minimize both the significance and potentially dangerous consequences of the election as well as of the Constituent Assembly. He [Page 1872] believes the election was so patently a farce that it has fooled no one and possibly has even to some extent discredited Sheik Abdullah. In many areas of the state no rival candidates came forward and the elections were apparently not taken seriously by large and important elements of the population. The most potentially dangerous consequences of the Constituent Assembly reporting to reaffirm accession to India or otherwise passing upon the question of accession would, Graham seems to believe, be met by those points in his plan which would call upon both governments to reaffirm their determination to have a free and impartial plebiscite. I got the impression this is probably the chief importance of paragraph 6 in the outline.
I asked Graham what his attitude is toward the arbitration provision of the March 30 resolution. He does not believe that there is any hope, at the present time at least, of the Indians agreeing to arbitration. He believes, however, that this might be kept alive as a concept in a new resolution for possible ultimate use.
In general, his analysis is that there are two broad alternatives open to him and to the Council. One is for him to carry out the literal provisions of the resolution of March 30 and to report remaining differences of opinion so that arbitration could be invoked. The other course is the one he preferred and which is outlined in this letter. As I say, he has pretty much made up his mind that the latter course is the one which hold promise.
Now, as to timing. Knowing Frank as well as you and I do, you will not be surprised to know that he is intent upon working out his report meticulously and with the correct phrase. Now that he has made up his mind, he wants to allow himself time in which to shape up his thinking and he also wants his report to give a great deal of the history and background of the problem. He told me that accordingly he would not be ready for another ten or twelve days. This led us into a discussion of the situation in the Council because of the Iranian case. You will recall the Council decided yesterday to meet again on October 11 when Mossadegh may be here. I think we must assume that October 11 and 12 will be taken up very actively with the Iranian question. Moreover, I think that it would be a mistake for Graham to file his report on the very day on which the Council is debating Iran since his report would be completely overshadowed and the basic importance of the Kashmir question would be minimized. Therefore, I discussed with him the possibility of his filing his report on Monday the 8th or Monday the 15th. He said he would definitely not be ready by Monday the 8th and we left it on the wholly tentative basis that he would file his report on Monday the 15th. He said this was no commitment and I expressed understanding, but I did urge him not to delay beyond that date.
[Page 1873]I suggested to him, and he agreed, that if he were indeed ready on October 15 the Council might meet and he would make an oral presentation to the Council. There would be no need, therefore, to wait until the report is translated and processed which would probably require five or six days. His oral presentation on the 15th would start the ball rolling and meet the essential point in Deptel 167, October 1, in which the Department expresses the view that it would be advisable to have a Security Council meeting in New York before October 19 adjournment. I explained the adjournment problem to Graham and he agrees. There might even be a second meeting of the Council prior to October 19 in which the parties might state their preliminary reactions to his report. However, this can be left open for later determination.
I don’t suppose I need say it, but it will do no harm to reassure the Department that I undertook no commitment of any kind. On the contrary, I told Graham I was without authority and said that I would communicate with you and George McGhee and then get in touch with Graham again. He expects me to do so.
I think it only remains to say that Graham has returned from the subcontinent with the strongest feeling that this dispute will, if unsettled much longer, lead to war. My impression is that he feels that if his recommendations are adopted by the Security Council, it would open the road to a peaceful solution and that he would go back to the subcontinent with restrained optimism and deep faith in his mission.
Sincerely yours,
Ambassador