357.AB/10–551: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
priority
Unmis 64. For Hickerson from Gross. Re: Kashmir. Yesterday Graham telephoned and asked if on thinking it over I had developed some thoughts in reaction to the line of action he had outlined to me Monday,1 which I embodied in my letter of Oct. 2 to you. I said that I had not yet heard from you and McGhee but that I personally was having increasing doubts whether SC should go ahead on your idea without knowing whether it was jumping off cliff or five-foot fence. I wondered what would happen if SC shot its bolt and missed. Probably war.
Just now Graham called again and said that while he is still firmly wedded to his idea he is beginning to feel it should be presented differently, to minimize risk rejection by parties. He is now thinking of following:
Instead of SC, without warning, confronting parties with idea containing elements not put up to them on sub-continent, he would limit report to background and facts including his 12 points and statement of areas of agreement and disagreement thereon. After submission of report he could try out new elements (neutral force, etc.) on the parties in private consultations. He would probably choose Paris for these consultations in order be near SC and able, if parties agreed to proposal or for internal political reasons wished weight of SC pronouncement, to have immediate SC action.
[Page 1876]Graham thinks this mediation would be better than frontal attack of doubtful outcome. He realizes new procedure will take some punch out of report but said better to be wise than “punchful.”
- October 1.↩