Office of the Historian

792.00/2–1351

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and South-east Asian Affairs (Lacy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

secret
[Washington,] February 13, 1951.

Subject: Ambassador Stanton’s Estimate of Present Situation in Thailand and his Recommendations.

There is attached an excellent despatch drafted by Ambassador Stanton estimating the present situation in Thailand and making specific recommendations for our present and future courses of action. [Page 1596] If you should have the time, all of the despatch is well worth reading.1 I summarize the high points as follows:

1. There exists among the Chinese, Viet Minh2 and Malay elements within Thailand a well organized aggressive communist group which can and will strike hard when the signal is given.

2. In opposition to the communist threat there are the following factors:

(a)
Thai resistance to foreign domination.
(b)
Thai reverence for King and religion.
(c)
The substantial prosperity of the Thai economy.
(d)
Thai dislike of the Chinese who epitomize the impending threat of communism.
(e)
The firm position of the Thai Government in international affairs against communism.
(f)
An active overt and covert psychological war program being developed by the Thai Government.

3. The most favorable period for the communists is within the next two or three months.

4. The pattern of communist attack will probably include:

(a)
Strong guerrilla bands springing into operation in frontier regions in the north, northeast and south.
(b)
Intensified communist activities within the country including sabotage, terrorism and propaganda designed to confuse and terrify the Thai people.
(c)
Ah attempted coup d’état using Thai political outs.

5. It is improbable that an all-out invasion by Chinese communist troops would be made because (a) the Chinese believe it unnecessary and (b) an open invasion would increase the probability of involvement with the United Nations, as Thailand would certainly appeal to that body.

6. What should the United States do?

(a)
It should accelerate and judiciously expand the various aid programs already commenced, particularly (1) the military aid program as this may make all the difference in the Thai will to resist as these arms may be needed at any moment; and (2) the economic aid program should be implemented with the utmost speed as its various projects reach the village level and make a tremendous impression upon the general population in favor of the United States and the United Nations.3 Expansion should especially be made in the medical field in the northeastern provinces which are sensitive politically.
(b)
The specific recommendations made by the Melby–Erskine Mission4 for the further equipment of Thai armed forces should be expedited as modified by the Chief of MAAG.
(c)
A pool of military materiel for distribution among Southeast Asian nations should be established in the United States for urgent shipment in the light of actual needs.
(d)
National armies of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should be speedily armed.
(e)
Organized guerrilla groups in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and South China which are actively fighting communists should also be armed.

  1. Not printed; the despatch under reference is No. 486 from Bangkok, January 24 (792.00/1–2451).↩
  2. Viet Minh, the military forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.↩
  3. On September 19, 1950, the United States and Thailand concluded an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement. The text of this document is printed in TIAS No. 2170; 1 UST 915.↩
  4. For information, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 164.↩