Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

611.92/3–1551

The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 616

Bangkok, March 15, 1951.

Ref: Department’s Secret Instruction No. 35, November 9, 1950.¹

Subject: Comments on Department Policy Statement on Thailand, October 15, 1950²

The Embassy refers to the Department’s Secret Instruction No. 35, dated November 9, 1950 under cover of which was enclosed a copy of Department of State Policy Statement on Thailand, dated October 15, 1950. The Embassy has studied the enclosed Policy Statement with care and has recently re-examined it in terms of subsequent developments. The Statement has been useful and interesting and the Embassy hopes that the Department will, in the near future bring this statement up to date. Meanwhile, a careful re-examination of the Statement has resulted in several comments which the Embassy desires to make in the hope that they will prove of some constructive use when a new Policy Statement is prepared.

1. The last sentence on Page 1 of the Policy Statement, says that, “Thailand has thus irrevocably severed its ties with the Communist countries and committed itself positively to the cause of the free nations”. In the opinion of the Embassy, this statement is more general and more positive than the circumstances warrant. It is the opinion of the Embassy that the present Government, controlled by Premier Phibun³ and his clique of military cohorts, is probably so far committed to the “cause of the free nations” that it would be impossible for Phibun and this particular clique to reverse their position. It is highly probable that as long as Phibun’s Government continues to make the foreign policy for Thailand, it will stick by the United Nations and the United States. Furthermore, there are signs that popular fear of and distaste for the Chinese Communists are growing and that support for the present foreign policy is growing. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that Thailand, as a nation, is thus far or irrevocably committed to the “cause of the free nations”. There are groups, who under certain circumstances might come to power and who might very well reverse or modify the present foreign policy. As has been pointed out before, although the foreign policy of the Government is receiving increased support, yet at the same time there are significant political factions which are so strongly opposed to the regime on other grounds that they might well accept a new foreign policy if that appeared necessary as a means to regain domestic power. Therefore, while agreeing that as long as the present regime remains in power, the Government will be committed to our cause, the Embassy believes that specific note should be taken of the possibility of a change in Thailand’s international posture resulting from the repercussions of a domestic shift in power.

2. Closely connected with this point is the interpretation to be placed on Thailand’s recognition of the Associated States of Indochina, and particularly, the Bao Dai regime.⁴ It would be a great mistake to regard this action as a genuine indicator of the feelings of the Thai people, or of even the Thai Government, toward the French supported states. As has been pointed out on several occasions, the Thai people, including many persons in the Government feel a certain sympathy with the Vietminh, not because of any leanings toward the Communist cause, but because of the belief that whatever his political complexion, Ho Chi-minh is fighting to drive out the French, which the Thai regard as a desireable objective. In fact some Thai are inclined to blame the U.S. for “driving” Ho into the Communist camp. While recently there probably has developed a somewhat better understanding of the real consequences of a Vietminh victory, it would be wrong to think that the Thai have suddenly developed a burning desire to see the liquidation of the Vietminh.

The circumstances surrounding the recognition of Bao Dai are instructive of the real foundation of the present Thai foreign policy. The Department will recall that the Foreign Minister, Phot Sarasin, resigned in protest over the Premier’s personal decision to recognize. The evidence available at the time was that not only was the majority of the thinking populace and the bulk of the press against recognition, but even a majority of middle to high level officials. But the decision was carried in favor of recognition by Phibun’s personal insistence. Thus, recognition can hardly be called the policy of the Thai people or nation. It was the decision of Phibun and his clique. To a large extent, the same thing is true of many other major foreign policy decisions of the Thai Government. The basis for this foreign policy is a gamble or calculated risk which Phibun has personally taken upon himself. That gamble is based on the following assumptions by Phibun:

1. That the democratic powers ultimately will win the struggle with the Communist powers.

2. That by committing his Government to the cause of the West, he is actually buying an insurance policy which will guarantee that in the event of aggression the United Nations and the United States will step in—in force—to help defend Thailand against the Communists.

In acting on these calculated risks, Phibun is enough of a gambler (or realist) to understand that it is futile to try to temper the anticipated Communist reaction by “going slow” or trying to pursue an overt policy of restraint while covertly working against the Communists. Whatever his other faults may be, Phibun probably has realized that this is an “all-or-nothing” international conflict and he probably realizes that the Communists regard a “neutral” as as much of an enemy as an outright opponent. Therefore, Phibun has probably decided that having made his choice, the only sensible thing to do is to put everything behind it. If he loses he will be no worse off than if he tried to play the part of neutrality, and if he wins he will be all the more endeared to the hearts of the victors, i.e. the West. Furthermore, if he wins, his internal political position will be well-nigh impregnable. Furthermore, if he is temporarily driven out of Thailand by the Communists, he probably believes he can obtain sanctuary in the United States and return as the victor when Communism is defeated finally.

With this kind of a viewpoint in mind, such things as non-recognition of Communist China, recognition of Bao Dai, sending troops to fight Communist aggression in Korea, and voting to condemn Communist China an aggressor, fall into some kind of understandable pattern. They are the bets of Phibun, who in his position as official spokesman for Thailand, successively adds chips to a stack which he has placed on the United States. But, as stated before, in fact Phibun does not always express the will of the whole Thai people. Furthermore, sometimes he leads from weakness (e.g. recognition of Bao Dai) in the hope and expectation that his partner (United States) will pick up and cover his lead (by ensuring the defeat of the Vietminh). This, in the Embassy’s opinion is a very important factor behind Thai recognition of Bao Dai. The important element in such a foreign policy is that it is largely a personal policy. As long as the person (or clique) sponsoring this policy remains in power and as long as he is convinced that the policy will pay off in the end, then the United States can probably be assured of continued support. But in such a situation it is always possible that any one of various rival cliques will achieve power in which case the foreign policy might be seriously jeopardized. Finally, if the Premier ever became convinced that this policy had failed he could hardly be blamed if he ceased to cooperate with the United States. This fact is of great importance for the United States since there appears to be an hiatus between the American and Thai Government views at one point.

It was stated above that one of the two assumptions on which Phibun has based his present foreign policy is that by committing his Government to the cause of the West, he is ensuring that in the event of aggression against Thailand, the United Nations and the United States will put forces in the field to defend Thailand’s independence. As far as the Embassy is aware, no such decision has been taken by the United States and there is no assurance that the United Nations could be prevailed upon as they were in the case of Korea. Consequently, open aggression against Thailand, unopposed by UN and US forces, would produce a situation which, from Phibun’s point of view would constitute a failure of his foreign policy. While, in such a case, Phibun still probably would not be able to go over to the other side, yet he would probably be so disappointed and disgusted that, feeling deserted and abandoned, he might also abandon the cause and flee, leaving the field to whatsoever group of opportunists or fellow-travellers might be able to seize control. Thus, while it is true that as long as no outright! aggression occurs, the Phibun regime will continue to support the United Nations and cooperate with the United States, yet in the last analysis, when the chips are down, we find that Phibun’s foreign policy is predicated on the assumption that he will get certain support which neither the United Nations nor the United States is committed to give. From this point of view, there would seem to be serious flaws in an unqualified and easy assumption that, “Thailand has thus irrevocably severed its ties with Communist countries and committed itself positively to the cause of the free nations”.

3. The last sentence of the Policy Statement provides a clue to a further point the Embassy desires to make. There it is stated that, “A continuation of present US policies toward Thailand should help it remain free of Communist domination.…” This is no doubt true but the statement as it stands leaves many problems dangling in mid-air because no specific effort has been made in the Policy Statement to weigh these policies in terms of the specific threats that confront Thailand. Some of the policies mentioned in the Statement are:

1. Promotion of Thai prosperity

2. $10,000,000 of military aid

3. Drawing Thailand into various UN activities

4. USIS and cultural exchange projects

5. Encouragement of Thai participation in GATT.

6. Development of agricultural production, port facilities, etc.

7. Economic aid

8. Protection of US petroleum company interests in Thailand

9. 1947 Bilateral Air Transport Agreement⁵

10. Encouragement of normal trade relations with Japan

The Embassy does not question any of these policies and the Embassy agrees that over the long run (granted that we are permitted to think of the long run) such policies will strengthen Thailand and will strengthen the bonds of friendship with the United States. However, most of this program is based on the assumption that Thai independence and peace will continue for a number of years. Hence to consider this program in terms of maintaining Thai peace and independence in the immediate future, the face of very specific threats, comes perilously close to begging the question.

On many occasions the Embassy has reported to the Department on the following possible, specific and fairly immediate threats to Thai independence:

1. The possibility of a Vietminh conquest of Indochina and consequent reaction in Thailand.

2. The possibility of a “peaceful” takeover of Laos by Vietminh and Chinese Communists through the method of infiltration, subsequently threatening Thailand through its north and northeast provinces.

3. The possibility of Communist victories in Burma and/or Indochina, followed by sudden diplomatic and political pressure forcing a reversal of Thai policies.

4. The possibility of Communist capture of certain dissident political groups and their use in an effort to topple the regime by coup d’état.

5. The possibility of direct Chinese Communist invasion in force.

6. The possibility of a Communist-organized series of sabotage and guerrilla movements supported by the Communist-controlled Chinese minority.

The Embassy cannot of course predict which, if any of these steps will be adopted by the Communists. But there is no evidence in the Policy Statement to show that U.S. policies toward Thailand have been weighed in terms of such threats in an effort to determine to what extent these policies are likely to meet these threats. It may be that the United States is unable to adopt policies to meet such threats. It may be that it is assumed that our policies will not necessarily meet the threat that exists. It may be that because Thailand is in a relatively low priority area it is impossible for the United States to go any further. It may be that we must reconcile ourselves to the ultimate writing off of Thailand. It may be that in view of our commitments elsewhere it has been determined in Washington that it is best for us to do so. But in any case, it is the Embassy’s opinion that a Policy Statement on Thailand should include some analysis of our policy in terms of the situations and threats which it has to meet and should come to some conclusion as to the degree to which our policy meets these threats. It should also contain some consideration of the consequences to our policy of the various possible or for seeable events or developments. Specifically a Policy Statement on Thailand might well include some statement to the effect that in the event of open aggression against Thailand, or indirect aggression through guerrillas, the United States would support in the United Nations any appeal from Thailand requesting United Nations assistance in defending its independence.

Edwin F. Stanton

1. Not printed.
2. Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1529.
3. Field Marshal P. Pibulsonggram (Phibun Songkhram).
4. Bao Dai, Chief of State of Viet-Nam.
5. On February 26, 1947, the United States and Thailand concluded an Air Services Agreement. The text of this document is printed in TIAS No. 1607 and also in 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2789.