795.00/4–1851
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Question of Possible Retaliatory Action Against Manchurian Airbases in Event of Large-Scale Enemy Air Attacks
| Participants: | The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin |
| Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy | |
| FE—Mr. Rusk | |
| BNA—Mr. Shullaw |
The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin, called on me today at his request to reiterate the views of his government on action which [Page 365] would involve the United Nations in military operations outside Korea. The Ambassador recalled that Mr. Moodie in a conversation with Mr. Merchant on April 61 had stated that the Australian government believed no step should be taken which would have this effect without frank and full consultations and general agreement. Mr. Merchant, the Ambassador stated, had questioned the practicability of having consultation and general agreement in all circumstances, and this comment had been reported to Canberra. The Ambassador said that he had now been instructed again to put forward the view that prior consultation with governments contributing forces is imperative and that general agreement should be reached before such action is taken. He added that if the time came when this question were put to the several governments for discussion, all relevant information concerning the military situation would be required. Mr. Makin said that the Australian government does not accept the view that the scale of enemy air intervention is likely to be such as to make it impossible to consult the other governments before retaliating. He remarked that a United Press dispatch of April 5 reported that General MacArthur had been authorized to bomb Manchurian bases if the Chinese committed their air force in Korea. It had been the Australian understanding that the original directive forbidding General MacArthur to bomb bases in Manchuria would not be altered without consultation with interested governments.
The Ambassador inquired whether we had given any consideration to warning the Chinese of retaliation if they launched an air offensive against United Nations forces. He also asked about the capacity of United Nations forces to meet an enemy air attack with anti-aircraft protection and whether there is any evidence that Soviet pilots have participated in recent air battles in Korea.
I told the Ambassador that we want to consult with the other governments having forces in Korea in advance of any action by the enemy raising the question of retaliation and also when such action occurred. We recognized, however, that enemy action could be of such a character that consultation would be very difficult. Apart from the fact that the United States acts as the Unified Command, it also has a responsibility so far as the security of the 250,000 American troops in Korea is concerned. If the security of this large American force were endangered by enemy action, we might be obliged to strike back even in the absence of consultation and agreement with the other governments having forces in Korea. I said that we fully appreciated the difficulty in this situation for Australia as well as for the United States, and I expressed the hope that the Ambassador would make this point in reporting our views to his government.
[Page 366]Mr. McNichol remarked that as he understood it we regarded consultation on this question as already taking place through such exchanges of views as these. I said that this was correct and again emphasized the fact that we had every desire to consult with the other governments on this question. I recalled that during the last war theatre commanders had been designated who were empowered to take action to meet emergencies as they arose. The purpose of this action was to avoid the possibility of a command vacuum in periods of danger. I said that so far as the United Press dispatch was concerned no directive authorizing General MacArthur to bomb Manchurian bases had been issued—that decision would have to be taken in Washington.
In discussing Mr. Makin’s question about a warning to the Chinese Communists of retaliation, I pointed out that such a warning might introduce prestige considerations and actually produce the action we hope the Chinese will not take. Furthermore in issuing a warning to the Chinese Communists it would be very difficult to handle the problem presented by the fact that the Chinese are even now operating against our forces from Manchurian bases. We could not in effect condone this situation in a warning directed against large-scale as opposed to small-scale enemy air attack. I mentioned, however, that the Chinese Communists were undoubtedly aware of the possibility of retaliatory action on our part because we had told India of our thinking along these lines.
I told Mr. Makin that our forces in Korea had the ordinary antiaircraft equipment but that additional equipment from other countries having forces in Korea would be helpful. Fighter aircraft, both land and carrier based, would be the principal weapon in resisting enemy air attacks. I said that we have not yet shot down any enemy planes behind our lines and therefore have not been able to confirm whether Soviet pilots are being used. We have, however, intercepted conversations between enemy planes and the ground which were being carried on in Russian.
- Memorandum of conversation, dated April 6, by Mr. Merchant, not printed (795.00/4–651).↩