795.00/7–1051: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
29. Emb has attempted in numerous messages in past week to give Dept picture Korean attitude towards cease fire negots. I have not reported details every conversation with Pres Rhee, PriMin and others, [Page 645] in which I emphasized arguments outlined Dept’s special guidance but there have been many such conversations, including those attended by Army Undersecretary Alexander and Gov Dewey. Koreans have put up same case each time with practically no variations despite fact during this period they increasingly aware these unwanted negots sure to take place.
Gen impression I have gathered is that Rhee, Chang Myun and others are principally concerned lest arrangements leading to cessation of fighting result in withdrawal UN troops and situation which in effect will leave ROK undefended and unsupported. I have endeavored reassure Koreans on this point and Gov Dewey’s remarks, as reported, were helpful. Fact is, regardless of protestations from any quarter that US and UN have continuing interests Koreans welfare, ROK leaders likely remain highly skeptical and hence fearful. Behind this fear is doubt that any subsequent polit negots will advance cause of unification, which to them means extension ROK sovereignty. They also have qualms that UN, in anxiety to achieve polit agreement, might go too far in placating Commies. In view foregoing their only hope at the moment is that present cease-fire talks will break down.
It is difficult to judge effects this attitude may have on collaboration between ROK and US–UN. Fol armistice, I doubt whether ROK Govt will take overt action of serious nature. On other hand Rhee has committed himself so far in opposition whole idea of cease-fire that he cannot well publicly reverse himself when faced by fait accompli.
I have impression he already is soft pedalling his open opposition. If talks fail he will be successful champion ROK people; if talks produce armistice he will probably maintain his position to the end and only accept the situation grudgingly as something which he did not have power to prevent.
ROK leaders, recognizing their powerlessness to influence turn of events, are understandably sensitive to minor role they permitted to play in negots. Rhee personally has been annoyed by prominent role accorded Kim Il Sung. I have suggested to Ridgway importance playing up, particularly from publicity point of view, participation of ROK representatives. Feel move (this morning) to invite Pres Rhee to Seoul for preliminary briefing may go far to eliminate issue over alleged inadequate ROK representation. Nevertheless believe Dept shld keep this aspect in mind in order to play up in publicity media ROK participation throughout the conference.
Sent Dept 29, rptd info Tokyo 9.