Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 75: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, 16 July 1951—2:55 p. m.

JCS 96421. From JCS for CINCUNC. Reur HNC 096.

1. We see no objection to attempt to afford opponents opportunity to recede from inflexible position, provided it can be done without giving away important points of our own.

2. We do not wish to leave impression that UN Forces will withdraw in near future; not only would this impression be contrary to probable course of events but it would cause deep fears and misgivings among South Koreans at very time they need to feel reliance upon continued UN support.

3. We do not believe you should become a transmittal agency through which political questions can be raised by commanders who we consider are not entitled to raise them on a governmental level. If you transmit their views on this question, they would undoubtedly expect answers and would quickly avail themselves of opportunity to raise other political questions by same means.

4. We believe amended statement given below is about as far as we can go and provides face-saving device if opponents wish to use one. This is authorized for your use at such time as you feel desirable.

“1. We cannot consent to inclusion on the agenda of these mil discussions of any topic intended to open discussion of ‘withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea’.

“2. The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops is a question which should be discussed at the governmental level in connection with the final settlement of the Korean problem. The decision to withdraw United Nations Forces from Korea can be taken only by the United Nations and by those govts whose decisions placed them there at the request of the United Nations. The United Nations Command, as a mil command, is not authorized to represent the United Nations and the several govts concerned on this question. It cannot be discussed in these present talks, which are limited strictly to mil armistice questions within the purview of mil commanders. It is expected that following a mil armistice as a first step, questions concerning a final settlement of the Korean problem could be taken up at a governmental level.

“3. The foregoing does not minimize in any way the importance of the question of the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, in relation to an over-all settlement of the Korean question. Its importance is recognized in the public declarations of the United Nations as well as of individual govts having troops in the United Nations Command. However, this question is only one of those which must be considered on the governmental level in effecting a permanent settlement and which cannot be discussed separately or in advance of agreement on, and implementation of, armistice terms.”¹

1. General Ridgway sent the following reply in his telegram C–67196, from Tokyo, dated July 17:

   “Grateful for your 96421 of 17 [16] July. Have authorized Admiral Joy to use first 2 subparagraphs amended statement as contained Paragraph 4 of your message but not the 3rd and final subparagraph. Shall not use this 3rd paragraph for reasons stated in 2nd paragraph of your message.” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 77)