795.00/7–1751: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
flash
52. When Gen Ridgway met with Pres Rhee on July 10 he offered to keep the President informed of progress at cease-fire mtgs.1 With a view to gaining Pres Rhee’s assent to our basic thinking and at the insistence of the ROK del, Maj Gen Paik, who felt very uneasy, Gen Ridgway again met with Pres Rhee on July 16. Mtg was attended by ROK Defense Min,2 Maj Gen Paik, Maj Gen Hodes and myself.
Believe Dept will be interested in following fairly detailed summary of conversation which is revealing of President’s attitude.
At opening Gen Hodes read a most carefully prepared statement as to our thinking on line of demarcation as a basis for the demilitarized zone. Pres Rhee at once challenged concept of cease fire, stating since enemy forces lacked naval and air strength he thought it better if UN forces pushed on to Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Ridgway pointed out that any substantial movement to the north would require tremendous increase in UN forces. In reply to further questioning he stated advance further north impossible without greater forces which countries participating in Korea apparently not able to supply in view of other worldwide commitments. In any case for many months roads and railways unable transport huge quantities supplies required to support such troops. Problem supplying civilian population in liberated areas in north added further complication to logistics difficulties.
Rhee stated he did not lack confidence in Ridgway but it was unfortunate idea of cease fire in vicinity of thirty-eighth parallel should have originated with State Dept. This seemed all the more strange to Korean people considering fact UN forces were winning the war. Ridgway commented UN delegation has already informed Commies it will not discuss thirty-eighth parallel nor withdrawal UN forces; that current talks have sole purpose ending hostilities, not reaching peace settlement; and UN motives completely sincere.
Rhee warned that cease fire wld be used by Russians for propaganda and Commies everywhere wld believe they were victors and that US had sued for peace. Soviet objective was to eject US from South Korea and he saw no polit possibility ever inducing Soviets get out of Korea. Thus if Korea ever to be united short of world war III it must be done now by mil means. Ridgway commented we hoped avoid global showdown and democracies wld not start it. If it came, we wanted to be in position to insure victory. Rhee reiterated belief Chinese wld quit if UN advanced further north and that Soviets wld not come to their [Page 695] rescue. Ridgway again stated point was physical inability make major northward advance unless Chinese withdrew.
Rhee insisted Koreans desired to reunite at any cost and obliterate memory of thirty-eighth parallel. He said that in signing cease fire UN would be helping Commies and WW III could never be avoided that way. Ridgway rejoined that if WW III inevitable UN could not afford to exhaust themselves in Korea. In reply to question why we did not use atomic bomb, Ridgway stated that would only precipitate WW III. He reminded Rhee there wld be no cease fire if terms of armistice not agreed; that terms wld include safeguard of inspection and prevention reinforcement of troops which was improvement over 1945 situation.
Rhee stated he could not argue with point that advance to north was beyond our capabilities and that he would try to influence public opinion and would inform Cabinet they must accept situation. He appreciated info received on capabilities was top secret.
Ridgway, after mentioning this decision was on governmental level and approved by Pres Truman, pointed out best hopes for Korean independence in long run lay in split between Chinese and Russians which would offer chance for political settlement for united Korea. Rhee felt best possibility obtain such split would be by pressing on with the fighting to the north; that defeat of enemy would shake Soviet satellite empire; and that this might do more to prevent next World War than stopping fighting in Korea now.
Gen Paik put in plug for training and equipping ROK army to point where it could take care of itself in three or four years. He pointed out danger in northward advance in view of necessity for forces to diverge. Lack of troops made it impossible contemplate major advance now. He also suggested Seoul not good site for capital if proposed demilitarized zone established.
I mentioned I thought I detected concern in President’s mind that US–UN might back out of Korea. I assured him this was impossible and that we wld see Korea through or collapse as a collective community.
For two hours Gen Ridgway most forcefully and with the utmost sincerity and conviction explained why it was impossible to move north by force at this time. Although most of the info re our position should have been known to him before, Pres Rhee left meeting rather shaky. Upon taking his leave of Gen Ridgway he remarked, “All your arguments have not convinced me that you cannot move north”.
Foregoing résumé of conversation shows single track on which Rhee’s mind is working. It is most important next few days and weeks to get him to see impossibility of course he recommends and inevitability, if not acceptability, of armistice.
[Page 696]I returned to Pusan today as I felt that in view of Rhee’s unpredictability and present frame of mind it important I be here for few days.