Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/7–2051: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Pusan, July 20, 1951—2 p. m.

61. Fol is summary of long communication addressed to Gen Ridgway by Pres Rhee setting forth in writing position ROK Govt toward cease-fire talks. Original ltr signed by Rhee and members his War Cabinet was handed to me by FonMin yesterday afternoon and was transmitted by special courier to Gen Ridgway last night.¹

Ltr pays tribute to Gen Ridgway’s skill as mil commander, his wisdom as administrator US–UN policies in pending cease-fire negots and states, “I feel it incumbent upon me to declare to you in writing the views of my Govt, which I expressed in our conf in Seoul on Monday afternoon.² Substance of position of my Govt is that we cannot maintain our nation in half our country. A divided Korea is a ruined Korea, unstable economically, politically, and militarily. Wholly aside from broad and significant question of value to US of maintaining principle of collective security by punishment of the aggressor in Korea, fact is clear to us that Korean nation must be committed to simple but vital principle of reunification. … Separate maintenance of north and south divisions cld only be by sufferance of and through direct support by foreign powers. Korea must in effect either cease to be independent entity or it must become all one body—all Democratic or all Communistic.”

Ltr then describes econ and mil plight of country if left divided. Polit consequences wld be frustration and despair of people, abridgement of processes of democratic govt, fertile soil of discontent and probably eventual though reluctant acceptance Commie demands by large segment ROK population. If UN forces were defeated on battlefield ROK wld have no choice but accept surrender. However, it is enemy which has suffered mil defeat “even though it continues to hold the polit initiative.” Ltr states familiar ROK case that if Soviets intended intervene Korean war they wld have done so before and therefore they will not do so in future. Biggest Sov weapon is fear among democratic nations of another world war. “In world that is basically in conflict, if one power is willing to risk war and the other is not, the power whose policies are characterized by daring will always triumph.”

Sovs enormously successful expanding their empire by winning psychological victory, undermining will to resist. ROK determination to resist gave free world chance to end this psychological aggression and Korean nation has paid frightful price. All this to what avail? “Is free world to abandon role of resistance and submit once again to psychological aggression? Are we once more to confront condition in which Sov Union will frighten peoples into surrender.… In such case Korea will have suffered tragically for decision to stand for natl independence on [and] equally tragically free world will have lost best chance to stop aggression before it can succeed in undermining very foundation upon which final security must rest.… To agree to continued division of our nation wld be to accept inevitable defeat of our freedom. We would rather die on the field than lie down supinely before relentless foe. It is our earnest hope that UN may not now leave us to pursue our course alone. But it is not our intention stubbornly to insist upon infallability our own judgment.”

Ltr continues these views shared by almost all Koreans North or South who believe reunification inevitable either through democratic means or through Commie aggression. Best informed fon observers agree this analysis although contrary policies being urged by persons “far removed both in understanding and in sympathy from realities of power situation in Far East.”

Ltr concludes that much may be said for ROK position in terms of welfare of entire free world but this is matter for sound judgment of policy makers of other free nations. In every Korean heart and mind is belief nation wld be plunged into irrevocable disaster if continues divided. At same time there is conviction that forces of freedom not so weak as to be forced to bow before Sov menace. Actually democracies are strong and Commie empire rampant with internal weakness. He saw no need to settle short of goal of unification and free elections.

My interpretation of letter, which only reiterates well defined ROK position, is that it was written largely for the record. It is eloquent appeal deserving sympathy and understanding as expressing widespread Korean convictions. Its fears for future, particularly prospects of continuing economic mil dependence on other nations, can hardly be refuted. On other hand Pres and most Koreans seem unable or unwilling recognize realities of situation, their position in global sphere and consequences to them of outbreak of world conflict. I do not feel that Rhee ltr adds very much to situation as known before but it highlights continuing need on our part to continue through all available media to explain US–UN position.

I called on Pres shortly after receiving Ridgway ltr. He recalled his request spring of 1949 for some sort of agreement between US and Korea.³ He suggested possibility of affirmation of amity clause on the Korean-American defense alliance.⁴ He further stated he wished Koreans might serve as part of UN security forces. Pres claimed he personally satisfied US will not abandon Korea but hoped for something to ease mind of people and thought alliance of some kind wld be helpful from every standpoint. He asked me to forward his ideas to my govt.

Sent priority Dept 61, rptd info priority Toyko 24 CINCFE.

Muccio

1. The complete text of President Rhee’s letter was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 22, July 20, from Pusan, not printed (795.00/7–2051).
2. See telegram 52, July 17, from Pusan, p. 694.
3. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, pp. 940 ff.

4. Presumably, this is an allusion to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of January 26, 1950; text in TIAS No. 2019, 1 UST 137. No bilateral mutual defense treaty was signed until October 1, 1953, and that treaty did not enter into force until November 17, 1954; text in TIAS No. 3097, 5 UST 2368.

   The comment attributed to Prime Minister Chang in telegram 65, infra, also appears to indicate that a mutual defense treaty was what the Korean officials had in mind.