Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 112: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, 25 July 1951—2:08 p. m.

JCS 97223. From JCS. Reur C 67474,¹ C 67520,² CX 67652³ and JCS 96938.⁴ JCS withheld approval your C 67474 because they considered it undesirable to issue warning in manner suggested and because to single out Pyongyang as the target for an all-out strike during the time we are holding conferences might in the eyes of the world appear as an attempt to break off negotiations.

In view of your C 67520 in which you emphasize over-riding military requirements, and your CX 67652 in which you suggest no warnings be given, objections to this strike are removed if you consider Pyongyang as your most important target. No publicity will be given to “mass” nature of this raid. Your public attitude should be this strike a normal operation against persistent enemy build-up. In this connection, JCS agree that mass raids constitute effective utilization of air power and assume you are considering similar raids against other targets.⁵

1. Dated July 21, p. 718.
2. Dated July 23, p. 721.

3. This message, dated July 25, read in part as follows:

   “… I would, if permitted to execute this plan, amend it by omitting all advance warning. Supporting reasons are:

   • “(a) United Nations air has been bombing military installations in urban areas continuously for over a year.
   • “(b) Civil populace of North Korea has been warned in the past to vacate areas in vicinity military installations and, accordingly, will be relatively insensitive to one more warning.
   • “(c) Weather uncertainties might cause appreciable delay in strike and thereby afford enemy unusual opportunity to improve and/or augment active and passive defense means with resultant increased losses of attacking aircraft.
   • “(d) Advance warning would subtantially, if not seriously reduce expected tactical benefits. …” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 109)

4. See footnote 1, p. 719.

5. General Ridgway responded in telegram C–67729, July 26, from Tokyo which read as follows:

   “Implications contained in your JCS 97223 fully appreciated here. I am having my chief of information and my major commanders give the publicity aspect their full attention. I suggest that it may be worthwhile for you to alert the appropriate public information agencies in Washington to this important matter.” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 113)

   The raid on Pyongyang took place on July 30. According to the report of the United Nations Command for the period July 16–31, 1951, it was a “comparatively large attack” which produced “considerable damage to military installations.” (U.N. document S/2333; see also Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 33–34)