Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 122: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, 30 July 1951—5:45 p. m.

C–67984. Subject: Armistice Negotiations.

Repeated herewith for your information is teleconference between UNC Delegation and CINCFE at 1800 [0800?] 30 July.

“(CINADV–1).

Secret

Official

The Communists remained adamant on their stand that the only military demarcation line they would consider was the 38th Parallel and they did not indicate interest in ideas in our papers.¹ On the other hand, there was no indication that they did not desire to continue the conference. They did not submit any new ideas and did not seem to have any other ideas to present nor any papers ready other than the one they presented today. They appear to be expecting that we will eventually weaken and accept the 38th Parallel in view of indications previously from other sources that settlement on basis of 38th Parallel would be satisfactory to us.

There are 4 possible courses of action open to us:

a. Continue meetings and our present stand.

b. Try to shift discussions to concrete arrangements—Item 3—to determine their position on military armistice commission and inspection teams as indicated in para 7 JCS 96930.²

c. Go to our final demilitarized zone position in hopes that such a compromise will cause them to discuss a line other than the 38th Parallel.

d. Recess for several days during which Washington issue strong statements that we will not consider the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line so that the Communists realize that our position will be adhered to by the highest authorities. After recess, UNC Delegation would state in strongest possible terms that 38th Parallel will not be considered.

We believe that the Communists may remain adamant on 38th Parallel at least until they are assured that neither the Delegation or the United Nations will ever deviate from the stand that the Delegation will not consider the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line.

The UNC Delegation recommends course (a) for 2 more days or until answer received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the stand the JCS will take on course (d).

Course (c) not recommended until Communists state they will consider some line or zone other than 38th Parallel. Delegation believes present circumstances not suitable for course b.

Delegation is somewhat reluctant to use this course because it may be interpreted by Commies as a sign that we are weakening.

(End CINADV–1)

(CINADV–2)

Secret

Official

Under course (a) it is my present intention to meet each day only long enough to elaborate our often repeated stand and then recess until the following day unless Nam Il has additional papers to present. Of course, should a weakening be indicated in the Commies attitude we would remain longer to determine their position and seek an agreement.

(End CINADV–2)

(CINADV–4)³

Secret

Official

I also intend to close my daily statements by reiterating “A buffer zone based on the 38th Parallel is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command”.

(End CINADV–4)⁴

FEC–1

Secret

Official

Ref CINADV–1

Your recommendation with respect to course a approved.

Instructions concerning your course b and c will follow at later date.

With respect to your course d, believe sufficiently positive statements have been made. These include that of Secretary of Defense of 24 July, amplified and strengthened by AP dispatch quoted below:

“General Matthew B. Ridgway’s truce instructions will permit him to make minor adjustments but no concessions in the UN demand that an armistice buffer zone in Korea follow the present battle line. Informed officials said that the United States intends to stand absolutely firm on this issue, which has produced a head-on clash with Communist negotiators at Kaesong, and on the question of an adequate system for inspection of all troops in Korea after an armistice is established. Ridgway’s instructions were described as covering a wide range of possible moves and counter moves for use as negotiations developed. But in the State Department there was strong belief today that long, hard sessions around the conference table will now have to precede any really significant break in the situation.”

Believe in pursuing course a for next 2 succeeding days or even longer, you should refrain from any suggestion of recess, forcing Communists to suggest recess or some other method of relieving impasse.

Developments you are now experiencing are in strict accord with the ancient oriental custom. Firmness and patience are the only effective counter measures, and must outdo theirs.

(End FEC–1)

FEC–2

Secret

Official

Ref CINADV–2

Concur.

(End FEC–2)

FEC–4

Secret

Official

Ref CINADV–4

Concur.

(End FEC–4)

[Here follows the brief concluding portion of this message, which did not contribute substantively to the preceding exchanges.]

1. Reference is to the meeting of July 29; see telegram C–67939, supra.
2. Dated July 21, p. 716.
3. The source text contained no mention of a “CINADV–3” nor an “FEC–3” in response.

4. General Ridgway reported on the 14th meeting, which took place at Kaesong on July 30, in his telegram C–67997, not printed. The summary and conclusion of that telegram read as follows:

   “Summary: The two delegations exchanged rebuttals of the other’s arguments, with Commies bringing forth no new arguments, merely repeating old ones. Admiral Joy offered broad invitation to en delegation to engage in discussion of UNC proposed zone with a view to minor adjustment, but Communists did not react. No evidence offered by either side of willingness to abandon its basic psn.

   “Conclusion: The conference is making no progress past the issue of 38th parallel.

   “No evidence of intent on part of enemy to yield, and no evidence of intent on their part to break off conferences.” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 124)