Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/8–351

Memorandum by John D. Hickerson and Livingston T. Merchant to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 3, 1951.

Subject: Courses of Action in the Event No Armistice is Achieved.

It is assumed that the courses of action to follow upon a failure of armistice talks will depend on the circumstances surrounding the termination of negotiations and the character and intensity of renewed hostilities by the Communists. We envisage the following possibilities:

A. Alternative One: The following circumstances exist:

(1) There is a definitive end to negotiations;

(2) The Communists launch mass offensive against UN forces;

(3) The enemy does not initiate massive air attacks.

Course of Action:

Military

a. Continue preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on relatively short notice;

b. Direct the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available;

c. Remove restrictions on advances into North Korea to the neck of the North Korean peninsula;

d. Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed:

(1) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(2) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming the major responsibility for the defense of Korea;

g. Remove all restrictions against attacks in North Korea (except Rashin), the Yalu River dams, and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on breakdown of armistice;

b. GA resolution recondemning the aggressor, reaffirming UN determination to carry on the fight, and requesting further assistance;

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

d. Additional vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to place blame for armistice breakdown on Communists, including wide publication Ridgway report;

b. Efforts to maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;

c. Efforts to spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;

d. Efforts to drive wedge between Peiping and Moscow.

Domestic

a. Presidential address to nation;

b. Stepped up national preparation for possible war;

c. Preparation of domestic opinion for greater sacrifices;

d. Public campaign to stress patience and resist pressures for preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in Far East.

B. Alternative Two: In addition to circumstances described in Alternative One enemy begins to use massive air attacks against UN ground or naval forces.

Course of Action: Same as under Alternative One; in addition:

Military

a. After consultation with the participating nations to the extent permitted by situation, institute “hot pursuit”, attacks on air bases in Manchuria and China (except Port Arthur and Dairen) from which enemy planes are launched, and on anti-aircraft installations protecting such bases.

b. Re-examine desirability of Chinese Nationalists for use in Korea and against China mainland.

Psychological Warfare

a. Program to inform world that Communists are responsible for prolongation and extension of hostilities, that UN will continue all efforts to keep area of hostilities limited to that required by military necessities, and that UN intends to make every effort to avoid World War III.

C. Alternative Three: Assumptions:

1. Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility open for renewal at any time;

2. Communists do not launch offensive or massive air attacks.

3. No evidence of major enemy ground or air build-up in Korea or Manchuria. (In other words enemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of de facto cease-fire without agreement.)

Course of Action:

Military

a. Maintain Kansas line defensive positions;

b. Make only tactical advances to keep enemy off balance and prevent possible build-up.

c. Continue air and naval activity on same basis as prior to armistice talks.

d. Build up ROK forces so they can take over increasing share of UN defense position.

e. Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

f. Develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming the major responsibility for the defense of Korea;

Diplomatic

a. Efforts, perhaps through the USSR, to resume armistice negotiations on basis consistent with UN objectives in Korea.

b. Efforts to obtain additional troops to better distribute defense burden and to increase number of countries contributing troops.

In the United Nations

a. Ridgway report on negotiations after some time has elapsed.

b. In Sixth GA, another GA resolution calling on Communists to give up their aggression and resume peace talks on UN basis.

c. Additional economic measures against China, looking toward complete economic blockade, including possible alternatives to naval blockade, e.g., calling on nations to control their own shipping, or to agree to have UN help them control shipping.

1. A notation on the source text indicated that this document was seen by Mr. Acheson.