With respect to the possible submission of the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the National Security Council for the information of the
Members, the Department of State has noted that the memorandum of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is in the nature of a commentary on the position
paper prepared for use of the United States Delegation to the Sixth
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and that,
accordingly, the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in its present
form could scarcely be circulated without circulating the position
paper. This position paper has been prepared within the framework of
existing national security policy, notably NSC 48/5, and consequently in the Department’s view there
is no reason to request the renewed consideration by the Council of the
approved policy in the paper. However, should the Joint Chiefs of Staff
desire to propose a re-examination by the National Security Council of
U. S. policy with respect to Formosa, the Department would of course
have no objection.
[Enclosure]
Position Paper Prepared in the Department of
State
secret
[Washington,] November 21,
1951.
Formosa
problem
To determine the United States position on Formosa in the Sixth
General Assembly assuming an armistice is
concluded in Korea.
united states objective
The policy of the United States is to deny Formosa to any Chinese
regime aligned with or dominated by the U.S.S.R. and expedite the
strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa. As appears
below, no permanent disposition of Formosa which would be acceptable
to the principal interested governments appears possible at this
time. Our immediate objective therefore is to postpone the issue,
and work so far as possible toward the development of an acceptable
solution, keeping in mind the importance of maintaining the maximum
possible support of other nations, particularly among the
Asians.
recommendations
- 1.
- The United States should oppose:
-
a.
- Any General Assembly move to link the Formosa question
to the settlement of the Korean problem;
-
b.
- Any move to call a conference on Far Eastern problems
(including Formosa), prior to a political settlement of
the Korean problem.
- 2.
- The U.S. should make vigorous efforts to prevent the question
of Formosa from being considered at the Sixth Session. Public
discussion in present circumstances could only expose and
underline the differences between us and our allies. We should
inform other delegations, if questioned regarding our views,
that while the armistice stopped hostilities, peace and security
were not yet fully restored; in the circumstances it does not
appear that a satisfactory permanent solution could be achieved
at this time. The question could be reexamined when there is a
political settlement in Korea or when the armistice had been in
effect sufficient time to establish Chinese Communist good faith
and intentions.
- 3.
- If it appears that despite our vigorous efforts a majority of
the members of the General Assembly will insist on taking up the
question of Formosa in one form or another it might be desirable
to steer the consideration toward a proposal that the Assembly
establish a special
[Page 1860]
commission to gather facts, hear interested parties including
the inhabitants of Formosa, explore all possible solutions, and
report to the General Assembly when done. If the situation
outlined in this paragraph seems to be developing, the
Delegation should consult the Department for further
instructions.
comment
[Here follows a summary of United States public statements and
developments in the United Nations, between June 27, 1950, and June
1951, regarding the disposition of Formosa.]
discussion
A. Possibilities of a Settlement Consonant with
United States Policy Objectives.
- 1.
- Formosa as part of “China”.
- Ethnic and historical factors support the proposition that
Formosa should be part of China. President Roosevelt, Prime
Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated
their intention in the Cairo Declaration that Formosa should be
restored to the Republic of China. Division in the world
community regarding the government which properly represents
China complicates the implementation of this Declaration. In
these circumstances the above solution would not adequately
protect the United States security interests which require that
Formosa be denied to a regime aligned with or dominated by the
U.S.S.R.
- 2.
- Trusteeship or other forms of United Nations administration
or supervision.
- The trusteeship system was intended to apply to people not yet
capable of self-government. The Formosans themselves may
possibly favor United Nations administration perhaps on a
temporary basis with a possibility to determine the final status
by a plebiscite at a later date. The mainland Chinese and the
National Government would probably oppose it. There is also
serious doubt whether this arrangement would adequately
safeguard the island against seizure by the Communists by
subversion or invasion. In any event, Nationalist control of the
island excludes this solution now.
- 3.
- An independent Formosa.
- This would not be acceptable to the Chinese, whether
non-Communist or Communist. An independent Formosa probably
would require external military and economic support
indefinitely.
- 4.
- Restoration to Japan.
- The Japanese Peace Treaty divests Japan of its sovereignty
over the island. This solution has accordingly been rejected.
- 5.
- Determination of the status of Formosa and the Formosans in a
free plebiscite.
- In a plebiscite which might be supervised by the United
Nations, the Formosans might vote for any of the above
alternatives 1–4. A free plebiscite would probably be impossible
under present circumstances owing to the presence of Nationalist
troops on the island and opposition by the National
Government.
- It appears that there is no presently
achievable solution for the disposition of Formosa which will
satisfy United States policy objectives. The unresolved question
of ultimate control of China and many other fluid factors in
Asia including the possibility of general hostilities in the Far
East make it impossible at this time to define our position on
the ultimate status of Formosa. On the other hand, a lapse of
time may well clarify these factors.
B. Possibilities for Maintaining a Satisfactory
Short Term Position.
Unlike the Korean question, where our position is supported by an
important majority in the United Nations and where we are able to
engage in negotiations without danger of isolation, our negotiating
position on the Formosa problem is most difficult. We cannot agree
to withdraw the Seventh Fleet under existing circumstances in view
of the danger that the Chinese Communists would take over the
island. We are equally unable to indicate that we agree that Formosa
should ultimately become part of China since we do not know what
Government will control China nor are we in position to support
other proposals for the disposition of the island. Our military
strength, particularly in the Far East, is still limited. Thus, our
position leaves very little room for negotiation at this time.
On the other hand, after an armistice we may be faced with a pressure
to have us agree to negotiations on Formosa, particularly if a
“peace atmosphere” should develop in Paris at the Sixth Assembly.
This pressure may come not only from the Asians, but also from our
Western European friends who accepted our decision to neutralize the
island at the most only as a temporary military expedient made
necessary by the aggression in Korea. Those who will advocate
negotiations will point to the fact that the United States itself,
prior to the large scale Chinese intervention in Korea, placed the
question of Formosa on the agenda of the Assembly; and that
Secretary Acheson indicated in the Joint Senate Committee hearings
the willingness of the United States to discuss Formosa when the
fighting in Korea is terminated, and the aggressor ceases the
defiance to the United Nations. Finally, the Communists will again
press this question and probably renew the charges made in the
Security Council and the Fifth Assembly that our action with respect
to Formosa constitutes aggression.
[Page 1862]
Following an armistice we may agree to participate in a conference on
a political settlement for Korea insisting that negotiations in this
conference must be limited to Korea.
We would oppose the calling of a special conference to consider Far
Eastern problems (including Formosa) until there is a political
settlement of the Korean problem. At that time we may not oppose
discussion of other Far Eastern problems in an appropriate
conference in which all parties with interests in the various
questions to be discussed would participate.
We should also make every effort to discourage consideration of the
ultimate status of Formosa in the Sixth Assembly. As indicated
above, no solution acceptable to us appears feasible in the present
circumstances and public discussion would only expose the
differences between us and our allies.
It is likely that our efforts to discourage the consideration of this
question in the Sixth Assembly will be successful. However, it is
possible that the question may be raised again in a more
objectionable form such as in the context of the mission of the
Seventh Fleet. Moreover, pressure may develop in the event of an
armistice, for the above referred special conference on Far Eastern
problems. In such circumstances, it may be desirable for the United
States to initiate or support an exhaustive study in the Assembly of
the broad question of the ultimate status of Formosa as an
alternative to the moves mentioned above. Any substantive
recommendations would be abided pending the study.
C. Mission of the Seventh Fleet.
It is the policy of the United States (NSC 48/5) to continue the mission presently assigned to
the Seventh Fleet, as long as required by United States security
interests. In the light of this policy, an armistice in Korea itself
would not so change the basic situation as to warrant terminating
the present mission of the Fleet.
We are unable to foresee how long it will be necessary and advisable
to continue this policy and we must therefore remain free to review
it from time to time, in the light of changing circumstances.
Consequently, if the United. Nations takes up the question of Formosa
under present circumstances, on one hand we must avoid any move to
force us to agree to withdraw the present mission of the Seventh
Fleet. On the other hand we should not commit ourselves to maintain
our neutralization policy for any specific period or indefinitely.
We should not ask the United Nations to endorse the mission of the
Seventh Fleet because, (a) such a request
would probably not receive an adequate majority, (b) a United Nations endorsement
[Page 1863]
would tie our hands if we should decide to
lift the restrictions imposed upon the National Government by the
present policy.
D. Proposal for study and inquiry.
If in the circumstances indicated in recommendation 3, the question
of Formosa comes up, the United States should endeavor to place
emphasis on the need for a peaceful solution of the Formosa question
in the interest of the international community and of the people of
Formosa. We should say that the problem of ultimate status of
Formosa required an extensive study as a question relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security under Article 11 and
requiring peaceful adjustment under Article 14, with full
opportunity for ascertaining all pertinent acts, hearing all
interested parties and considering all possible solutions. The
General Assembly should appoint a Commission to study the problem in
all of its aspects and report its findings at a later unspecified
date.
- 1.
- Composition of the Commission.
- In general in the commission the proportion of members
recognizing the National Government should be roughly the same
as obtains in the General Assembly, and the United States should
be represented in it. However, it should be recognized that the
problem of composition would raise a number of serious
difficulties.
- 2.
- United States attitude on the Merits of the Formosa
Problem.
- In the Assembly we should make clear our conviction that in
present circumstances the island should not be handed over to
Communist China. We should point out, however, that in our view
the problem of the ultimate status of Formosa should be explored
by the Commission and that we have no specific solution in mind
at this time. We should further state that in our view the
purpose of the Commission is to bring out all relevant factors
and provide a full exchange of views; and that we expect to
formulate our position as the work of the Commission progresses.
Beyond this we should indicate that the Commission should give
consideration to all factors including the Chinese claim to
Formosa, the well-being and wishes of the Formosans themselves,
and the interests of the United Nations in promoting peace and
security in the Western Pacific area. This interest of the
United Nations embraces not only the need for a peaceful
solution of this problem where use of force had been threatened;
it necessitates taking into account such other factors as the
past use of Formosa as a base for military aggression and the
possible future use of it for this purpose.
- 3.
- Work of the Commission.
- The scope and character of the study would be defined in the
broadest possible terms and the Commission would have wide
discretion in determining how far and in what direction it
wishes to proceed. It
[Page 1864]
would hear any person it desires. It may recommend some
procedure for determining the selection of representatives of
the Formosan people who would present the Formosan views to the
Commission. It would report to the Assembly at such time as it
will consider advisable.
