460.509/10–753: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
1831. 1. US Reps met with Reps Brit Emb and outlined proposals for bilateral talks with UK re COCOM and proposal to convene CG mtg first half Nov.
2. Fol paras give principal pts US resentation.
3. Shift in emphasis resulting from recent high level review US East-West trade policies was described. See CA–910 Aug 21, 1953.2 Principal pt made was that US emphasis in future wld be on improvement of enforcement and that addition items to security lists wld be de-emphasized.
4. US Reps pointed out that this shift in emphasis seemed called for by recent intelligence reports indicating much larger volume illicit trade than had previously been suspected. Pointed out also that US had been assuming role of international coordinator in illicit trade involving diversions of shipments among several countries. US did not believe this was role which any one nation shld be expected pursue in long run and that international group such as COCOM might more appropriately assume this essential function. This however wld require broadening in COCOM terms of reference and wld require development more explicit rules as to responsibilities individual countries in preventing movement diverted shipments.
5. US Reps also pointed to fact that in recent COCOM discussions re exceptions for shipments strategic goods to Soviet bloc, member countries have frequently injected political and economic considerations in discussion rather than confining themselves to examination [Page 1019] strategic nature particular shipment. Moreover other COCOM countries have become increasingly receptive to such considerations. US feels that in view fact such considerations cannot practicably be excluded from discussions, might be well alter CG/COCOM terms of reference to encompass such considerations. This step wld permit examination on their merits of contentions by exporting countries, e.g. that failure obtain particular order wld result significant unemployment. It wld also permit examination alternative courses of action open to exporter. We recognize risk that other nations might construe such change in terms of reference as reflecting willingness on our part permit more frequent exceptions but we wld propose to be clear that we did not anticipate this result.
6. Another pt raised in discussion was desirability altering COCOM terms of reference to permit discussion Soviet trade tactics wherever such tactics were related to movement of strategic goods to bloc. We made plain fact that we did not contemplate seminar on Soviet trade problems but wished only discuss those tactics as they bore on possibility increased export strategic goods. We felt that NATO also had legitimate interest in this problem and that periodic NATO discussions might also be appropriate. We assumed however that NATO discussions wld be far less particularized and wld be related to broader questions of strategy vis-à-vis Soviet bloc.
7. US Reps noted that in addition above pts it wld be desirable button up pending transit control scheme before or in course CG mtg. We felt that failure settle on this plan might prevent us from pursuing as rapidly and as far shift in emphasis described above para 3.
8. We noted that question of shipping controls was soon to come up in COCOM as part List II review and we felt that it wld be desirable postpone such review long enough for US and UK shipping experts get together to consider joint proposals. We stated that we propose to frame our own ideas in light new US directives described above and that we wished try some of these ideas on UK first.
9. Accordingly we suggested that UK invite us to London for talks Oct 19 to be followed by talks among shipping experts.3
10. For their part UK Reps made pts in fol paras:
[Page 1020]11. UK proposed in next ten days to raise question in Paris re continuation existing controls on antibiotics to Communist China. In this connection UK Reps asserted considerable domestic pressure for relaxation such controls, maintenance of which they regarded as dangerous from propaganda viewpoint and as imperilling their ability cooperate on strategic controls in general.
12. UK Reps also stated that above US proposals wld probably be far easier to swallow if US in fact intended substantial cutback list of strategic items. For our part we stated cutbacks cld only be justified if strategic considerations permitted, not as part of horse trade between US and UK.
13. Finally UK Reps stated that reaction to their antibiotics proposals might affect atmosphere in which UK considered our new proposals for CG/COCOM.
- Drafted by Vernon and repeated to Paris.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 2 to NSC 152/2, p. 1014.↩
- In response to this suggestion, according to Polto 582 from Paris, Oct. 15, 1953, the British requested that the bilateral talks be postponed until Nov. 1, and that the CG meeting be correspondingly postponed. (460.509/10–1553) The Department’s instruction CA–2186, Oct. 20, informed all American missions abroad that Nov. 3 had been finally agreed upon for the U.S.-British bilateral talks. (460.009/10–2053) For a summary of the discussions which took place at this meeting, see despatch 1714 from London, Nov. 10, p. 1039.↩