S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 163 Series
Statement of Policy by the National Security
Council1
top secret
NSC 163/1
Washington, October 24, 1953.
[Page 1035]
Security of Strategically Importantly
Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries
- 1.
- The security of strategically important industrial operations in
foreign countries is important to the national security of the United
States. U.S. efforts aimed at maintaining, and where feasible,
improving, the security of its most important and vulnerable foreign
sources of supply, should be continued.
- 2.
- A feasible program limited to the few absolutely essential foreign
installations should be carried out as follows:
- a.
- The program will be limited to (1) foreign-owned foreign
facilities listed in Annex 1–A; and (2) U.S.-owned foreign
facilities listed in Annex 1–B supplementing, as necessary,
action within the capabilities of the U. S. companies.
- b.
- The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, after
coordination with the Department of Defense, will be permitted,
in the event that the supply situation of any material, whether
or not listed in Annex 1, deteriorates or improves substantially
in relation to war needs, to add to or delete from the list one
or more facilities involved in its production, processing or
transportation.
- 3.
- Responsibility for implementing the program should be as follows:
- a.
- The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization will:
- (1)
- Administer the program in coordination with the
Departments of State and Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
- (2)
- Arrange for the conduct of surveys, where feasible, of
the security of the listed facilities and devise plans
for their protection, utilizing available facilities of
other agencies so far as practicable.
- b.
- The Department of State will determine the feasibility of and
will conduct any negotiations with foreign governments which
will be required under the program. Where appropriate, security
and intelligence liaison channels will be used in arranging for
foreign cooperation.
- c.
- The Central Intelligence Agency will provide, from time to
time at the request of ODM,
intelligence appraisals of the nature and extent of the threat
of sabotage to the security of each of the listed facilities;
and, in exceptional circumstances with the concurrence of the
Department of State, will conduct covert surveillance of such
facilities.
- 4.
- Administration of the program by the ODM will take into account the appraisals made by the
CIA, as well as the assurances
received from responsible governments or private companies, in
determining the need for surveys of facilities and in recommending
protective action to be taken.
- 5.
- Expenditures for surveys and protective measures in Fiscal Year 1954
should not exceed $25,000 and $75,000 respectively, from funds to be
provided by the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense
Mobilization or the Central Intelligence Agency, subject to the approval
of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Annex 1
A. Foreign-Owned Facilities
1. cobalt
Belgian Congo
- (a)
- (1) Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (Belgian) processing facilities
(concentration, ore treatment, and refining) in Katanga
Province;
- (2) Three hydroelectric stations in same province; and
- (3) Other facilities, if any, which on the basis of further
investigation prove to be of equal or greater importance to the
entire operation. (The mines have been omitted because production is
scattered and involves surface operations not specially vulnerable
to sabotage.)
- (b)
- In 1951 this source provided about 90% of U.S. supply of cobalt
and it is estimated that during the first year of an emergency about
65% of our requirements will come from this source, 25% from
domestic supply, and the balance from the stockpile (of which 40% is
on hand).
2. nickel
Canada
- (a)
- (1) International Nickel Co. of Canada smelter at Copper Cliff,
Ont., and
- (2) International Nickel Co. of Canada refinery at Port Colborne,
Ont.
- (b)
- In 1951 U.S. obtained 93% of its supply from Canada. Estimates
during the first year of an emergency about 80% of requirements will
come from Canada. The stockpile is only 15% complete.
3. bauxite
Surinam (Dutch)
- (a)
- Billiton &Co. (Dutch) mines at Ovverbacht, Para Creek
District, 25 miles southeast of Paramaribo. These mines supply about
25% of Surinam production, the remaining properties being
American-owned; see B–3 below.
- (2) Port Facilities at Moenga.
- (b)
- U.S. obtained 52% of its supply of bauxite from Surinam in 1951.
It is estimated that during the first year of an emergency 40% of
requirements will come from that country.
Trinidad (British)
Transhipping facilities. The availability of Surinam bauxite is dependent
on port facilities in Surinam plus transhipping facilities in
Trinidad.
4. petroleum
Curacao (Dutch)
- (a)
- Shell Company (Dutch) refinery at Wilhelmstadt.
- (b)
- This refinery has crude charging capacity of 350,000 B/D. With the U.S.-owned refinery of
Aruba (see B–4 below) it represents the principal means of refining
Venezuelan petroleum production. Although at present a large part of
the output is marketed in Europe, large reliance is placed on it for
U.S. wartime supply.
5. copper
Chile
Principal companies are U.S.-owned. (See B–5 below)
B. U.S.-Owned Facilities
1. cobalt—(None)
2. nickel
Cuba
- (a)
- Nicaro Nickel Co. refinery, Oriente Province.
- (b)
- Produces 30 million lbs. nickel oxide per year; about 14% of the
U.S. requirement during the first year of an emergency,
3. bauxite
Surinam (Dutch)
- (a)
- U.S.-owned mines, accounting for 75% of Surinam production.
- (b)
- See A–3 above.
4. petroleum
Venezuela
- (a)
- U.S.-owned producing fields and refineries, principally located in
Lake Maracaibo area.
- (b)
- Approximately 70% of U.S. petroleum imports in 1952 came from
Venezuela, normally after refining at Curacao and Aruba. State
Department progress report of June 8, 1953 indicates over-all
[Page 1038]
security situation
spotty, with Creole Company having the only complete security system
under which regulations are enforced and adequate equipment
maintained.
Aruba
- (a)
- Standard Oil of New Jersey refinery; crude charging capacity of
470,000 B/D.
- (b)
- With the Dutch-owned refinery at Curacao, it represents principal
means of refining Venezuelan petroleum, (see A–4 above)
Indonesia
(a) Standard Vacuum Co. refinery at Palembang; capacity 72,000 B/D.
5. copper
Chile
- (a)
- U.S.-owned (Kennecott and others) production, power and
transportation facilities (including ports)
- (b)
- In recent years from 10 to 20% of U.S. copper supply has been
imported from Chile. It is estimated that during the first year of
an emergency 20% of our requirements would come from that country.
The stockpile is approximately 53% complete.
