Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

511.00/4–2253: Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

confidential

Washington, April 22, 1953—5:05 p.m.

The Soviet “Peace Offensive”

Following is Infoguide Bulletin 342.

USSR: President Eisenhower’s speech of April 16,² designed to seize the political and psychological initiative from the USSR at the current critical juncture in international relations, sets the framework of United States’ principles and overall policies looking toward settlement of outstanding issues and relaxation of world tensions. In the words of Secretary Dulles (in his speech April 18 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors)³ the President’s speech has thrown back the so-called Soviet “peace-offensive” and turned it into a “peace-defensive”.

Information policy guidance on continuing exploitation of the President’s speech and subsequent planned developments to maintain the political and psychological initiative vis-à-vis the USSR has been, and will be, given as circumstances require.

Meanwhile the Soviet Government and other members of the Soviet bloc, including the Chinese Communists, may be expected to continue the current campaign of “peace” gestures and “peace” overtures. The guidance below, based upon a consensus of Department thinking in estimating the motivations and significance of the current Soviet “peace” moves given in the immediately following FYI section, is intended to set a general pattern for information output in dealing with continuing manifestations of Soviet-Communist “peace” attitudes.

(FYI begins: While it is still too early to determine the exact meaning of recent Soviet gestures of a seemingly conciliatory nature, the Department is inclined to doubt that they indicate any change in basic Soviet long-range objectives. In analyzing these moves it must be kept in mind that Soviet policies are basically determined not so much by individuals as by the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state structure and by the doctrines of Communist ideology. There has been no evidence that these factors have changed. Moreover, the new Kremlin leaders were trained in the Stalinist school; they have long participated in the formulation of Soviet policies and have never, so far as is known, disagreed with Stalinist objectives. It must be recognized that the death of Stalin has probably created strains and tensions which the new regime needs time to overcome. The achievement of a “breathing spell” by a tactical retreat would simply be an application of standard Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

On the other hand, it is possible that the new regime does not regard itself as irrevocably bound by the positions of the previous regime. It may even be that in their efforts to establish themselves and consolidate their power the new leaders in the USSR have special and personal interests which, in their judgment, can conveniently be advanced by departure from established Stalinist policies. However, we cannot assume that they need or desire any general settlement or that they would readily abandon their long-range objectives.

Whether the new leaders are playing for time in which to consolidate their position or whether it is their intent to employ new tactics in an effort to accomplish what earlier Soviet aggressive policies could not accomplish—namely to disrupt and disarm the coalition of free nations—we cannot exclude the possibility that they may find it both convenient and useful to make certain adjustments of accommodation. While it is most unlikely that a general settlement of international tensions can be obtained at this time, it is possible that by remaining ready to respond if genuine offers are made we may obtain certain advantages from the new Soviet attitude.

Whatever may be the real significance of current Soviet maneuvers, it is clear that the almost universal fear of war throughout the world may cause many people to feel that the present Soviet gestures constitute “peace offers” which if properly responded to would lead to an easing of tension. Even the less credulous may feel that future sacrifices would be more bearable if all honorable and reasonable means to achieve a settlement had been explored. In these circumstances it would be unwise to appear to reject Soviet gestures out of hand and thereby to invite the onus of obstructing peace. Ends FYI).

In light of the above, it is highly important at this critical stage that all United States information activities, both in public projection and in private contacts and conversations, make every effort to:

(a) explain clearly and positively the United States’ position with respect to Soviet moves of apparent conciliation;

(b) maintain a posture which does not jeopardize exploitation by our diplomacy of whatever opportunities the unfolding situation may present for resolution of substantive issues;

(c) exercise caution with respect both to tone and content of output so as to give no ground for subsequent accusations, particularly on the part of allied and neutral powers, that it was United States’ intransigeance or bellicosity which ruined the chances of desired accommodation;

(d) make clear that some time may elapse before we can form a reliable impression of the intentions of the new Soviet regime and that, in the meantime, particularly in the light of demonstrated Soviet capabilities, the free nations cannot afford to relax their efforts to build collective strength.

Treatment:

The basic attitudes of the United States towards the whole complex of Free World-Soviet orbit relations and the fundamentals of United States’ policies looking toward the settlement of outstanding issues and relaxation of international tensions have been set forth in President Eisenhower’s speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, and Secretary Dulles’ supporting speech to the same body April 18. Further high-level utterances implementing the major themes of the President’s speech may be expected in the near future.

Specific United States’ attitudes towards the current Soviet “peace” gestures were set out in President’s press conference statement April 2 (Annex 1) and Secretary’s press conference statement April 3 (Annex 2).⁴

Taken together, these official high-level utterances set a general posture for United States official information output for treatment of current and future developments of the so-called “Soviet peace offensive”. This posture may be summed up as follows:

The United States genuinely desires peace and has consistently acted on the basis of that desire. Examples are our efforts to achieve an armistice in Korea, to conclude an Austrian treaty, to reach a satisfactory German settlement, to work out a reliable formula for reduction and regulation of armed forces and armaments, etc.

We do not presume to pass judgment on Soviet “peace” gestures before the USSR has had sufficient opportunity to prove their sincerity. We accept all signs at face value while we await clarification of Soviet intentions. We cannot, of course, disregard the history of frustrations and disappointments of the past eight years, and the many lessons we had to learn through bitter experience of Soviet duplicity and intransigeance. If we are disposed to caution and reserve that is justifiable in the light of recent history and of demonstrated Soviet capability to menace the security of the community of free nations. It is natural that we should be careful.

The Soviet Government is in a position to demonstrate the sincerity of its peaceful intentions, not by “concessions” on minor or peripheral matters which are normally resolved by conciliation as a matter of routine international comity, but through actions of substantive significance. It is clearly within the power of the USSR to take such actions.

If the Soviet leaders demonstrate constructive action—as differentiated from mere propaganda—on serious matters of substance they will not find us wanting. President Eisenhower has stated flatly that the United States is prepared to go “at least halfway” to meet all sincere, serious and constructive overtures. In his speech of April 16, he set forth in impressive detail what the United States is prepared to do. The question now is: “What is the Soviet Union ready to do?”

While reflecting both in tone and content of output the general posture set out above, treatment should also conform to the following specific points:

1. In general, we should make careful distinction in output between our treatment of developments concerning actual diplomatic negotiations, and our treatment of developments in other fields. Output with respect to actual diplomatic negotiations should be factual, scrupulously correct in tone, and should not attempt to score debating points on tactical issues.

2. Output should avoid discussions which attempt to lump together or catalog the various actions which make up the Soviet “peace defensive”. We should analyze such actions individually, each on its own merits, while referring to the “peace defensive”, where necessary to speak of it in general terms, in some such description as “recent Soviet overtures, many of them essentially only of token character”.

3. We should emphatically not attempt to specify any particular issue as constituting “the acid test” of Soviet good faith, or what order of priority must be observed in the resolution of substantive issues, except that we should emphasize the President’s statement that “the first great step … must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea”.

4. Wherever the facts justify our doing so, we should point out that this or that Soviet gesture is not a “new offer” made on Soviet initiative, but is actually a belated response to suggestions or proposals originally made on the initiative of the free world. A clear-cut example of this is the proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners-of-war in Korea.

5. We should, as opportunity offers and particularly in output to non-Communist areas, remind audiences that the Soviet gestures to date, either individually or in their totality, give no assurance whatever of Soviet abandonment of long-range Communist objectives; they are instead all consistent with the standard Marxist doctrine of “tactical retreat”. In this connection we can usefully recall pertinent elements of Communist doctrine, particularly Stalin’s pronouncement on “The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR”, published on the eve of the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party last October. That pronouncement reaffirms the need to promote conflicts and exploitable weaknesses in the non-Communist world. Where used, however, material of this type should be balanced by appropriate references to United States’ willingness to go at least halfway to meet all sincere, constructive overtures.

6. In the past Soviet “peace” gestures have frequently been counterbalanced by Soviet actions demonstrating continued aggressiveness. If such aggressive actions occur in the future, they should be characterized as raising legitimate questions as to Soviet intentions and as justifying continued free world skepticism.

7. It is essential at this critical juncture to maintain our own capabilities and freedom of action adequately to meet shifts—easily made by a totalitarian dictatorship like the USSR—in the intentions of the Soviet power bloc with which we have to deal. Output to non-Communist areas should, therefore, continue to carry factual material setting forth the relationship of Soviet capabilities to intentions. We should also cross-report statements of prominent free world spokesmen warning of the continued need for caution and vigilance, and of the dangers of relaxation of free world efforts.

8. Output to the USSR should continue to use materials designed to exploit the situation created by the death of Stalin and the transfer of power in the USSR to new hands. Encouragement of whatever divisive forces may emerge in the new Soviet power setup should, however, be promoted without stridency, and preferably in the form of raising questions relating to concrete Soviet-orbit developments.

9. Materials exposing the true nature of the Soviet system should be continued in output, e.g., forced labor, police-state methods, denial of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Handling of these standard themes should be neither belligerent nor hortatory.

10. While output to the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe should devote no more attention to Soviet “peace” gestures than is strictly necessary for credibility, it should give strong emphasis to the theme expressed in President Eisenhower’s April 16 speech, calling upon the USSR to “allow other nations, including those in Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own form of government”.

Cautions:

a. We do not reflect alarm or anxiety with respect to the implications of current or future Soviet “peace” moves. Our attitude is: we have faith in our ability to cope with situations regardless of how they may develop. If Soviet gestures are not followed by deeds of substantive significance, we will have incontrovertible evidence that their peace protestations are fraudulent.

b. We should not attempt to take propaganda credit for Soviet moves whose bona fides have not been established. We should avoid suggesting that the Soviet world is suffering from serious internal weaknesses, a suggestion which might be seized upon as excuse for relaxation of free world defense efforts. We may, however, suggest in appropriate contexts that the Soviet conciliatory attitude may have been influenced in part by their realization of the growing strength and unity of the free world, particularly as evidenced by NATO, EDC, and progress towards unity in Europe.

c. We should not react impulsively to tactical moves such as Vishinsky’s apparent reversal on the repatriation of Korean POW’s. It is particularly important to avoid drawing “final conclusions” concerning the exact meaning of Soviet “peace” gestures from tactical moves of this kind.

Annex 1: Extract from Transcript of President Eisenhower’s Press Conference, April 2, 1953.

Q. Mr. President, what is your estimation of the analysis of the recent peace overtures from Russia and Communist China?

A. The President said it was very difficult to say that any speculation on this affair should be dignified with the term “analysis”, and that you were really doing some pretty definite guessing. But, he said, he thought that in this whole business of the peace approach in which the hearts of America were so deeply involved, we should take at face value every offer which was made to us until it was proved not to be worthy of being so taken; and that by that, he did not mean we ignored the history of the past, and some of the frustrating experiences we have had in trying to promote peaceful arrangements with some of the people with whom we would now have to deal. But he did say, the President remarked, that here was something which when the proffer came along, we should go right at it like it was meant exactly as it was said.

Now, in the proposal made by the Chinese Commanders in Korea, the President said, which was in response to a request made by General Clark in February, and in line with the recommendations which the United Nations side of the negotiations had repeated over and over again, it was stated it was believed that the free exchange of sick and wounded prisoners during hostilities would do much to promote negotiations for an armistice. Now, the President continued, we have therefore the hope that this exchange of sick and wounded prisoners will be quickly accomplished, which, certainly, to his mind would be clear indication that deeds rather than words and more frustrating conversations were now to come into fashion—something which certainly every right thinking person would welcome very heartily.

Annex 2: Extract from Transcript of Secretary Dulles’ Press Conference, April 3, 1953.

Mr. Dulles: “Nothing that has happened, or which seems to me likely to happen, has changed the basic situation of danger in which we stand. There are three basic facts, which, I think, we should always have in mind as long as they are the facts.

“The first is this: The Soviet Union is a heavily armed totalitarian state, subject to the dictates of a small group, whose total control extends to one-third of the people and the natural resources of the world.

“The second fact is that the leaders of the Soviet Union are basically and deeply hostile to any other state which does not accept Soviet Communist control. That is part of their fanatically-held creed.

“The third fact is that the Soviet Communist leaders do not recognize any moral inhibitions against the use of violence. In fact, they do not admit the existence of such a thing as the moral law.

“Now those facts combine to create a grave danger, and, as I said, nothing that has happened, or seems likely to happen in the near future, ends that danger, or our need, or the need of the free world generally, to take precautions against it. That, however, does not prevent accommodations from time to time which may be useful—useful, if, but only if, they do not blind us to the persistence of the danger.

“At the moment I see nothing which ends that danger or would justify us in changing any of our basic defensive policies, either alone or in conjunction with our allies. Now, there are, as I have said, possibilities of useful accommodation that could relate to such matters as the exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war in Korea, and if good faith is shown in relation to that, then there may be the possibility of an armistice in Korea. …

“The point I want to make is that so long as these three conditions persist, to which I referred, we must not, in my opinion, assume that the danger is over, and that we are living in a peaceful world which requires neither armament nor our allies. …”

Smith

1. Drafted by Montgomery and Revey; cleared by Phillips, Pratt, Raine, Straus, Sanger, Connors and by Ray L. Thurston and Walter J. Stoessel of EE, Henry B. Cox of EUR/P, Lawrence W. Wadsworth of FE/P, and Major Kelleher of Defense; sent to 98 posts and the Department of Defense.
2. Reference is to the speech entitled “The Chance for Peace” delivered by President Eisenhower before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. It is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179–188. Circular telegrams 1035 and 1044 of Apr. 16 and 17, 1953 respectively, had earlier stressed the importance of promoting the President’s speech. Circular telegram 1035 stated, inter alia, that the “Address should be made occasion exceptional efforts to assure its importance recognized and intent correctly interpreted. Diplomatic officials of all overseas missions have been instructed present copy speech to Foreign Ministers and to discuss widely with diplomatic colleagues.” Circular telegram 1044 asserted that the President’s address “is policy statement of major importance. Trust you will make every effort under leadership Ambassador to insure its importance and deep sincerity is fully appreciated”. (511.00/4–1653 and 4/1753)
3. Reference is to the address by Secretary Dulles entitled “The First 90 Days” printed in Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 603–608.
4. The President’s press conference of Apr. 2, 1953 is printed in full in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 147–160. The excerpts from Secretary Dulles’ Apr. 3 press conference are also printed in Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 524.