320/7–2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Matthews) to the Department of State

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124. Geneva for Under Secretary Smith.1 Foreign Minister Luns asked me to call urgently and told me that he could not sufficiently express, not only in his own name but in that of Prime Minister Drees and his colleague Beyen the “utter dismay and extreme indignation” at Department’s decision to support Prince Wan for Presidency GA (Deptel 95, July 20). He said while it was true no formal commitment to support Van Kleffens had been given, three times the question had been discussed with the Department by the Dutch and they had definite [Page 559] impression of American support and encouragement. He emphasized there had been three Asian Presidents and only one European. To the Dutch he said this American decision is “proof positive” of complete lack of interest in or understanding of views of smaller countries by US. To gain a “cheap and ephemeral victory” in Asia he said the US is going back on its moral commitment to the Netherlands. After Dutch ratification EDC he said Under Secretary Smith had told Ambassador Van Roijen that because of that courageous step Dutch could ask “practically anything of US and it would be granted”. He was now appealing to us to reconsider our position re Van Kleffens and to implement this “promise” of Under Secretary Smith.2 He said Prime Minister Drees had directed him to inform me in name of entire Dutch Government that this would have deep and lasting effect on Dutch attitude toward other questions. Luns referred to delay in consulting Neitherlands re “united action” Southeast Asia, to our unwillingness to support Dutch on Indonesia and New Guinea questions, to “Bonsal’s open encouragement” to Indonesians on New Guinea which have already disillusioned Dutch Government but decision unwillingness support Van Kleffens is “the last straw”. In conclusion he told me that Dutch have already received assurances of support for Van Kleffens from substantial number of countries not only in Europe but in Latin America and Near East and government is determined whatever the outcome to maintain the candidacy of Van Kleffens.

While I can understand reasons behind Department’s decision support Prince Wan I must stress that if we do not support Van Kleffens we cannot expect further Dutch cooperation on EDC, NATO or any other important matter. It will poison the atmosphere of Dutch-American relations.

Matthews
  1. Sent as telegram 1 niact.
  2. In telegram 120, July 21, midnight, from Geneva, Under Secretary Smith cabled: “I made no such promise to Dutch, although I heartily agree with you they deserve something from us.” (320/7–2154).