Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

714.001/6–2354

Notes of a Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, Held at the Department of State, June 23, 1954¹

secret

June 23, 1954

• Present: Holland, Atwood, Burrows, Jamison, Sanders, Weiland, Herron, Sparks, Woodward, Warren, … Leddy, Pearson, Col. Clark, Dreier

1. Security Council Action

(a) Lodge informed Holland that the British and French representatives² to the Security Council are prepared to go along with a Soviet proposal that the Council send peace observers to Central America. Lodge believed that he would have to go along unless an OAS organization announced that it was planning to send observers.

(b) Holland later during the meeting called Lodge and told him the following: 1) our plans for action in the IAPC, which, if successful, would mean that that body would propose to send peace observers; 2) in his statement³ opposing the Guatemalan request for further Security Council action he could say that this is a dispute involving charges of Guatemala on the one hand and denials by Nicaragua and Honduras on the other hand, that this dispute was being handled by an inter-American organization just as it should be, that Nicaragua and Honduras would accept observers from an inter-American organization but not from the Security Council where the Soviet veto was used to prevent reference of the Guatemalan charges to the OAS; 3) as a second part of his statement before the Council, he should emphasize that there is another far more fundamental problem, namely, the attempts by international communism to penetrate the Western Hemisphere. This problem also is under study in the OAS.

2. Preparation for IAPC Meeting

Since the IAPC was meeting this afternoon and since Lodge had made his call concerning the British and French attitude toward the peace observer proposal, it was necessary to plan the best course of action. The following actions were decided:

(a) Since Valle had, without instruction, sent a note⁴ to the IAPC requesting that the Guatemalan charges be taken up, Holland called Willauer to tell him to persuade the Honduran Foreign Minister⁵ 1) to give Valle the instructions⁶ backing up the note which he had left with the IAPC and 2) to call Quintanilla direct concerning the Honduran position. Holland placed a call later to have Willauer ask the Foreign Minister to instruct Valle to ask that peace observers be sent by the IAPC.

(b) Holland called Sevilla-Sacasa and got him to agree to a plan whereby, after making the statement⁷ which he had already prepared, he would request that peace observers be sent to all three countries; indicate that his country was always prepared to receive observers from an OAS organization but that he would oppose observers from the Security Council because of the Soviet veto; suggest that the Committee invite the three countries to send delegates to discuss the arrangements for the peace observation mission.

(c) Dreier was to talk with the Argentine, Mexican, Brazilian and Cuban representatives to the IAPC to persuade them to respond favorably to the request by Nicaragua and Honduras for peace observers and to say that they would recommend that their governments approve this proposal.

(d) Dreier was to persuade the Cuban representative to propose that the investigation begin with Guatemala.

(e) Burrows was to help Valle draft a note⁸ to the Committee complaining of the bombing of Honduran territory by Guatemala and also to see that he got in touch with Sevilla-Sacasa.

3. Draft Resolution

Secretary Dulles would not approve sending notes to the Foreign Ministers in an effort to get their agreement in advance that no changes would be made in the draft resolution without the unanimous approval of the sponsoring group. He indicated that it would damage his prestige if some of these countries did not accept. Consequently, it was decided to send a message to each of our Ambassadors instructing them to obtain the oral agreement of the Foreign Minister to our proposal to be confirmed at a later date in writing. When a total of fourteen countries, including ourselves, have approved this proposal the meeting will be called.

4. U.S. Plans if Armas Fails

(a) Holland observed that the messages coming in from all over Latin America bear out Warren’s observation at the previous meeting⁹ that the revolution and particularly its failure would result in greatly lowered prestige for the U.S. in Latin America. Guatemala is more than ever the underdog and hence has very great appeal to all Latin Americans.

(b) As a general course of action we should take all steps possible to minimize the Guatemalan underdog position and we should also do everything possible to take the stigma surrounding the revolution off the U.S.

(c) The primary immediate actions discussed at this meeting were a) preparation for the IAPC meeting and b) advice to Lodge on the Security Council meeting, both of which were discussed above.

1. Drafted by Mr. Pearson.
2. Sir Pierson Dixon and Henri Hoppenot, respectively.
3. Apparent reference to Ambassador Lodge’s statement made before the Security Council on June 25, 1954; for text, see USUN press release 1927, dated June 25, in Department of State Bulletin, July 5, 1954, pp. 29–31.
4. For a summary and quoted portions of the referenced note, dated June 22, 1954, see Annals of the Organization of American States, 1954, p. 240.
5. J. Edgardo Valenzuela.
6. In a memorandum to Mr. Holland, dated June 23, 1954, summarizing a telephone conversation with Ambassador Willauer which took place at 11 a.m. on that date, Mr. Leddy stated in part that the Ambassador was asked “to see whether the Government there could be encouraged to send Ambassador Valle some instructions for the presentation of the Honduran case before the I–A Peace Committee.” (714.00/6–2354)
7. Reference is to the statement made by Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa before the IAPC on June 23, 1954, in which, inter alia, he denied the truth of Guatemalan charges against Nicaragua, explained that the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries resulted from Communist infiltration into Guatemala, and suggested that the IAPC’s subcommittee on information should visit Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala; a translation of the text of the Ambassador’s statement is attached to 363.1/7–654.
8. No such note was found in Department of State files.
9. Reference to the meeting of the Guatemalan Group held at the Department on June 22, 1954; the notes of that meeting, by Mr. Pearson, record Mr. Warren as having “expressed the view that if Castillo Armas loses we will probably lose at Montevideo.” (714.001/6–2254)