Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, 1953–61, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 174th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 10, 1953

top secret
eyes only

Washington, December 11, 1953.

Present at the 174th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense; Gen. Porter, Foreign Operations Administration; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Maurice Arth, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 5); the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follow items 1–2, dealing with significant world developments affecting United States security and the Bermuda Conference. For that part of the minutes dealing with the discussion of the Bermuda Conference, see page 1847.]

3. The NATO Ministers meeting

Secretary Dulles indicated that it was the intention of the U.S. delegation at the forthcoming NATO Ministers conference¹ to emphasize the following points:

1. The long-range nature of the Soviet threat and the need to adapt NATO programs to this long-term threat.

2. The added capabilities for defense conferred by new weapons.

3. The desirability of a fuller interchange of information on these new weapons.

4. The importance of bringing the German contingents into the structure for the defense of Western Europe.

All that we would say at Paris, continued Secretary Dulles, would be firmly based on the premise that EDC will presently come into being. If this eventuality did not occur we would, of course, have drastically to reconsider our plans and policies.

Secretary Dulles indicated that the delegation would also make every effort to avoid discussion of the redeployment of U.S. forces in Europe. In this connection he said he wished to bring up a point that deserves most careful consideration, namely, the very delicate and important psychological implications of the redeployment of any substantial number of our troops. Secretary Dulles said that he was of course well aware that such a redeployment was our goal, but that nevertheless, under the instructions of the National Security Council, it was the responsibility of the Department of State to prepare the way by diplomacy for such eventual redeployment. This diplomatic task would be rendered completely unsuccessful if, through other than State Department sources, the impression were to get around that the United States was shortly planning to pull out of Europe. Every time such statements were made by officials of this Government, the Secretary of State had to forthwith issue denials. The more often such denials had to be issued, the more solidly frozen was the United States position on this issue.

The President said that he had no particular objection to philosophical dissertations on the general effect of our new weapons on strategy, but as for any attempt to relate these new weapons to the status of U.S. forces in Europe, he wanted everybody to keep still. Our great objective now, continued the President, is to get EDC ratified and the German contingents in place. Until these objectives have been achieved, let us all keep quiet on redeployment.

Secretary Wilson said he was troubled by the question whether or not to indicate, in statements about force levels for the services in future years with respect to NATO, the possibilities for successive reductions. He said that if we did not soon indicate some change in this area, the position vis-à-vis the NATO powers would be frozen.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the conviction that the President ought very shortly to lay out in a public statement what he called “the pattern of our new defense posture”. He noted that the President’s UN speech² had been followed very quickly by a Pentagon announcement of a reduction in the total force levels of the services. This had been followed by statements indicating a reduction in the budget for national defense of some $6 billion. Under present plans there would come, about March 1, the announcement that we were redeploying the two divisions from Korea. This significant series of moves would create the most dangerous speculation and very serious problems unless the President could indicate that all these moves followed a set pattern regarding our new defense posture. The President’s statement should therefore reflect the attribute of strength, not only for ourselves but for our allies, and at a considerably reduced cost. If this were done and people really grasped the essentials of our new defense posture, they would not be frightened over the imagined implications of the individual steps. These would then appear to be the result of design rather than of happenstance.

The President replied that he thought Secretary Humphrey was right in general, but he stressed again the very touchy feelings in Europe on the subject of any U.S. redeployment. We, more than any other people, said the President, have accepted the atomic age in which we now all live. Many European peoples are lagging far behind us and think of themselves only as the defenseless targets of atomic warfare. Thus, while Secretary Humphrey’s pattern idea was eminently sensible, we should proceed to carry it out very gradually. The President also observed that for all our talk of U.S. redeployment, the British did not have a single division in the home islands. They regarded themselves as far more “stretched out” than we are.

Secretary Wilson replied that it was a matter of great distress to him that we now seemed hopelessly caught between the fear of the Europeans as to the use of atomic weapons, and our own desire to bring our forces home.

The President reacted with some warmth to the point made by Secretary Wilson, and explained that our one great objective at the moment was to secure the ratification of EDC. Accordingly, it seemed crystal-clear to the President that we could not afford to take any steps toward redeployment, or even to talk about redeployment, until these objectives have been reached. The French have an almost hysterical fear that we and the British will one day pull out of Western Europe and leave them to face a superior German armed force.

After these remarks, there seemed to be general agreement that the President alone should make any public statements on the redeployment problem. Secretary Dulles, in this connection, warned that while we regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of defensive strength, many of our allies regarded the atomic capability as the gateway to annihilation.

Secretary Humphrey repeated that his only thought was that a certain number of steps were being taken and that it would be advantageous for the President to indicate and explain the pattern of these steps.

To this the President replied that as far as preparing our friends behind the scenes for accepting our new strategic concept was concerned, this was the responsibility of the Department of State. Public statements on the relation between new weapons and the redeployment of U.S. forces were in the province of the President.

Secretary Wilson then stated his belief that it would be a mistake to move the U.S. forces now stationed at Trieste to Austria in the event of a settlement of the Trieste problem. After all, said Secretary Wilson, the British and French had removed many of their forces without bothering to talk to us in advance.

Secretary Dulles replied that from a strictly political point of view, he would interpose no objection to bringing our forces in Trieste home after the Trieste problem had been satisfactorily settled. As for the military implications of such a move, he felt he must leave these to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford.

The President pointed out that it was unwise to move too hastily to bring back our forces from Trieste. After all, our plans called for flank protection for Southern Germany as well as protection for Northern Italy. However, if once we could get Trieste settled and get the Italians and the Yugoslavs together, we could certainly envisage bringing these forces home.

Secretary Wilson commented that there were several million dollars involved here, and it would be awfully useful to him to know whether these dollars were to be put in or taken out of next year’s Defense Department budget. The President answered that he would not put this amount in the 1955 Defense Department budget.

Secretary Wilson, who seemed relieved, pointed out that if one were ever to make a beginning of redeployment one would have to start with small steps. The action of the Council in recommending last week the redeployment of two divisions from Korea had been very helpful, but Secretary Wilson hoped we would not stop there.

Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed themselves as favoring the redeployment of these two divisions, but they pointed out that a sudden unilateral announcement by the United States of its intention to redeploy these two divisions might well have the great disadvantage of causing others of our allies in the UN to scramble to redeploy their own contingents.

The President expressed skepticism as to this eventuality, and pointed out that he had told Sir Winston Churchill that he expected the British Commonwealth Division to remain in Korea. Secretary Dulles promised that he would do his best to keep the Commonwealth Division in Korea, and he believed that Sir Winston would agree to this course.

Admiral Radford commented at some length on the psychological importance of the timing of the announcement that these two divisions were coming back to the United States. Not least of the advantages which could be derived from the right kind of handling of this move would be the indication it would give to our allies that if we have to fight another war we will fight it in a different way. All this could be conveyed without having to talk publicly about redeployment, new weapons, and the new look of U.S. strategy.

Secretary Dulles expressed strong agreement with the points made by Admiral Radford, and added that since the Europeans are well aware of how vital we regard our security interests in Asia, our willingness to redeploy two divisions from Asia would not be interpreted as an intention by the United States to abandon its security interest in Asia. This might clarify to the Europeans that a subsequent redeployment of some of our forces from Europe was likewise no indication of an intention by the United States to cross off its security stake in the defense of Western Europe.

Secretary Wilson then pointed out with great satisfaction that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had finally come up with a unanimously agreed report on a new three-year Defense Department plan and program. He felt that this was a very great tribute to Admiral Radford, and pointed out that the redeployment of the two divisions from Korea would be most helpful as a first step in the implementation of this three-year plan.

The President wondered whether the announcement of the redeployment of the Korean divisions should not be made at least sixty days in advance of the movement. Admiral Radford, however, thought that the announcement might well be made as early as next week, while Secretary Wilson thought that the best time would be just after the NATO Ministers meeting.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on U.S. objectives at the forthcoming NATO Ministers meeting.

b. Noted the President’s desire that public statements by Government officials should not directly or indirectly relate the effects of new weapons on military strategy to the redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe.

c. Noted the President’s statement that the Department of State would conduct confidential discussions with allied governments regarding the redeployment of U.S. forces, but that public statements on this subject would be made only by the President or by others at his direction.

[Here follow items 4–8, dealing with United States policy and courses of action to counter possible Soviet or satellite action against Berlin, United States policy with respect to Germany, United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Latin America, United States assistance to NATO allies, and the status of NSC projects. For text of the section of the minutes dealing with Berlin, see volume VII. In the section dealing with assistance to NATO the Council noted the President’s approval of two statements concerning continued United States assistance to NATO.]

1. Scheduled for Dec. 14–16 in Paris; for documentation, see pp. 454 ff.
2. Documentation on President Eisenhower’s speech at the United Nations on Dec. 8 is presented in volume ii .