Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

662A.00/4–752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret

Washington, April 11, 1952—12:34 p.m.

6022. For Chief of Mission personal from the Secretary.²

I am gratified at progress recently made at Bonn in speeding up conclusion contractual negots as result McCloy’s efforts (Bonn’s 2278,³ rptd Paris 711, London 605). As time has continued to slip by since Lisbon with slower progress in Paris on EDC treaty and in Bonn on contractuals than we had anticipated, I have become increasingly concerned to find some means of successfully completing these arrangements.

Deptel 2420,⁴ rptd London 4999, Paris 5925, expressed the conclusion to which I have more and more come that a deadline for signing must be set and must be met or we shall be faced with the prospect that all our efforts to bring about the EDC and to establish new relationships with Ger will founder. I note similar conclusion reported Paris’ 6127,⁵ giving MacArthur’s and SHAPE’S views. I recognize and have weighed carefully the dangers inherent in establishing a deadline as set forth by Roberts of Brit FonOff (London’s 4478,⁶ rptd Paris 2092, Bonn 479) but am firmly convinced risks involved in not doing so far outweigh them. Probable trend of Ger opinion under pressure of Sov proposals on Ger unity⁷ appealing to their natl instincts causes us anxiety. Some EDC countries appear to be increasingly hesitant to take final decision to join with Ger in EDC. In addition, Congressional attitude toward MSA appropriations, which will probably be under full consideration by mid-May, cannot be predicted if real success in uniting Eur defense efforts cannot be reported. Furthermore, this session of Cong will certainly end by Jul 3 at latest, and possibly earlier. If contractuals are not submitted sufficiently far in advance of that date there can be no ratification before 1953, except in the very unlikely event of a brief autumn session of the Cong. Any such delay wld represent a severe check to our plans.

Will you therefore pls present the fol personal msg from me to the FonMin of the govt to which you are accredited without delay:

Begin message. “at the various mtgs in London and Lisbon last Feb, I was encouraged by the progress made and was led to hope that problems of concluding the treaty for the Eur Defense Community and the various contractual agreements with the Ger FedRep cld be speedily resolved. Since then I have been increasingly concerned by the slow rate of progress, which I believe is gravely imperiling all our plans. I therefore wish to make this appeal to you to join with me and our other colleagues in the countries concerned to make a supreme effort to conclude the various treaties and agreements in time for signature on a definite date in the near future.

“You are, of course, well aware of the risks which delay will cause in Europe. You are perhaps less well aware of certain grave difficulties which will be encountered in the US with respect to Congressional action if there is further delay. The proposed appropriations for Mutual Security Assistance will be under active consideration by the Cong by mid-May at the latest. The Govt will be very hard pressed to present effective arguments for the voting of such appropriations in the absence of a successful conclusion of the efforts being made to establish a Eur Defense Community. Further indefinite promises of progress in this field wld, I fear, be regarded by the Cong as discouraging evidence of inability to achieve a unified defense effort in Europe.

“I also wish to point out that this session of Cong will end at the very latest by Jul 3 and possibly several days earlier. If the contractual agreements with Ger are to be ratified at this session they must, therefore, be laid before the Senate by the middle of May at the very latest. Even this date wld make action by the Senate difficult. If the agreements cannot be completed and submitted to the Senate in time for action at this session they will have to go over until the session which begins in Jan 1953. I do not need to impress upon you the grave jeopardy in which such a lengthy delay wld place the entire Western policy with regard to the common defense and with regard to Ger.

“All of these considerations have persuaded me that there is no alternative but to set for ourselves a specific date now for signing the contractuals and the EDC treaty and such other docs as must be signed simultaneously. I wld hope that we could set May 9 as the date for signing both sets of agreements, I stress the point of signing both sets of agreements, and I believe it is highly important not to [allow?] EDC and the contractual arrangements to be separated chronologically.

“I have given a good deal of thought to the question of the place of signing. The contractual agreements cld, of course, be signed at Bonn, but I question the desirability of having the EDC treaty signed there. Paris has been suggested for the signature of the latter treaty but I consider it wld be unfortunate if the contractual agreements were to be signed in any of the three Western capitals. The signing of the two acts of agreements in different places not only is absurd from the point of view of physical arrangements for moving Ministers back and forth on the same day, or even on successive days, but likewise wld be a regrettable loss of an opportunity which it seems to me we shld grasp to make an impressive and historic ceremony of the simultaneous signing of both sets of agreements. I therefore suggest that we consider selecting The Hague. Prominently associated as it is with ideals of peace, and containing the Peace Palace where the ceremony cld occur, it wld seem to me to be an ideal site.

“Most important, however, in my thinking, is the necessity for setting a date, preferably May 9, and making a public announcement of that fact without delay. This wld, of course, mean that the draft EDC treaty and the contractual conventions wld have to be initialed by the negotiators by Apr 30 at the latest in order to permit final governmental consideration of them before signing. I appreciate that this means renewed and untiring efforts on the part of the negotiators in Paris and Bonn. From the info I have at hand, however, I conclude that with such efforts on the part of the reps of every govt, the remaining points at issue can be settled during Apr. I am instructing the US Reps at Bonn to cooperate to the utmost in achieving the result we aim at and I urge you to similarly instruct your reps at Paris [and/or Bonn].”⁸ End message.

Paris for MacArthur. Pls inform Gen Eisenhower of above and of my earnest request that he continue his already helpful efforts to speed up negots.

The Hague: Secy went over substance this msg with Stikker in great detail but did not mention Hague as place of signature nor specify May 9 as date. Pls deliver substance to FonOff.⁹

Acheson

1. Drafted by Calhoun and Laukhuff of GER. Sent also to Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.
2. The origins of this telegram lie in a memorandum dated Apr. 8 from the Secretary to Bruce, Matthews, Perkins, and Lewis in which Acheson stated that three telegrams in that day’s log:6127 from Paris, Apr. 5, p. 636; 2278 from Bonn, summarized in footnote 3, below; and 4478 from London, summarized in footnote 6, below, “add to my growing concern over the lack of progress in completing the EDC arrangements and some of the decisions which have to be taken at Bonn in connection therewith.” Acheson added that “we should give this whole matter urgent attention” with the following questions in mind: was it possible to keep the EDC and contractual arrangements linked “if the latter gets hopelessly bogged down”; had careful plans been made for having the Senate consider and approve the German contractuals? “If the Congress is going to get out of Washington by the end of June,” Acheson continued, “there will be very little time for hearings and consideration if the signature of these documents drags on until the end of May,” and that might well mean that the Senate might not get around to full consideration of the entire EDC matter “until January 1953, with all the delay and uncertainty that that involves” (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, “Memo from S & U–1952”).
3. Dated Apr. 7; for text, see chapter I in volume vii .
4. Not printed.
5. Dated Apr. 5, p. 636.
6. Not printed; Roberts was reported to have stressed the need to secure proper safeguards with respect to the German financial contribution, a “most difficult subject”, and to take into account the possible necessity of a “top level tripartite conference” to determine a common position with which “to confront FedRep” on other outstanding issues that might prove difficult to resolve (662A.00/4–752).
7. For documentation on Soviet notes of Mar. 10 and Apr. 9 proposing a peace treaty with Germany and the establishment of an all-German government, see volume vii .
8. Brackets appear in the source text.
9. On Apr. 17, the British Embassy delivered to the Department the text of a message, dated Apr. 16, from Eden to Acheson in which the Foreign Secretary asserted his equally strong desire to hasten as rapidly as possible the conclusion of a treaty establishing the European Defense Community. Eden noted the recent decision by the United Kingdom to guarantee the EDC Treaty and the warm reception that this decision had received by the EDC governments. However, he added that the issue of the German contractuals remained sufficiently difficult and complex as to suggest that the earliest date on which the various documents could be ready for signature would be May 15th or 20th, and in particular, the very important financial provisions must be fully agreed upon. Eden agreed that the German contractuals and the EDC Treaty should be signed at the same time, but argued that Paris was a more appropriate site than Bonn, and stressed again the hope that Acheson would accept mid-May as a more realistic target date. A copy of the text of the Eden message is in file 740.5/4–1652. On Apr. 23, the Belgian Ambassador, Baron Silvercruys, called upon Under Secretary Bruce and left a reply to the Secretary’s message of Apr. 11 which stated the Belgian Government’s belief that May 9 was too early and that May 20 was a more realistic date, with Paris favored as the site of signing (Memorandum of conversation by R. D. McClelland, Apr. 23, 1952, 740.5/4–2352). In telegram 1146 from The Hague, Apr. 28, Counselor Trimble transmitted the text of the Netherlands Government reply to the Secretary’s message which stated that although the Netherlands Government was in complete sympathy with the views expressed by Secretary Acheson, the existence of a considerable number of outstanding problems made it unrealistic to set a specific date for the signing of the necessary documents relating to German contractuals and the EDC (740.5/4–2852).