Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

740.5/12–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

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Paris, December 24, 1954—noon.

2687. For Secretary from Dillon. Assembly’s unfavorable vote last night on key section of Brussels Treaty poses very serious but not insurmountable problem.² General consensus is that vote represented a miscalculation by MRP and other former backers of EDC who, in trying to hold government to narrowest possible majority, overdid the thing. They took this action in knowledge that there would be a second chance on Monday when question of confidence would be posed. However, effect of vote on public opinion over week end may be very serious and could cause further Socialist defections on Monday so that favorable result on Monday, although possible, is by no means assured. Consensus of French political commentators is that U.S. and U.K. reaction will be so severe as to bring Parliament to their senses. It is clear that Parliament expects some such reaction from both U.S. and U.K. In view of the seriousness of the situation I recommend that the President and Churchill make similar statements today prior to ten o’clock this evening Paris time so as to get full coverage in French morning press Saturday.

These statements should cover following points: (1) emphasize seriousness of situation for Western allies; (2) state clearly that if treaty is rejected by French Assembly France can in future expect no further concessions; (3) state that result of rejection will be immediate unilateral rearmament of West Germany by U.K. and U.S.; (4) state that without ratification there is no possibility of Four-Power conference with Soviets. During debate yesterday Mendes-France made point regarding unilateral rearmament of Germany and no Four-Power conference if ratification failed. Assembly reaction was clearly to doubt his statement regarding German rearmament. U.S. and U.K. statements could therefore be pegged to Mendes-France’s own statements before the Assembly.

I have conferred with Jebb and his views are identical and he is making same recommendation to London. We both feel that action of French Assembly requires reaction by U.S. and U.K. at highest level and that to be effective such reaction must be prompt and clear-cut. To have political effect reaction must appear in French press tomorrow morning and so must take place on time schedule indicated.³

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. A summary of the first 4 days of debates concerning ratification of the Paris Agreements is contained in telegram 2692 from Paris, Dec. 24 (740.5/12–2454).

3. Five hours later, Dillon informed the Department in telegram 2689 from Paris, Dec. 24, that British Ambassador Jebb had just phoned the Embassy to report that Eden had an unfavorable reaction to the recommendation in the source text (740.5/12–2454).

   At 6:45 p.m. Dillon and Jebb went to see Mendès-France at the Prime Minister’s request. Mendès-France told them that they should not lose courage and that he hoped their governments would limit any statements on the subject to the minimum. When reporting this conversation to the Department in telegram 2693 from Paris, Dec. 24, Dillon withdrew his previous recommendation concerning a need for a statement, a decision Jebb concurred in. (740.5/12–2454)

   Just before the Department of State received telegram 2693 from Paris, which withdrew Dillon’s recommendation, it informed the Embassy in Paris that it was inadvisable for the President to make a formal statement and that any appearance of external pressure would be counterproductive (telegram 2321 to Paris, Dec. 24; 740.5/12–2454).