Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

396.1 LO/9–2254

Report on the Secretary of State’s Conversations With Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Secretary Eden, September 16–17, 1954¹

top secret

[Washington, September 20, 1954.]

Members of Party:

• The Secretary of State
• Mr. H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
• Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff
• Mr. Roderic L. O’Connor, Personal Secretary
• Mr. Ben Moore, Chief, Office of Regional Affairs
• Mr. Coburn Kidd, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs
• Miss Mildred Asbjornson, Secretary
• Mr. Frank Madden, Security Officer

Schedule:

Departure Washington,	5:30 p.m., September 15
Arrival Bonn,	2:30 p.m., September 16
Departure Bonn,	10:15 a.m., September 17
Arrival London,	12:00 noon, September 17
Departure London,	8:00 p.m., September 17
Arrival Watertown,	8:00 a.m., September 18

The purpose of the Secretary’s visit to Bonn and London on September 16th and 17th was to ascertain at first hand, from Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Eden, the results of the latter’s tour through the European capitals and to obtain an estimate of the possibilities of Mr. Eden’s plan and the prospects for the proposed nine-Power conference on September 28th. The following report represents the impressions received by the Secretary’s party, which may be supplemented by reports received from our Embassies. The Secretary made departure or arrival statements at Washington, Bonn, London, and Watertown, which are appended hereto.²

Bonn

The Secretary was welcomed at Bonn with a cordiality which appeared to indicate that much significance was attached to his visit. Friendly crowds lined the streets to and from the airport. Chancellor Adenauer showed every mark of personal consideration and confidence. His chief advisers eagerly utilized the opportunity for frank and responsive discussions. The Chancellor had in fact excused himself from important parliamentary debates on the John case³ with the curt remark that his conversations with the Secretary would be of decisive importance for Germany.

In the ensuing talks, which were continued from midafternoon to near midnight without interruption except for a state dinner at Schloss Schaumberg, the Chancellor touched upon general policy towards France, the personality and politics of the French premier, the continued importance to Germany of the integration policy, immediate objectives of sovereignty and German defense participation, revision of the Contractual agreements, utility and shortcomings of the Eden plan for revival of the Brussels Pact, and the importance of interim measures to forestall further delays.⁴ En route to the airport on Friday morning the Chancellor particularly reverted to the subject of interim measures.⁵ The Chancellor was assisted by State Secretary Hallstein, Under Secretary Blankenhorn, his confidential adviser Globke, Blank (head of the German defense agency), Ophuls and Grewe (legal advisers), and von Herwarth. Ambassador Conant and Mr. Dowling participated in the discussions, with Mr. Hensel, Mr. Merchant, and Mr. Bowie.

With regard to general policy toward France, the Chancellor was of opinion that the Secretary had done wisely in omitting Paris from his schedule. He felt that it was a bold move, since Mendes-France would no doubt take it personally; but on the whole he felt it would have a salutary effect. Without indicating any ill-will towards Mendes-France, the Chancellor appeared to regard him with detachment as a man who, either from his own personality or from the exigencies of French politics, was an exponent of an opportunist type of politics which could be dangerous. His dealings with the Soviets, or possible dealings with the Communists, should thus be explained, in the Chancellor’s opininon, on the grounds of opportunism rather than any pro-Communist leanings. The Chancellor felt that Mendes-France was primarily interested in economic and financial matters, and could probably be most easily influenced on this side.

The Chancellor said that so much time had passed that it was imperative for the Federal Republic to be given its sovereignty and be allowed to participate in the defense effort in the near future if continued support for the policies he represented were to be expected. He felt that NATO membership was the most suitable answer to the question of defense participation. With regard to sovereignty, he thought that this might be most simply effected by declarations of the respective occupying Powers, ending the occupation status while retaining their rights founded on international agreements with respect to Berlin and matters pertaining to Germany as a whole (unification). He said that he would not wish to go back to the Bundestag for ratification of more than one document, namely an agreement on stationing of forces. He thought that the rest of the provisions in the Contractuals could be taken care of by comparatively minor revisions. Some of the provisions were now out of date; these could perhaps simply be dropped. Pending the conclusion of these revisions, the position of our forces would continue under existing arrangements. The Chancellor’s legal adviser, Grewe, gave the impression that the revision of the Contractuals would be carried out in a conciliatory and expeditious manner at the technical level. In general we gained the impression that a good deal of the substance of the Contractuals may be retained if the more important issues of sovereignty and defense participation are resolved in the near future. If the latter are not resolved, sniping at the Contractuals may continue to increase.

The Chancellor emphasized that there should be no mistake about the continued importance of the integration policy. So long as he was in office this would remain an integral part of German policy. This suggested one of the shortcomings of Eden’s plan. The Brussels Pact solution was being put forward because (a) it avoided any supranational features, and (b) it would provide for the British association which was so important to France. The combination of these two facts, he pointed out, would result in the speed and level of future integration becoming dependent upon British decision. The Chancellor hoped that means could be found to insure that adoption of the Brussels Pact solution would not preclude future progress toward integration.

A second weakness of the Eden plan was of course that it might be subject to the same fate as the EDC, namely, that after being agreed to by Mendes-France, there would be further delay or refusal on the part of the French parliament to ratify. In order to obviate the disastrous effects of such a result in Germany, the Chancellor felt that it would be of highest importance to undertake certain interim measures. These measures (which have been the subject of a State Department memorandum now being studied by Defense) would include enlarged activity of the Blank Office, German participation in build-up planning with authorization to proceed with certain preliminary measures such as construction of barracks, and recruitment and training on a limited scale (especially air-force training). The Chancellor felt that the US and UK had this leverage in their hands, as well as the power to recognize German sovereignty, and that such interim measures might be necessary in order to obtain a decision from France as distinct from discussion. The Secretary said that we would urge upon the British and French the desirability of interim measures, and that we would be prepared to proceed alone with the British to the extent feasible, if the French declined.

These were the main points covered in the discussions at Bonn. Assistant Secretary Hensel had a good discussion with Blank on the subject of interim measures, and Mr. Dowling, Mr. Merchant, and Mr. Bowie had more detailed discussions with the Chancellor’s advisers. It was evident from this visit that the Chancellor was at pains to coordinate his policy with that of the U.S., and was relying a great deal upon the common front with the U.S. to obtain the objectives important to the Federal Republic. The Chancellor told the Secretary that he would not attend the nine-Power meeting unless the Secretary did.⁶

London

The discussions at London proceeded in a very different atmosphere from those at Bonn. In the Secretary’s arrival statement, he stressed his admiration for Mr. Eden’s statesmanlike efforts and the fundamental importance of the Anglo-American alliance. The Secretary had lunch at Downing Street with Churchill and Eden. Mr. Eden and the officials of the Foreign Office extended the welcome of old friends. Nevertheless, as the discussions progressed throughout a three-hour session in Mr. Eden’s office, it became apparent that the British were engaged in an uphill climb, seemed tired, and had not got as far as they hoped.⁷

Mr. Eden began with an account of his trip to the various capitals. There had been general apprehension after the breakup of EDC, and they had asked themselves what could be done. They were much against setting up another duplicating military organization under NATO. EDC had appeared tolerable because it had certain advantages, but no other had any attraction for them. They had thus asked themselves what were the possibilities which would not involve some elaborate military organization. One possibility would be to set up a new organization, but there were so many international organizations already. Therefore it had occurred to them to take a new look at the Brussels Pact, which might at least meet part of the political problem. If Germany were admitted into NATO, the Brussels Pact in its present form would be something of an anachronism, and accordingly they thought it might be revised and conformed to meet German membership. They also had Italy in mind. It had not been their intention to use the Brussels Pact except as a political instrument for extending certain guarantees to Germany and assuring the rest of Europe with regard to the EDC type of guarantees.

Mr. Eden said he had proceeded to Brussels with no more of a plan than this in mind. He had been most gratified at the reception. He had feared that the Belgians and Dutch might take the line that the Brussels Pact was designed to be primarily a protection against the Germans, but Spaak and the Dutch were quite receptive. The Dutch had produced the idea that some of the German assurances might more appropriately be given through the Brussels Treaty than through NATO. This idea seemed to him worth examining. The French would like it. He thought that on the whole the Germans would too. In any event he had found support in Bonn and Rome as well as Brussels for this scheme plus German membership in NATO. (Sir Frank Roberts said that the Germans were “enthusiastic”. He had asked twice in order not to be mistaken about the expression.)

At Paris Mr. Eden found the first day depressing. He found that Mendes-France welcomed the Brussels Pact idea with eagerness, as a means of building in a large part of the EDC controls over Germany without any supranational features. It was apparent that this would involve prolonged negotiations and difficulties with respect to the Germans. Mendes-France also thought of the Brussels Pact revision as a preliminary to German membership in NATO. Mr. Eden had replied that this was no good at all. Everyone wanted Germany into NATO, and the French would stand alone. There had been a long argument about this. On the second day Mendes-France said that he recognized German membership in NATO was inescapable, but he would have difficulties with the French Assembly. Mendes-France recalled some bothersome resolution passed by the Assembly in 1952 against German membership. Mendes-France would wish the matter to be so presented that the Brussels Pact would appear to be at least equivalent in importance to NATO. The French position would then be: we have got so much in the Brussels Pact, that we might be willing to accept the Germans into NATO. It was just the opposite for the British. Their primary interest was in NATO. In any event Eden thought that these two matters must take effect simultaneously. He had accepted Mendes-France’s appeal not to represent the results of the Paris discussions as French acceptance of German membership in NATO.

This brought Mr. Eden to the question of safeguards. What would these be? One suggestion of Mendes-France might be worth considering. Mendes-France did not exclude nondiscrimination in theory, but he desired some arrangement on the manufacture of armaments as to who should make what. He also wanted some form of inspections. He would like the UK to join in this. Mr. Eden saw no reason why the British should not take some share of the responsibility. Ismay had said that his organization could help provide inspectors. That was the sort of thing that the Brussels Treaty could do.

Another suggestion of Mendes-France had been that it was difficult for NATO to provide ceilings. It was a little odd for the same organization to have the tasks both of building up and holding down military preparedness. NATO might set the minimums and Brussels the maximums. These were the main features of Mendes-France’s ideas. The French wished to make the Brussels arrangement look as important as possible in order to demonstrate the British commitment.

One disquieting thing that had occurred to Eden was to find the means of finishing up the Occupation Statute. Mendes-France had said that a Saar solution was a precondition. Eden had replied that this was impossible. There had been no more argument—perhaps no agreement either. Eden believed that Mendes-France would do his best to obtain German membership in NATO; but the more we could dress up the Brussels Pact, the better would be his chances. Mendes-France was conscious of the risks of failure; he had no taste for a second Brussels. Eden thought that Mendes-France perceived that to do nothing would be equally fatal. Mendes-France was apprehensive about France again finding herself alone.

Mr. Eden said that the UK would be willing to extend to the Brussels Pact the same assurances they had made for EDC.

In sum, Mr. Eden asked, the question is whether we should take the risk of a nine-Power meeting? The second question was whether there was anything else that could be done by way of preparation? All countries were in favor of German membership in NATO; the French were resigned to it if the Brussels Pact could be sufficiently dressed up; therefore the UK was in favor of a meeting.

With regard to preparations, Mr. Eden thought it would be an excellent idea for Mr. Merchant to go to Paris, as had been suggested.

Mr. Eden had incidentally talked with Lange, of Norway, while he was in Paris. Lange had just seen Mendes-France after Eden’s first conversation. Lange had the impression that Mendes-France was sincere, and Eden increasingly felt that Mendes-France was willing to go along.

Sir Frank Roberts mentioned that the French had made one or two references to the US, not in the sense of raising new demands, but with the idea of US participation in controls, e.g. over atomic matters.

Mr. Eden said that Mendes-France was not against ending the occupation regime. One of the advantages of the nine-Power meeting was that it would provide an opportunity to wind this up.

The Secretary said that when he had expressed his admiration for Mr. Eden’s statesmanship in all that he tried to accomplish on his tour, it was no idle compliment but sincerely meant. It would be wrong however to minimize the difficulties confronting the US. The hope of European integration had had great appeal to the American people and Congress. This was reflected in speeches and legislation. Aid to Europe had been tied to consummation of the EDC. The result of the French rejection of EDC was a shock. It would be used by isolationists as justification for moving toward the type of policy they recommended. Several of the Democratic Senators who had been mainstays of the program were now about ready to quit. Many were now in favor of bringing our troops home. There was a problem in trying to sell a substitute policy. The Secretary had not yet received the views of the Joint Chiefs or of the Congress, but he might say in a general way that it was a policy of the Joint Chiefs to concentrate on mobile striking power of sea and air forces, with land forces retained in the strategic reserve at home. Mr. Eden would recall that two divisions had been withdrawn from Korea last spring; four more were being withdrawn. We were looking forward to getting our forces out of Japan. We were not prepared to build up a land power in the SEATO area, where our contribution would be primarily one of sea and air power. The presence of US divisions in Europe was thus an exception to our general policy. Certain members of our Joint Chiefs feel that we should reduce that land commitment. No decision has yet been reached, but there is also a feeling in Congress that our position should be adjusted to that strategic concept. The Secretary felt that it was highly doubtful that Congress would be willing to repeat the commitments it offered for EDC to a new concept. Our traditional policy for over a hundred years had been to avoid commitments on the European continent. The position of the US since World War II had been entirely different from this traditional policy. It was not easy to make such a turn around. Our rationalization of this course was based on the assumption that something new and stronger was being erected in Europe.

The Secretary said that it was the President’s desire as well as his own to salvage as much as possible out of the existing situation. However, it could not be taken for granted that they would succeed. Continued participation of the US on the past scale was doubtful. Congress had been sold on the other idea, and it would now be difficult to sell a substitute. The Secretary foresaw that it would involve at least some loss. He hoped that it would not be material or decisive. He merely wished to point out that any plan based on the assumption that the US would go along as in the past would be a fallacy. This did not of course mean that we would pull the rug out from what was going on; it meant merely that we could not put as much into it.

Mr. Eden commented that that was worrying.

“Probably to you,” the Secretary replied, “but no one else appears to take it very seriously.”

Mr. Eden said that the support of the US was crucial. The British wanted Germany into NATO. They attached almost as much importance to binding Germany to the Western orbit by this means as they did to a German military contribution.

The Secretary said that he did not suggest that there was a better way. At any rate he had not thought of it. As he had remarked to Adenauer, the future policy of the US would be subject to pressures. He could not predict the outcome. He was in no position yet to make commitments. Our position must necessarily remain fluid until the views of the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council, and the President have been taken into account, in the light of the general political possibilities. It was also necessary to see how the Congressional elections came out. This prevented us from making definitive commitments at the present time.

The Secretary said the general scheme or conception which Mr. Eden had developed seemed the best that could be devised to meet the situation which confronts us. The whole conception had been brilliant and statesmanlike.

The Secretary had a few comments on procedure. He would hope that something could be done in the way of keeping alive the idea of closer integration at least on the Continent. Adenauer had mentioned that one of his worries about the Brussels Pact scheme was that there could be no more rapid development of integration than the UK’s pace. Mr. Eden had mentioned the possibility of including something in the preamble suggesting that at least other Powers could be free and should be encouraged to move in that direction. The Secretary saw no harm in this and thought it might do some good. Adenauer had said: “The Brussels Pact is being used because, first, it is not supranational, and secondly, because the UK is in it; the combination of these two factors amounts to a block against future integration.”

Mr. Eden exclaimed that the last thing he desired was to stop any movement toward integration. He thought they could do something about this. Norway would like it; he was informed that Yugoslavia would like it too—although he was not quite sure that he wanted the Yugoslavs to like it.

The Secretary said that he had originally had that idea about NATO, but had come to have misgivings about Italy and Norway. NATO had ended up by becoming primarily a military alliance rather than a group of nations with common traditions. This accounted for the failure of Article 2. The Greeks and Turks were another example of good nations, with a strong people, which did not however have the same traditions and concept as Western Europe. If NATO could have been held to a smaller group, it might have become more effective. If the Brussels Pact could be held to a smaller group with more in common, it might be to the good.

Mr. Eden said that that was exactly their thought. The Brussels Pact did not seem to be Norway’s particular place.

The Secretary said that he thought it was a sound concept to have NATO press for more defense, leaving any limitations to be imposed by another organization. He felt that it would be advisable to permit exceptions and departures from the rule to be decided by less than unanimous vote. The Versailles Treaty had been the most thorough instrument for restrictions ever devised, yet it had not worked. Give one country a veto and the results may be negative. For example, Blank was already talking about 24 divisions, 12 in being and 12 in reserve.

Broadly speaking, it seemed to the Secretary that the lines along which Mr. Eden was working were as sound as could be expected under the circumstances. However, it struck him that it was one thing to reach agreement in principle; another thing to reach agreement in writing. Who was going to redraft the Brussels Treaty? Would Adenauer participate? Would the French participate? The US was not a party to this Treaty, but if the Brussels Treaty were to become an adjunct to NATO we should have a very vital interest in it. In the past, one of the best guarantees of a successful conference had been the preparatory working parties. The Secretary felt that it would be a disaster to have the nine-Power meeting fail like Brussels. The possibility of failure would of course constitute a pressure on the conference, which would lead people to try to agree; even so, was there not need for some preliminary exchange of views on specific questions? What would Mendes-France be willing to put up to the Assembly? The Secretary said he could see Mendes’ difficulty about admission of Germany as an equal partner in NATO. French preconditions might exceed what Germany or the US could take. There thus seemed to be advantages in having a working party. It would be a gamble to go into this conference with Mendes-France if we had no guidance as to what Adenauer could accept. How could this be avoided? Is Mendes-France to be left to work all alone?

Mr. Eden said that they had started with mere ideas. They had found easy agreement with Benelux, Bonn, Rome, and the US. The French would no doubt make it difficult. In answer to the question how far one proposed to go at London, he thought perhaps it would suffice to reach agreements in principle, with the working parties to set to work thereafter. With regard to ending the occupation regime, he saw no reason why a working party of four should not start immediately.

The Secretary agreed that on that phase there was a certain amount of work to be done. He had spoken to Hoyer-Millar and Poncet about it that morning. We wished to save some of the provisions of the Contractuals, for example, with regard to Berlin, sharing of expenses, the status of forces. Working out agreements on this phase could go ahead. The Secretary said that we were of course in the position to agree to restoring German sovereignty. His earlier remarks about commitments had referred to US forces in Europe. It was reasonably certain that the Senate would accept a protocol to the NATO treaty to bring Germany in and to extend the NATO area to Germany.

Mr. Eden reverted to the point that what was worrying was the inability of the US to do for the plan under discussion what had been done for EDC.

The Secretary said that he was informed that the April 16th assurances had been difficult to obtain even for EDC. Mr. Merchant confirmed this. The Secretary added that he did not say they could not be obtained; merely that they could not before Congress reconvened; and the odds were against it.

Mr. Eden said that psychologically people would say that just because the Germans get an army, they would not want the Americans to disappear.

The Secretary said that we were much more likely to stay if there were something like a German army.

Mr. Eden said that they would try a redraft of the Brussels Treaty, omitting anything prejudicial to Germany.

The Secretary asked whether Mendes-France had not thought of adding twenty articles.

Sir Frank Roberts said that this would be a protocol.

Mr. Eden said that it would probably have to be as binding as a treaty. The British would circulate a revised text of the treaty before the meeting. Mendes-France had said that he would send around his suggestions within the next day or so, to all of the NATO countries and also Germany—not his original document, but his proposals on arms manufacture, etc.

The Secretary inquired about the possibility of increasing the powers of SACEUR.

Mr. Eden replied that General Gruenther had said that it was quite possible. With regard to logistics, everything would be operated through NATO rather than Brussels.

The Secretary said that Adenauer considered this important.

Mr. Eden acknowledged that SHAPE could not operate armament controls. This was something the Brussels Powers would have to do themselves. The principle should be, in other words, that nothing should be taken away from NATO (SACEUR) which it was at present doing.

The Secretary asked whether it was wise to have a meeting until we had seen drafts in advance. He did not think Mendes-France was very flexible.

Sir Frank Roberts said that Mendes-France had had this on his mind and was shy about circulating a paper for that very reason, lest the others jump to the conclusion that he was repeating the Brussels situation. Consequently he intended to send out his general ideas only. His officials said it would be this weekend.

Mr. Eden said that what he had had in mind was that the nine-Power meeting would firm up what he understood to be the results of his swing around the circuit. It would confirm the understanding that Germany be admitted to NATO, sovereignty be restored, etc. On the basis of this, they could try to draft documents. Perhaps they could authorize a redraft of the Brussels Treaty. We might utilize some of our NATO people to work out the details. Eden did not feel sure about Adenauer. The British and the French might wish something more than Adenauer would be prepared to accept. Mendes-France had said that it was hard to get in contact with Adenauer at this time. That had been one of the difficulties at Brussels, the lack of contact between Mendes-France and Adenauer. However, Mr. Eden was convinced that the momentum for a solution could not be sustained without a meeting. He was a little frightened about how Adenauer might react in an exchange of papers. Mr. Eden recalled that the Germans had suggested that a meeting be held as soon as possible; the Italians, “a little later”; Mendes-France, “not too late”.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Eden intended to come to the UN Assembly. Mr. Eden said he thought not; he would stay and work on this.

“Really I am flummoxed,” Mr. Eden said, “particularly about Franco-German agreement.”

The Secretary asked whether Adenauer had indicated that he would come to the meeting. Mr. Eden said that he had never shown any signs of not coming. Perhaps he had cooled off. Adenauer had a meeting with the Turkish President on October 2nd. There were of course risks in a meeting—but there appeared to be equally as many in not meeting.

The Secretary mentioned Adenauer’s interest in “interim measures”. He supposed that these could also be dealt with on a four-Power basis. It would be a difficult thing to revamp the Brussels Pact and find an expression of German assurances in a form acceptable to both the Germans and the French.

The British Under Secretary said that he should have thought that a condition precedent for this would be a successful meeting of Mendes-France and Adenauer.

After some further general discussion it was agreed that an effort should be made through the proposal of an agenda for the conference to obtain Mendes-France’s agreement to the following program:

(1) Further progress towards European unity by expansion of the Brussels Pact so as to admit Germany and Italy;

(2) Admission of Germany to NATO.

(3) The working out of “accompanying arrangements” by the Federal Republic and the occupying Powers, who should at the same time declare their intentions with regard to restoration of German sovereignty.

A paper to the above effect was drafted by Sir Frank Roberts. After a brief discussion of this and the text of a communiqué, the meeting broke up at 6:30 p.m., when the Secretary’s party left for the airport. Before bidding farewell to Mr. Eden, the Secretary again mentioned the importance Adenauer attached to interim measures in case the NATO–Brussels Pact plan miscarried. Mr. Eden assented in general.⁸

Conclusions

In the discussions at Bonn and London, supplemented by the reports from Paris, certain things were apparent on the surface:

The urgency of German admission to NATO and restoration of German sovereignty is a contemporary reality acknowledged by almost everyone, the UK, Benelux, the Germans, Italy, Norway, Greece, Canada, and the US. In contrast to this Mendes-France’s original plan seemed as outmoded as a superannuated vehicle: increased British assurances to France, with the transfer of EDC restrictions to the Brussels Pact minus supranational features, in a manner so as to hold down German manufacture of armaments and build up French heavy industry. When Roberts remonstrated about this, Mendes’ advisers, Boris and Soutout, replied that the point was to satisfy the French Assembly. The Foreign Office’s annotation of this passage in the telegram is: “This is it.”

Nevertheless the French have a point to which the British and most of the other countries are willing to accede in wishing for certain restrictions upon German rearmament. Adenauer has acknowledged his willingness to accept the EDC 12-division limitation, NATO controls, and other restrictions on a nondiscriminatory basis (provided that the only restrictions on the initial German rearmament are those voluntarily assumed). This appears to provide an area for negotiation. The British are hopeful that French demands may be reduced to proportions acceptable to Adenauer and the US when confronted by the united stand of eight other nations, and that Adenauer will be amenable to restrictions which appear reasonable to the US and six other nations as well as France.

It is evident that the US has one very powerful means of influence, to which at least the British are sensitive, in the suggestion that we may revise our basic strategy. The British will work hard to avoid this. An additional source of influence, which the British count on, is Mendes-France’s obvious desire to avoid a repetition of his experience at Brussels, in which he found himself isolated. The British believe he will work hard to prevent this.

These are the positive elements, out of which, with a little luck, the British hope to sustain the momentum towards a solution, in Mr. Eden’s phrase.

The negative elements latent not very far below the surface include the following:

(1) The British appear to have no precise plans for what should be done in case their plan goes amiss. Moreover they are taking the chance, without finding out in advance, of Adenauer and Mendes-France confronting each other at the conference with positions not sufficiently flexible to be modified in the course of negotiations.

(2) The elements in the French Assembly on whom Mendes-France must depend for approval of any plan he presents, are utilizing the situation to bring about his downfall, with the hope of forming a new Government which, when defeated, could call for general elections, which would either improve or restore the inter-party balance of forces to what it was before Mendes-France’s advent.

(3) The Germans count upon an astute policy of self-restraint coupled with rigid identification of their position with the US as a means of making the French break if they do not bend.

Confronted with these mixed features in the situation, the Secretary summarized a cautious but not discouraging reaction in the following words in his Watertown statement:

“It is apparent, indeed it has long been apparent, that there is no adequate substitute for the European Defense Community. Nevertheless we must do the best that we can. Many minds are resourcefully studying what next steps are in order. We hope that sufficient preparatory work can be done during the coming week to justify a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the countries principally concerned during the week following that.

“It would be a mistake to assume that any acceptable solution has been fully developed. It would be an even greater mistake to adopt a negative approach which would result in the disintegration of what has been built, since the war, out of the sacrifices, the efforts, the aspirations of many.

“The United States is deeply concerned with the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent. European security is intimately connected with our own. We shall, therefore, continue our association with European planning to achieve those ends. There are many European leaders who retain hope of real achievement. They know that we will support them in their creative efforts.”

1. The source text was drafted by Kidd on instruction by Merchant as a background report for officers in the Department of State who were primarily concerned with the matters to be discussed at the forthcoming Nine-Power Conference in London.
2. Not printed.
3. Regarding the Otto John case, see footnote 3, p. 1027.
4. A 15-page memorandum of conversation of Dulles’ afternoon meeting with Adenauer, drafted by Bowie, is in the PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Chronological 1954”. A brief telegraphic account of that meeting is contained in telegram 796 from Bonn, Sept. 17 (662A.00/9–1754). A summary of Dulles’ after-dinner conversation with Adenauer on Sept. 16, contained in Dulles’ memorandum of conversation of the same date, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359. The Department of State summarized the results of Dulles’ talks with Adenauer in a telegram 931 to Rome, Sept. 19, which was repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg (740.5/9–1954).
5. Dulles’ memorandum summarizing this conversation with Adenauer en route to the airport on Sept. 17, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359.
6. For Adenauer’s summary of his meeting with Dulles, see his Erinnerungen 1953–1955, pp. 308–312.
7. In telegram 932 to Rome, Sept. 19, which was repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn, the Department of State summarized the results of Dulles’ 3-hour meeting with Eden; for a copy of this summary, see Department of State file 740.5/9–1954.
8. For Churchill’s summary of Dulles’ visit to London, see his letter to Eisenhower, Sept. 17, p. 1225; Dulles summarized his visit to London in a personal letter to Eisenhower on Sept. 18, p. 1227.