Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 433
Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

top secret

[London,] undated.
Received April 1, 1954.

My Dear Friend: I am grateful to you for permission to speak about the aircraft in reply to a question.¹ As we are going to have a full dress debate on Monday the question has been postponed. I send you herewith the answer I was going to give which I think meets most of Strauss’ misgivings.² I shall now weave it into my argument. Meanwhile any topical comments upon it will be welcome.

2. Another matter far more important presses upon me. The foundation of my argument is that the United States Government is bound by the McMahon Act and cannot disclose forbidden information even to their closest friends. You are appealing to Congress for more flexibility in view of our own knowledge independently acquired and the general diffusion of knowledge on this subject. Our Opposition, especially its anti-American left wing, are trying to put the blame for the present restriction of information on to me and this increases my difficulty in defending, as I have done and will do, your claim to keep your secrets as agreed with the late Socialist Government. I am also supporting, as you will have seen, your continued experiments.

3. In view of the attacks, however, I am sure you will agree that the only course open to me is to quote and publish the text of my agreement with F.D.R. in 1943, which completely vindicates my own care of British interests.³ You will remember I showed it to you in Bernie’s flat before you had assumed power, on my way to Jamaica in January, 1953.⁴ It will prove decisively that the Opposition, not I, are responsible for our present position, and how great is the difference between the situation which I handed over when I was thrown out by the election of 1945 from the new position which I inherited from the Socialists in 1951.

4. The fourth clause of this document about commercial possibilities contains a prediction by me that I was content to leave the future of commercial atomics to the President of the United States, “as he considered to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.” This has now been vindicated in a striking manner by your scheme announced in U.N.O. on December 8, 1953.⁵ I feel I have a right to disclose this document which I signed with your predecessor eleven years ago, and which has since been superseded by other treaties agreed between Great Britain and the Truman Administration. I am nevertheless explaining my position and intentions to you because of our personal friendship and our various talks about the document. It would be an encouragement to me to hear from you that you are content with the course I am taking.

Our talks with Stassen went off very well and will, I am sure, produce fruitful and harmless results.⁶

With kindest regards,

Winston

[Attachment]

Text of Answer Referred to in Paragraph 1 of the Prime Minister’s Message to the President

[London,] undated.

The United States authorities agreed that we should have certain limited facilities for collecting scientific data bearing on the effects of the present series of nuclear experiments in the Pacific. This arrangement was made in return for similar facilities which we had granted to the Americans on the occasion of our own nuclear test in Australia. For this purpose an aircraft of the Royal Air Force made a flight in the vicinity of the explosion of March 1, some hours after it occurred; a similar flight was also made on March 27. No injury or damage was suffered by this aircraft or its crew, on either occasion. I think, however, that the House should know that two Canberra aircraft which had been assigned to this duty were lost in transit between Australia and the base in the Pacific from which the experimental flights were to have been made. Of these, one is believed to have fallen into the sea and its crew of three have been posted missing. The second made a forced landing on an Island with the loss of the aircraft but without injury to the crew. Her Majesty’s Government greatly regret the loss of life and I feel sure that the House would wish me to express our sympathy with the relatives. The House will understand, however, that the loss of these two aircraft was in no way due to the risks of the special mission which they were to have undertaken.

1. Under reference here is the message from President Eisenhower which is summarized in footnote 2, supra.
2. Churchill is referring to the attachment below.
3. For the text of the Agreement relating to Atomic Energy, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec on Aug. 19, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 1117–1119.
4. Regarding Churchill’s conversations with President-elect Eisenhower in New York at the beginning of January 1953, see Document 373.
5. For the text of President Eisenhower’s speech before the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 8, 1953, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 813–822, or Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 847–851.
6. At the end of March Stassen was in London to discuss East–West trade; for a record of his conversation with Churchill on Mar. 28, see telegram 4201 from London, Mar. 29, vol. i, Part 2, p. 1134.