741.13/4–2754: Telegram
No. 439
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Radford) to the Consulate at
Geneva
operational immediate
JCS 960578. From CJCS sgd Adm Radford exclusive for Secretary Dulles info Ambassador Aldrich.1
I received a most cordial reception from the Prime Minister at Chequers where I dined with him last night.2 The only others present were Captain Anderson and the Prime Minister’s private secretary. Sir Winston was in good conversational mood. He talked with great frankness and also listened attentively.
The line taken by Sir Winston was in exact accord with my understanding of views expressed by Mr. Eden to Secretary Dulles at Geneva and as stated earlier to me yesterday by the British Chiefs of Staff.3 He is apparently aware of serious implications stemming [Page 1031] from the deterioration of the French position in Indo-China involving the possible loss of the Associated States and later of other areas of South East Asia. He recognizes this will probably lead to a worsening of the French position in North Africa and have its effects on NATO, particularly in case a more neutralist-minded government comes to power in France.
While he deplores the foregoing possibilities he is determined to commit forces and incur risks only to hold Malaya both militarily and politically. This he thinks can be done. He brushed aside the potential threat to Australia in the event that Indonesia falls into the Communist camp and the effect of the loss of the rice producing areas on the Far Eastern situation generally. He did not seem to appreciate the effect of the loss of South East Asia on the future of Japan. In connection with NATO, he stated that we have waited long enough for the French to make EDC a reality, therefore the United Kingdom and the United States should “get on with the rearming of the Germans themselves” glossing over the question as to how this should be accomplished.
Throughout the evening’s conversation, the Prime Minister repeatedly referred to the loss of India to the Empire making the point that since the British people had been willing to let India go they would certainly not be interested in holding on to such a place as Indo-China for the French. He discoursed at length on the impact of the threat of atomic weapons to the U.K. itself, citing this as a factor which required the utmost caution in dealing with the situation in the Far East. Other than endorsing the position set forth by Mr. Eden to Secretary Dulles and his affirmation of his determination to fight for Malaya, the only solution for the problem of containing the Communist offensive, world wide, which Sir Winston appears to have in mind is a personal and intimate conversation between President Eisenhower, Mr. Malenkov, and himself to settle the big problems. He refers to tackling the problem at the “summit” instead of the fringes.
The Prime Minister made the same point mentioned to me by the British Chiefs of Staff that they regretted that the United States had not stood with them two years ago in coping with their problem in Egypt and in maintaining the security of the Suez Canal. I gathered that the Chiefs referred to a U.S. refusal at that time to make a joint approach to the Egyptian Government. Our recent agreement, they apparently feel, does not make up for our unwillingness to join forthrightly at the earlier occasion.
The Prime Minister deplored his lack of personal knowledge of the Far East stating that he had never been beyond Calcutta and that he did not really know the problems and solutions for the area. I suggested that it might be helpful to him to have a conversation [Page 1032] with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald who was thoroughly familiar with matters in the Far East. He seemed receptive to this suggestion.
I indicated to Sir Winston the possibility of an unfavorable reaction of U.S. public opinion particularly by the U.S. Congress should Great Britain not join with the United States and other nations in a real effort to stop the spread of Communism in Asia. I pointed out that the trend of Congresssional thinking had been evidenced by the restriction imposed last year on military assistance to European countries because of the failure to implement the E.D.C. He did not react to this point except to state that he hoped that Britain could soon be fully independent of financial and material aid from the United States.
While it is possible I may have given him some food for thought, I feel certain that for the present at least he is unwilling to alter the British position. In fact I do not believe he is prepared to take collective action on any matter involving commitments of British resources or incurring any risks unless some British territory is under imminent threat. His personal appraisal of action which can be taken to halt the spread of world Communism seems now limited to talks as he says at the summit. Whether this stems from a personal conviction, a real fear of atomic attack on Britain, or a feeling that the British people will not approve a stronger course, I do not know.
- Secretary Dulles was in Geneva for the opening of the Geneva Conference. This telegram was repeated to London.↩
- Admiral Radford was returning from a 3-day visit to France and had stopped in London on Apr. 26.↩
- See telegram Tedul 15, Apr. 28, vol. xvi, p. 594.↩