Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower correspondence, Whitman file.
No. 446
Prime Minister Churchill
to President Eisenhower1
Dear Friend: 1. I am very much relieved by your kind telegram2 which reassures me that no serious differences will arise between our two governments on account of Russian excursion or “solitary pilgrimage” by me. I feel sure that you will do your best for me in presenting it to the United States public. I accept the full responsibility as I cannot believe that my American kinsmen will [Page 1041] be unanimous in believing I am either anti-American or pro-Communist.
2. I do not intend to go to Moscow. We can only meet as equals and though Stockholm which you mentioned to me before you took office, or Vienna, are both acceptable, Anthony has proposed what I think is the best, namely, Berne. If Malenkov will come to Berne when Geneva is over, Molotov could meet him there and Anthony and I could have a few talks on the dead level.
3. My idea is to create conditions in which a three, or perhaps with the French, a four-power conference might be possible, perhaps, as I said to you, in London early in September. For this I feel, and I expect you will agree, that Russian deeds are necessary as well as words. I should ask then for a gesture or as better expressed, “an act of faith” after all Stalin’s encroachments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Korea, etc. which ruptured Anglo-American wartime comradeship with them, and created the world wide union of the free nations, of which N.A.T.O. is the first expression and M.E.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. are coming along. The sort of gesture I should seek at Berne would be, as I think I mentioned to you, an undertaking to ratify the Austrian Treaty on which all their conditions have been agreed, and to liberate Austria and Vienna from Russian military domination. Surely also it would be a help if they would accept your atomic theme which you told us about at Bermuda and afterwards proposed to U.N.O.
4. But I am not asking any promise from you that even if the above gesture were attained you would commit yourself to the three or four power conference in London, but naturally my hopes run in that direction.
5. Of course all this may be moonshine. The Soviets may refuse any meeting place but Moscow. In that case all would be off for the present, or they will give nothing and merely seek, quite vainly, to split Anglo-American unity. I cherish hopes not illusions and after all I am “an expendable” and very ready to be one in so great a cause.
6. I should like to know your reactions to what I have set out above before I formally ask the Cabinet to propose to the Soviets the two power meeting as described.
7. Now let me come to the main subject of your telegram. Anthony and I were astonished on the voyage to read the press extracts and other reports, etc., about the storm in the United States about the admission of Red China to U.N.O. against American wishes. Still more were we amazed (though not suspicious) that this seemed to be in some way or other linked with our visit as if we had come over for such a purpose. In fact it was hardly discussed. A brief reference was made to it on June 27 at the Foster–Anthony [Page 1042] talks in which Anthony is recorded by us as having said the following:—
China
“Mr. Eden said that he thought he knew something about the difficulties which the United States Government faced in relation to their policy towards China. But Her Majesty’s Government also had their difficulties. In dealing with this problem, he wished to keep in step with the United States. But he could give no unequivocal guarantee that it would be possible to do so.”3
8. There is also a very well informed account in the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune of July 7. This states inter alia that Mr. Eden “according to information available here did not press his point but rather sought to reach a meeting of minds. In doing so he promised to give further thought to the question, to consult his Cabinet colleagues, and to enter into conversation with other governments which perhaps were considering favourable action on the Red China view.”
9. The British position has in fact been defined in our absence but with our full agreement by the Foreign Office on July 5 as follows:—
“The United Kingdom policy has been constant since 1951 when Mr. Morrison, the then Foreign Secretary, stated that Her Majesty’s Government believed that the Central People’s Government should represent China in the United Nations. In view however of that Government’s persistence in behaviour which was inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter it appeared to Her Majesty’s Government that consideration of this question should be postponed. That was the policy of the late Government and it has been the policy of the present government. This policy was reaffirmed in July 1953 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer who stated that the only accretion or addition which he could make was the hope and trust that the day for settling this and other problems would have been brought nearer by the Korean armistice”.
10. I shall confirm this in the statement I am to make to the House of Commons on Monday next and also point out that since July 1953 there has been no settlement of the Korean question—the armies are still in presence—and the problem of Indo-China has assumed more serious proportions. I hope that will ease American minds. I am very sorry that this business which anyhow does not come up at U.N.O. until the third week in September should have been magnified by Knowland and others into a serious difference between the United States and Great Britain on which the press on both sides of the Atlantic are having a good time. It has somewhat taken the bloom off the peach of our visit, especially as [Page 1043] we have not yet been able to make clear by deeds and policy the full measure of our agreement on what I think are far more urgent matters.
11. I need not say how deeply I feel the force of the arguments you use in the latter part of your last telegram although we do not think that any nation could never, repeat never, come into U.N.O. we feel as strongly as you do that they should not come in as a result or at the time of successful and impenitent defiance of the Charter and while still persisting in this attitude. Meanwhile surely the easiest way is to postpone it? We have got enough difficulties in the world to face without it at present.
12. Meanwhile I cannot see why Anthony should not go on trying to persuade China to behave decently even if their conduct should make them more eligible ultimately for membership of the club. I earnestly hope that all the talk and feeling that has been aroused about the issue will not spoil the prospects of a cease-fire leading to a settlement in Indo-China. Such as settlement would in no way weaken our resolve to develop S.E.A.T.O. on the widest lines including the Colombo Powers and bringing Great Britain in for the first time to A.N.Z.U.S. affairs.4
With my kindest regards,
Yours very sincerely,
- The source text was attached to a note from Ambassador Makins to President Eisenhower which was initialed by the President and which stated that the Prime Minister had asked him to deliver it to the President.↩
- Document 444.↩
- For the U.S. record of this meeting, see Document 478.↩
- On July 10 President Eisenhower sent the Prime Minister a brief reply to this message saying that he would study it over the weekend and transmit a complete reply (infra) early the next week. This message was transmitted to London in telegram 184, July 10. (741.13/7–1054)↩