It was good to see you over here, and we only regret that your trip was
so brief. This carries with it every good wish and all the best.2
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of
Embassy in France (MacArthur)
secret
[Paris,] April 2, 1952.
Participants:
- General Eisenhower,
- General Gruenther,
- General Koenig,
French Deputy from the Bas-Rhin,
- Mr. MacArthur.
Several days ago General Koenig wrote General Eisenhower saying he would
be very glad to call upon him. In reply, General Eisenhower invited General
Koenig to lunch with
him today. In the course of the conversation, General Eisenhower expounded his
views on the role of leadership which France should play in
continental Europe and his conviction that in the long run, European
union was essential if the European countries were to be able to
maintain an adequate standard of living while at the same time
maintaining adequate military forces for their defense. He pointed
out that the continental European countries could only do this if
they made maximum collective use of their own individual economic,
financial, productive, manpower, etc., capacities. General Eisenhower thought that
France could take the lead in organizing a unified Western
Europe.
[Page 1197]
He expressed the strong view that it was essential to get along with
the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty in the next
month. The signing of this treaty should not await the organization
of a European federal political union, which would obviously take at
least a few years to work out. However, the EDC was a step in the direction of European unity and
should be implemented now, while the situation in terms of Germany
was probably as favorable as it would ever be. At the same time, the
participating European countries could organize some forum where
they could study the problems of political union and come up with a
plan for governments to examine perhaps in a year or eighteen
months. General Eisenhower concluded by saying Germany will not
continue to drift indefinitely between East and West, and that
Adenauer, who was
well-disposed toward European unity and affiliation with the West,
will not remain in power indefinitely. Even now, the German Social
Democrats and the neo-Nazis are both chipping away and endeavoring
to undermine his position. We should, therefore, press ahead
rapidly, and by signing the EDC
Treaty tie Germany solidly and irrevocably in with the West.
Koenig said that while he
agreed with General Eisenhower, it was naive to believe that the present
French leaders would ever do anything constructive. He said they
were nice, amiable gentlemen, but that they lacked character and
that to them politics was an end in itself, instead of means of
coping with France’s ills. He asked for General Eisenhower’s candid opinion
on the French Government, saying that he could not believe anyone
had any confidence in it since it constantly made promises which it
never fulfilled. For example, Moch had promised 15 divisions by
December 1951, and France had only produced about half that number.
General Koenig said that
when a government committed itself it should do so seriously and not
make lighthearted promises which it had no intention of keeping.
General Eisenhower said
the question of a government being able to meet its plans frequently
depended on financial and economic quesions, on which he, General
Eisenhower, was
not in a position to pass judgment. If the reports on France’s
economic and financial situation which he read in the papers were
accurate he could understand how and why they had been unable from
the financial end to do what they had said they would do,
particularly in view of the increasingly heavy financial burden in
Indochina.
Koenig said he agreed
there might be financial difficulties which would prevent a
government from meeting a commitment, but this was not the case in
France, where lack of leadership, incompetence, and fumbling had
been responsible for a very considerable part of the slippage. He
again said that France could never fulfill
[Page 1198]
the role of leadership which General
Eisenhower
envisaged for it, with the present leaders. Messrs. Pleven, Pinay, Reynaud, Auriol, etc., were all pleasant
and amiable politicians, but they would never give France real
leadership.
He said that from the military point of view, de Gaulle and the RPF insisted that the government should
increase the number of officers and non-commissioned officers in the
professional army; that it should increase the term of military
service to 24 months; that it should instill in the French armed
forces real morale and will-to-fight by seeing that they were
properly organized, trained, and equipped. These were military
conditions for the entry of the RPF
into a coalition government. Unfortunately, the other parties were
unwilling to accept these conditions because of the Socialists, who
were at heart anti-anything that had to do with the military.
Recently, Paul Reynaud
had sounded out all the parties to find out if a government of
national union could be formed. Reynaud made no mention of it being headed by
de Gaulle, and the
presumption was that someone else, possibly Reynaud himself, might head
it. The RPF had been willing to
participate, but the Socialists had refused to enter any government
in which the RPF joined because they
would not agree to the military conditions de Gaulle felt were essential
to France’s security.
Referring to General Eisenhower’s views on European Union, General
Koenig said General
de Gaulle strongly
favored such union. He did not, however, favor the European Defense
Force. In any event, steps for European military integration could
only be taken after there was a political union through which
political agreements had been reached. Insofar as the RPF is concerned, it does not object to
a German national army.
General Eisenhower said
that while the RPF might not object
to a German national army, Adenauer had objections, fearing that there might be
a rebirth of German militarism. Furthermore, General Eisenhower had the feeling
that the French people were opposed to a German national army.
Koenig did not
dispute this point, but simply said that de Gaulle was strongly
opposed to the European Army because it would mean the disappearance
of the French national army. This was unthinkable.
General Eisenhower said
Koenig had said that
General de Gaulle was
for European union. If this were really true, why did he not support
steps in this direction which the present government was taking?
Koenig replied that
the present government would never achieve any real steps in the
direction of European union because of the incapacity of the present
leadership and that therefore there was no point in the RPF’s supporting a government which had
a
[Page 1199]
policy of the lowest
common denominator and would never produce constructive results.
General Eisenhower said
he was discouraged and disappointed in what General Koenig said. He felt that the
survival of France and Europe were at stake. General Koenig gave him the impression
that playing politics was more important than survival. Koenig replied that it was the
present French leaders and not the RPF who were playing politics. The RPF would not lend itself to this and
would remain a party which had only France’s interests at heart.
In conclusion, General Koenig said he was going to the United States in May
to attend the West Point Sesquicentennial and that while in the
United States would make occasion to see a few prominent Americans
in public life to get across to them General de Gaulle’s real views, which
he felt were sadly misunderstood in the United States.
