Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.13/3–2953

No. 173
Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

Washington, March 29, 1953.

Subject: Agenda for Adenauer Visit

1. Following a meeting with the Secretary this morning,² I had a further conference³ with Mr. Blankenhorn at noon today at the house of Dr. Krekeler, the German Chargé d’Affaires. In accordance with decisions made at the Secretary’s meeting, I made the following points to Mr. Blankenhorn:

(a) The Secretary and several of his principal advisers had considered the Chancellor’s suggestions as conveyed by Mr. Blankenhorn and the Secretary had come to the conclusion that it would be exceedingly unwise, if not disastrous, at the present time to imply in any way that the EDC treaties would not be ratified. The proposals of the Chancellor would mean in effect that the United States government would announce what its intentions would be if the treaties failed ratification. This attitude might well be fatal to the efforts now under way in France to obtain the ratification of the agreements by the French Parliament. The same reasoning would apply to the suggestions which the Chancellor had made with respect to the military training of Germans by one or more of the Allies. Mr. Blankenhorn stopped me at this point to inject the statement that of course the Chancellor had never envisaged giving any publicity to any plans for training of German soldiers. I said I understood this but that any action of this character would quickly become known. I said further that the Secretary was not willing to embark upon this course which he thought was premature, and I volunteered the further comment that the Chancellor would be well advised to continue on his present clear and consistent line of ratification of the treaties and further development of European unity. Mr. Blankenhorn said he understood this position and that he would pass it on to the Chancellor when he saw him at Le Havre. He did not seem at all surprised at the reply which was given him.

(b) We then turned to the question of the Saar and possible meetings between Mayer and Adenauer. Mr. Blankenhorn said he had been in touch with the Chancellor on this subject following my conversation with him on March 28 and that he had received a cable this morning stating the Chancellor’s willingness to enter into negotiations with Mayer on the Saar and suggesting that such negotiations be conducted in Paris on May 12 when the Chancellor would be in that city for a meeting of the EPC Ministers. I said that we had hoped for a somewhat earlier meeting, preferably as soon after April 26 as could be arranged, and Mr. Blankenhorn will also convey this to the Chancellor. I anticipate that this question will be discussed further with us during the Chancellor’s visit.

In impressing upon Mr. Blankenhorn the desirability of an early Adenauer–Mayer negotiation on the Saar, I discouraged the idea of negotiations in Washington in the presence of U.S. and U.K. observers, pointing out that the French are very sensitive on this matter and that negotiations conducted under these circumstances, even if not successful, might create adverse sentiment in France. Mr. Blankenhorn said he saw the point and did not press the matter further.

(c) With respect to the possible negotiations on the Saar, Mr. Blankenhorn stated that he wished to be altogether explicit on what the present attitude of the Chancellor is and he believes it important that this be understood within the U.S. government. The Chancellor is convinced that Bidault is attempting to sabotage the EDC and that Bidault, fully conscious of the political difficulties of the Saar issue in Germany in an election year, will utilize the negotiations on the Saar in an attempt to place the blame for the failure of EDC on Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor is ready and prepared to negotiate with Mayer along the lines of the general principles which had been given to us.⁴ It is, however, altogether impossible for the Chancellor to come to a definitive settlement on the Saar issue before the election in Germany. It is difficult enough to settle an issue as thorny as the Saar but quite impossible to do it before June in an election year. Therefore, the Chancellor cannot be rushed on this matter, and he believes that this is precisely the intention of Bidault. I then asked Mr. Blankenhorn if there were any possibility of coming to an agreement on the general principles of a settlement which perhaps could be announced in May. Mr. Blankenhorn thought that this was a possibility and provided that it was not rated as an absolutely conclusive arrangement. After the issuance of the communiqué on the talks with the French,⁵ Mr. Blankenhorn now believes that the Chancellor will possibly raise the problem of the Saar in the course of his visit because he wants to explain in some detail the nature of the German political difficulties.

(d) We then discussed very briefly some of the other points suggested by the Chancellor and the only item of any significance was Mr. Blankenhorn’s recommendation that at least some sort of general declaration be included in the communiqué to be issued after the visit on the subject of refugees. He hopes that some general statement can be given to the effect that the U.S. Government will assist the refugees and will lend its support to international efforts in this field. Mr. Blankenhorn would like to have the refugees referred to in the communiqué as victims of the cold war. I said we were considering the entire refugee problem now and that I hope we would be able to say something about assistance in this field but that I was not certain that specific figures would be given.

(e) Mr. Blankenhorn agreed with me that it would not be desirable for Mr. Blank to accompany the Chancellor, but he very much hoped that he could come to the United States shortly thereafter.…I told Mr. Blankenhorn I thought this could be arranged after the Chancellor’s trip.

(f) Mr. Blankenhorn also expressed the hope that some information could be given to the Chancellor during his visit respecting the amount of off-shore procurement which the United States will undertake in West Germany. I said we might be able to give some figures on this program.

2. It was obvious to me that Mr. Blankenhorn, who incidentally is very close to the Chancellor, was somewhat concerned about the type of communiqué that will be issued after the Adenauer visit, particularly in view of the negative reaction which had been conveyed to him on the most important of the Chancellor’s proposals. I observed casually that the comminqué which had been issued after the Mayer visit had not gone far in any U.S. commitments on aid and in view of our reasons for rejecting certain of the Chancellor’s suggestions, the Chancellor should not be too disappointed if the communiqué was somewhat thin on the subject of U.S. commitments. I do believe, however, that we should give serious thought to what can be said in the communiqué and would recommend that perhaps we should consider further the possibility of raising the German Mission in Washington to an Embassy and asking the British and French to do the same in their respective capitals. It seems to me that this is a small consequence but one which might be given without material damage to French prospects of ratification. I should recommend that we should accept the Chancellor’s offer on a medical unit for Korea and on the rest home if this can conveniently be done. I do not anticipate that we should have much difficulty on the subject of atomic energy as Blankenhorn has indicated that what the Germans are most concerned about is the question of civilian defense.

3. Mr. Blankenhorn will return tomorrow to Germany and plans to meet the Chancellor in Le Havre.

1. The source text bears the handwritten notation by Roderic L. O’Connor “Sec saw 4 April, RLC”. Copies were also sent to Matthews, Merchant, and MacArthur.
2. No record of Riddleberger’s conversation with Dulles on Mar. 29 has been found in Department of State files.
3. For a record of Riddleberger’s previous conversation with Blankenhorn, see his memorandum, supra.
4. Attached to Riddleberger’s memorandum, supra.
5. For text of the communiqué, issued Mar. 28 at the conclusion of talks with Prime Minister Mayer, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 491–492.