Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

740.5/4–1753

No. 179
United States Delegation Minutes of the First General Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles, Conference Suite, 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, April 7, 1953, 3–4:30 p.m.¹

secret
GPT MIN–2

Washington, April 17, 1953.

• Participants
  • United States
    • Secretary of State
    • Dr. Conant
    • Mr. Matthews
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Riddleberger
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Linder
    • Mr. McCardle
    • Mr. Morris
    • Mr. O’Connor
    • Mr. Reinstein
    • Mr. Kellermann
    • Mr. Kitchen
    • Mr. Van Hollen
    • Secretary of Treasury
    • Mr. Burgess
    • Mr. Overby
    • Mr. Nash, Defense Department
    • Col. Gerhardt
    • The Director of Mutual Security
    • Mr. FitzGerald
    • Mr. Schelling
    • Mr. Harris
    • Amb. Draper
    • Mr. Slater
    • Dr. Hauge, White House
  • German
    • Chancellor Adenauer
    • Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein
    • Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan
    • Mr. Hans von Herwarth
    • Mr. Felix von Eckhardt
    • Dr. Alexander Boeker
    • Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler
    • Mr. Friedrich-Karl Vialon
    • Mr. Ulrich de Maiziers
    • Mr. Von Haeften
    • Dr. Gunther Harkort
    • Dr. Georg Federer
    • Dr. Albert F. Ernecke
    • Mr. Schulze-Boysen
    • Mr. Hans Podeyn

Ratification of EDC and Contractuals, Including Relation of Saar Thereto. After extending greetings to Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary Dulles opened the substantive discussion saying that both the Government and the American people had been cheered by the large vote by which the German lower house had recently ratified the EDC Treaty. Such a vote had been forecast by the Chancellor and it was apparent that the Chancellor was a man of his word. Secretary Dulles was gratified to note that the Chancellor had assured the President at the morning meeting at the White House² that the EDC would also pass the upper house despite opposition, an assurance which made the U.S. appreciate the Chancellor’s leadership. It was the feeling of the U.S. that the treaties would finally come into force providing additional military potential to support the NATO organization. Although there was disappointment that Mr. de Gasperi, because of a filibuster in the Italian Parliament over the electoral reform bill, had not felt it practicable to ask his Parliament to take up the EDC Treaty, nonetheless, de Gasperi had assured the U.S. that when the Parliament reconvened in July, ratification of the treaty would be the first order of business.

Secretary Dulles reported that the French talks had indicated that the primary difficulty in the way of EDC ratification was the solution of the Saar issue, a subject which had been discussed with the Chancellor at the White House meeting. As was pointed out in the communiqué of the French talks,³ the U.S. did not agree with the French thesis that the solution of the Saar dispute was a legal matter and that such a solution was indispensable to the ratification of the EDC and the Contractuals. Although the U.S. did not agree that the Saar problem had to be solved before ratification of the EDC, the U.S. likewise did not believe that it was necessary to defer a solution until after ratification. It was extremely important that both the Germans and the French solve this problem in a satisfactory manner because if such a solution were reached, the last major obstacle to EDC ratification would be overcome. As the President had stated, the U.S. looked to the Germans to play a major and farsighted role in the solution of the Saar question.

Chancellor Adenauer replied that he had told the President that Germany would make a serious attempt to solve the Saar problem. Delay had been caused largely because of a change in the French Government, but it now appeared possible to move forward to a successful solution. He pointed out that when the EDC had been signed in Paris in May 1952 all those who took part in the negotiations felt that the treaties would probably go into effect in August or September of that year. However, these prospects had not been fulfilled. Mr. de Gasperi, although he was most desirous of EDC ratification, was not able to carry forward his plans for ratification because of difficulties in the Italian Senate and, for this and other reasons, it appeared likely that it would be four or five months before complete ratification could be obtained.

Because of these delays, and because of the nature of German public opinion, the Chancellor said that he would welcome any assistance that might be given to mollify the public in Germany. He pointed out that he was now under attack by the Social Democratic Party and that in September elections for the Bundestag would be held. It was extremely important that there should be a continuation of present German policy during the next four years and yet it would be extremely difficult to explain to certain groups in Germany why the EDC had not been ratified. With the elections approaching, it would have been most advantageous if EDC ratification had been completed, since, at present, there were many individuals in Germany—who were not strong adherents of any political party—who were in a state of uncertainty because they felt that the Western build-up was being halted through a failure to ratify the EDC on schedule.

The Chancellor pointed out that, either in the Contractuals or the EDC—he did not remember which—it was provided that when France, Britain, the U.S. and Germany had ratified the EDC, certain portions of the Contractual Agreement would go into effect. Therefore, he wondered whether it would be possible, in order to assist with public opinion at home, to raise the status of the High Commissioner to that of an Ambassador. This was not to say that the High Commissioner’s task should be abolished. However, since there were certain matters which lay beyond the regular functions of the High Commissioner, it was probable that the High Commissioner would feel certain restrictions or inhibitions and for this reason the establishment of an Ambassadorship would be welcomed. In addition, it would be advantageous if the German representative in Washington could be raised to Ambassadorial rank. The Chancellor pointed out that a precedent for such a change already existed in Austria where, although the Allied Control Commission still existed, the three Western Powers were represented by Ambassadors and Austria, on its part, had an Ambassador in Washington. If the High Commissioner in Germany could be given Ambassadorial status, the Chancellor believed such a move would have a splendid impression on public opinion and would assist him in the forthcoming election.

In reply, Secretary Dulles said that one of the difficulties in meeting the Chancellor’s request was that, as the Contractuals were written, it would be impossible for the U.S. to take a position on the question of Ambassadors without prior consultation with the British and the French. While the U.S. would be sympathetically disposed to taking up this matter upon completion by the Germans of the ratification of the treaties, he felt that this subject could be dealt with more effectively if it were not given too much publicity in advance. He said that it would perhaps be best to agree that the U.S. would explore what could be done when German ratification was completed.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed with Secretary Dulles that advance publicity would be unwise and that careful consultation was necessary. He asked whether the U.S. had any objection to the Germans discussing this subject with the British. Secretary Dulles answered that the U.S. had no objection to the Germans discussing it with the British. Secretary Dulles then stated that he desired to make it clear that the U.S. sympathized with the German attitude on this subject and would do everything possible to give the Germans the benefits of the character suggested by the Chancellor so that these benefits would be available before the election. Naturally, if the High Commissioner were raised to an Ambassador, the U.S. would welcome an Ambassador from Germany in Washington since the two types of representation were directly related.

Estimate of Soviet Position Following Death of Stalin. Stating that at the earlier White House meeting both he and President Eisenhower had given a brief estimate of the Soviet position following the death of Stalin, Secretary Dulles asked the Chancellor for his views on this subject. Chancellor Adenauer replied that his estimate of the situation was the same as that of the President and the Secretary of State. It was his feeling that the recent peace feelers were simply evidence that the death of Stalin had caused instability within the USSR. There was no indication that the Soviet Union was diverging from its previous policies. It should be remembered that there had been a continuous armament build-up by the USSR, particularly during the period since 1950. For example, in the satellite states 70 divisions were presently deployed which now had modern equipment compared with the older equipment available to them two years ago. These divisions were backed up by 240 divisions in the Soviet Union itself. Furthermore, there were airfields in the Soviet Union and satellites located so close to Germany that jet planes could be over Bonn in 20 minutes and over Paris in 50 minutes. Soviet pressure on Eastern Germany appeared to be as strong as ever and, in the case of certain religious groups, pressure had actually increased.

The Chancellor felt that the main immediate task of the Soviet Union was to protect itself from unrest by consolidating its internal position. While it was true that the Soviet Union might extend a peace offer which could be acceptable to the West, the West must not relax its vigilance, but instead should continue to build its strength since the only way to negotiate with a totalitarian country was to negotiate from strength. Although the Federal Republic had no desire for war, the danger of war would increase if the West relaxed its build-up efforts. On the other hand, if the present policy of building strength should continue, it would one day be possible to undertake sensible negotiations with the Soviet Union. Referring to the latest Western note on the subject of free elections in Germany,⁴ the Chancellor pointed out that the Soviets did not answer the note at all. If they should approve free elections in Germany, a critical point of danger would be removed, since an agreement on free elections would bring about the unity of Germany. The Chancellor also felt that the West should demand that the Soviet Union release some 300,000 prisoners of war and civilian internees who, it was well known to the German Red Cross, were alive and somewhere in the Soviet Union, although their exact whereabouts were unknown.

War Criminals. Opening the discussion on war criminals, Chancellor Adenauer said that the U.S. now holds about 300 prisoners in Landsborg Prison. Alluding to the fact that the treaties provided for a Mixed Board to be set up to consider all cases, he pointed out that there were considerable psychological and public opinion problems in Germany connected with the war criminal issue. Especially difficult was the agitation of various soldiers and veterans organizations. These psychological difficulties with respect to war criminals must be overcome because they would affect the formation of German units for the European Defense Community, since these units would be composed in large measure of technicians and specialists who would be difficult to recruit unless there were a more lenient parole system for the war criminals. Therefore, the Chancellor requested that, even before the treaties went into effect, a study should be undertaken for the purpose of considering the possibility of establishing the Mixed Board provided for in the treaty. Because of the psychological situation at home, it would be most advantageous if this Board could meet before the end of the year without awaiting complete ratification of the treaties.

With regard to the parole system, the Chancellor maintained that the British were more lenient with paroles than the U.S. He said that a number of prisoners in Germany had been paroled by the French High Commissioner, but that it was more difficult to parole the war criminals who were held in France since the ultimate authority for paroling the war criminals in France was vested in the President under a system which was unduly complicated. With regard to the prisoners held in Spandau Prison, the Chancellor recognized that it was only with difficulty that relief for the prisoners could be achieved although there had been certain recent success. If the Russians were now actually engaged in friendly moves it might be possible to test their true motives by raising the question of the Spandau prisoners. Secretary Dulles replied that the U.S. preferred to defer until the following day the subject of war criminals, including those in Spandau.

German Defense Contribution. Chancellor Adenauer said that it had been agreed that the subject of a German defense contribution would be discussed at a meeting in Paris on April 17 between German Ministers and NATO representatives. Until that time, this subject should be discussed at the expert level since there were a number of questions still to be clarified. Furthermore, at the forthcoming NATO Conference,⁵ the NATO Ministers would be in a better position to receive the final proposals. Replying that the U.S. hoped that acceptable agreement could be reached at the Paris meeting, Secretary Dulles said that the information to date had indicated that the total contribution proposed by the Germans might be less than that agreed upon last year. In view of the Federal Republic’s improved economic condition, it seemed to the U.S. that any effort smaller than that agreed to last year would not be understood by other countries. Therefore, if this question were not satisfactorily resolved at the April 17 Paris meeting, Secretary Dulles urged the Chancellor to deal with the problem personally upon his return to Germany. He also emphasized the importance of providing support for Allied troops in Germany and expressed the hope that it would be possible to provide a substantial sum for support costs without affecting the amount provided for the German contingents in the EDC. Finally, he said that a substantial amount of military equipment might be made available to the Germans following EDC ratification. Secretary Dulles asked Mr. Riddleberger to comment on the subject of the German defense contribution and asked Mr. Nash to comment on the subject of military equipment for Germany.

Mr. Riddleberger said that in discussing the German contribution, it should be pointed out that the German submission would be given the same type of review given to the submissions of other countries and that therefore, no discrimination existed. It was important to ascertain the total amount of the German contribution by the April 23 NATO meeting, so that agreement could be sought with all NATO countries. If the German amount were not received, the entire review process would be complicated. The basic criteria for the defense contribution was the economic situation in each country, and it would be difficult to contend that the German contributions this year should be less than that provided last year in view of Germany’s economic situation, her position in the EPU, etc. As to the build-up of German contingents in the EDC, Mr. Riddleberger said that it was important to get agreement on support costs for Allied Forces in Germany and that he felt that a close examination of the German figures would reveal that the necessary amounts would be available for Allied support costs.

Chancellor Adenauer answered that he would be prepared to provide finished material for the NATO Conference. However, the task was difficult since, as his Finance Minister had pointed out, the Germans had difficulty in comparing their contribution with that of other countries since they did not know what criteria had been used in other countries. The Chancellor reiterated his suggestion that this question be left at the expert level until the Paris conference. Meanwhile, he agreed to do everything possible to adhere to the earlier commitment so that the Federal Republic would be ready for the conferences on the 17th and the 23rd. He said he would send instructions from Washington on this subject.

Military Equipment for Germany. After recalling that it had been agreed at Bonn last year, that when the EDC went into effect the U.S. would provide end-item military assistance to German contingents during the initial training period. Mr. Nash read the statement on military equipment attached as an Annex. At the conclusion of Mr. Nash’s statement. Chancellor Adenauer requested that the detailed figures be given to his military experts so that they would be in a position to take the necessary additional steps upon the ratification of EDC. Secretary Dulles closed the substantive discussion by saying that, with regard to the German defense contribution, he had not stressed the fact that it appeared to be less than last year but rather that the contribution should be more than last year.

The meeting concluded with an agreement that a working group of financial experts would convene to discuss certain technical problems^* and that another working group would be established to prepare the initial draft of the communiqué for the talks.⁶

Annex

[Washington, April 7, 1953?]

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nash) secret

Provision of Military Equipment by the United States

Taking into account the equipment availabilities for and requirements of the EDC countries as a whole, and assuming the continuation of present world conditions, the United States has made budgetary provisions which put us in a position to provide to the European Defense Community the major equipment required from outside the EDC for the first six German groupements and twenty-four German air squadrons, on a basis comparable to that used in providing equipment to the other EDC countries. This equipment will include:

a. For Army contingents:

In general, only those items having a primary military application, such as tanks, combat vehicles, field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, and basic signal and engineering equipment, including components and spare parts. This matériel is not restricted to items of United States manufacture, and includes items obtained through offshore procurement.

b. For Air Force contingents:

Fighter-bomber aircraft, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, primary and jet training aircraft, ground handling equipment, maintenance training units and related equipment, electronics maintenance training units and related equipment, electronics and communications equipment, machine guns, bombs, rockets, and miscellaneous ammunition.

I understand that negotiations have been going on, which are now being successfully concluded, concerning the transfer of certain TNC naval vessels to the Federal Republic.

The prompt and orderly delivery of United States equipment depends (1) upon the completion of necessary arrangements by the European Defense Community; (2) upon the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the United States, the European Defense Community, and the Federal Republic; and (3) upon the determination by SHAPE and United States authorities that the units which are to receive this equipment reach a state of training in which they can make effective use of it. While the United States is about to present to the European Defense Community and to the Federal Republic proposed drafts of the required agreements, it will also be necessary that planning for the buildup of German units by the EDC Interim Commission result in schedules which can be the basis of United States programming and plans for delivery of specific quantities of equipment. Our information at the present time is that such planning has not progressed beyond broad preliminary stages. If detailed arrangements for the receipt of United States equipment are to be completed promptly, it will therefore be necessary that the EDC Interim Commission prepare the necessary plans.

Should you desire more detailed information, we are prepared to provide specific delivery forecasts when the ratification of the EDC Treaty has been completed, when EDC Interim Commission plans for the German guildup and production have been finalized, and when bilateral agreements with the EDC and the Federal Republic have been signed. In the meantime we will consider requests for detailed information which is required by the EDC Interim Commission for planning purposes.

1. A summary of this meeting was also transmitted to Bonn in telegram 4845, Apr. 8. (611.62A/4–853) For Chancellor Adenauer’s account of this meeting and GPT MIN–3, (infra), see Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 443–447.
2. For the minutes of this meeting, see GPT MIN–1, supra.
3. For text of this communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 491–492.
4. For text of this note, Sept. 23, 1952, see Document 138.
5. Reference is to the Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, held at Paris, Apr. 23–25, 1953.
6. A record of these discussions is contained in Dept. of State cable to HICOG Bonn No. 4927, April 15, 1953. [Footnote in the source text; for the telegram under reference, see Document 184.]
6. No record of the work of this group has been found in Department of State files. A copy of the draft communiqué prepared by the interdepartmental working group, GPT D–16, dated Apr. 6, is in file 762A.00/4–653.