Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

740.5/5–2953: Telegram

No. 187
The United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Bruce) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret priority

Paris, May 29, 1953—9 p.m.

Coled 881. Eyes only Conant. Walter Hallstein called on me this afternoon to discuss EDC treaty. After conversation on this subject he told me that upon his return to Germany tonight he and Chancellor would deliberate upon following topic that had been under consideration by them and, if they decide go ahead, will be taking it up with you almost immediately. I thought it might be useful tell you of its possible reference to you although it may not take the form which Hallstein now contemplates.

Adenauer was somewhat disturbed by his conversations with Churchill.² He thinks Churchill unrealistic about benefits for West that might be derived from conference with Russians. He found Churchill in variable state of mental agility depending on time of day. Excellent at night, a bit confused in the morning. Adenauer wants President Eisenhower to know he is firmly in favor of President’s position on talks with Russians³ and so far as he is concerned looks to US for leadership in this regard and not to UK. He believes that Churchill mistakenly considers himself man who can accomplish personal wonders with Russians and overestimates his own and British Empire’s influence in Russian political circles.

Adenauer feels that existing East-West tensions involve Germany more than they do any other power and feels great sense of responsibility toward President in presenting to him point of view as to how matters that may come up affecting Germany should be handled. To this end he is considering asking you, if you approve, to try to arrange for Adenauer to send special message to President by Blankenhorn before the Bermuda meeting⁴ which would convey to President essential thoughts of Chancellor on this and I daresay other subjects. Since Federal Republic only has Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Chancellor thinks Blankenhorn, in whom he has complete confidence, should deliver written communication to President and expand on it orally.

Other subjects. Following unconnected topics may be of some interest.

1. Chancellor will go to Rome for first day of meeting and will leave Hallstein there as head German delegation.⁵

2. In German public opinion, Russians have recently made two great mistakes; first, turning down discussion Austrian treaty and, second, referring to Potsdam Agreement, which is utterly unacceptable to German people.

3. Chancellor very disturbed about Senator Taft’s remarks, which have had unfortunate repercussions in Germany, but President’s press conference somewhat counteracted them. Thinks Senator does not realize Russian domination of Germany would make Soviet war potential greater than US potential.⁶

4. Key problem in Europe is Franco-German relationship. Germany wants a strong France able to exercise leadership and carry out its commitments. Constitutional weakness of France makes future very uncertain. Adenauer and Hallstein feel that Rome meeting, especially on economic side, cannot make real progress because of the dangerous budgetary and monetary situation in France. All friends of France should do everything possible to help it by pressure or otherwise to put its house in order.

5. EDC. Adenauer is not worried about decision of constitutional court on EDC. He does not think it will be rendered until after election and is meanwhile educating members of court on subject.

6. Elections. Hallstein says recent polls in Germany indicate strong trend in favor Adenauer government and even Protestants in North Germany are swinging to him. However, if Chancellor does lose he would not join a coalition with SPD. He believes Germany needs a democratic opposition. Otherwise opposition would be formed of extreme right or left wings which would be anti-democratic as was case under Weimar Republic.

Bruce

1. Repeated to Washington as Coled 95 which is the source text.
2. For Chancellor Adenauer’s account of his visit to London, May 14–15, see Adenauer, Erinnerungen, pp. 205–208.
3. Adenauer is referring to President Eisenhower’s position as elaborated in his speech “The Chance for Peace” on Apr. 16; see footnote 2, Document 182.
4. For documentation on the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, initially scheduled for June and subsequently postponed until December 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.
5. The reference here presumably is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Political Community (EPC) scheduled for Rome in June, which was subsequently postponed due to the fall of the French Government.
6. On May 26 Senator Taft, in a speech at Cincinnati, had stated that the United States should abandon the United Nations in the Far East and reserve a free hand for itself. The following day at his press conference President Eisenhower said that U.S. policy was based on the theory that no single free nation can live alone in the world. Extracts from Senator Taft’s speech are in the New York Times, May 27, 1953, p. 6. For the transcript of President Eisenhower’s press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 328–341.