Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.00/6–453

No. 194
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)¹

secret

Washington, June 4, 1953.

• Participants: President Eisenhower
• Mr. Blankenhorn, Personal Representative of Chancellor Adenauer
• Mr. MacArthur

After the usual amenities, Mr. Blankenhorn said that Chancellor Adenauer had asked him to call on the President and hand to him two personal messages.² One was general in character, whereas the other was more detailed. After the President had read the letters, he said that Chancellor Adenauer had proposed consultation at Foreign Ministers’ Deputies level, between France, the U.K., U.S. and Germany prior to any 4-Power conference. The President was sympathetic to this suggestion and would discuss it with his foreign policy advisers. He personally believed such consultation would serve a very useful purpose since obviously none of the Big Three would wish to take decisions with respect to Germany’s future without knowing very fully the Chancellor’s views. The President said that the Chancellor’s letter had also suggested that a West German observer be present at the place where a 4-Power conference might be held and that such an observer would be currently and fully informed by the delegations of the three Western powers. The President did not commit himself on this but commented that if there were a West German observer present the Soviets would certainly have an East German observer also present. This question was one which would have to be examined.

Mr. Blankenhorn then said there were two points to which the Chancellor attached great importance and hoped that early steps could be taken. These were:

1. Giving Dr. Conant, the U.S. High Commissioner, the rank of Ambassador.

2. The early establishment of a Mixed War Criminals Clemency Board provided for in the Contractual Arrangements now that the German Bundestag and Bundesrat had ratified the EDC and contractual arrangements.³ If it were not possible to obtain U.K. and French agreement to the establishment of the above-mentioned Board, it was hoped the U.S. would be able to go ahead and set up some form of mixed U.S.-German board such as had been discussed with Chancellor Adenauer on the occasion of his recent visit to Washington in April. Mr. Blankenhorn said that if the above steps could be taken they would be extremely helpful to the Chancellor in the forthcoming electoral battle.

With respect to giving Dr. Conant the rank of Ambassador, the President said he was very sympathetically disposed and personally saw no reason why it could not be done in the coming weeks. He would, however, wish to discuss this with Secretary Dulles. With respect to war criminals, the President said he was also very sympathetic but he assumed that the French would be opposed to putting this provision of the Contractual Agreements into effect prior to entry into effect of the EDC. Mr. Blankenhorn agreed that the French would oppose this very strongly. The President said that this also raised the question as to whether as a matter of tactics it would be in Germany’s interest for the U.S. to do something which the French would violently oppose. What he had in mind was that the reaction in France might be unfavorable to the extent that it would further complicate French ratification of the EDC. The President said that he personally wished that the whole war criminals business could be settled. It was possible that the U.S. unilaterally could take steps such as suggested by Mr. Blankenhorn and the President asked Mr. MacArthur to have the State Department examine this matter.

The President then referred to eight points which were made in an enclosure to one of Chancellor Adenauer’s two letters.⁴ He said that some of the points seemed to correspond directly with what had been agreed by the U.S., the U.K., France and Germany. Other points included in the eight raised other questions such as Germany’s frontiers. He could not give any off-the-cuff opinion as to the various points but he assured Mr. Blankenhorn that he would ask Secretary Dulles and the State Department to examine them carefully.

The President then said that Chancellor Adenauer’s letter indicated he was worried about Prime Minister Churchill’s views. The President said that he was an old and good friend of Mr. Churchill. Churchill and the Chancellor were about the same age but in some respects Adenauer was the youngest of all the European Prime Ministers in his mental outlook and the way he sought new solutions rather than looking to the past for answers to the difficult problems the world faces today. He felt that there were no real differences in the fundamental objectives of Mr. Churchill and Chancellor Adenauer. The difficulty was that too many speeches were made and different interpretations were placed on the speeches in different countries which led to loose statements and recriminations. This had a divisive effect. The President said that U.S. policy with respect to Germany was based on (1) West Germany becoming an integrated part of Western Europe and (2) on the ultimate unification of Germany. These were the cardinal principles of U.S. policy with respect to Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn expressed gratification at the President’s remarks and said he would pass them on to the Chancellor.

Just before taking departure Mr. Blankenhorn said there was one other point which he would like to mention very briefly. Mr. Reber was leaving Germany and it was very important that Dr. Conant have as his Deputy a very capable officer who has a very complete background understanding of German affairs. The Chancellor hoped that it would be possible to name someone of Mr. Riddleberger’s stature. The President asked Mr. MacArthur to look into this matter but said he did not believe it would be possible to send Mr. Riddleberger to Germany since the U.S. Government had in mind for him another important assignment.

In conclusion, the President asked Mr. Blankenhorn to convey [to] the Chancellor his warm respect and also to express the admiration which the President and the American people feel for the great work which the Chancellor is performing in Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn expressed great pleasure at the President’s remarks and said he would pass them on to the Chancellor.

1. This conversation took place at the White House from 2:30 to 3 p.m. Copies of this memorandum were circulated to Dulles, Smith, Matthews, Merchant, Lewis, and Bowie. A summary of the meeting was transmitted to Bonn (repeated to London and Paris) on June 6 in telegram 5434. (611.62A/6–653) The source text also indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it on June 9.
2. Documents 189 and 190.
3. On Mar. 19 the Bundestag had ratified the contractual agreements and the EDC Treaty.
4. The letter of May 29, Document 189.