396.1 BE/1–654: Telegram
No. 323
The United States High
Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State1
2151. We met with Ollenhauer, Mellies and Wehner January 5 in cordial atmosphere to discuss latest tripartite positions on free all-German elections and formation of all-German Government. Meeting opened with prefatory statement our part in which we informed SPD leaders substantially as follows: US Government (and we thought generally also our allies) was approaching Berlin conference with deep awareness of gravity and importance of doing utmost to reach agreement with Soviets on solution German problem. SPD might be assured allies would make every effort secure agreement on reunification and failing that to prove they not to blame for continued division.
At same time allies deeply aware their responsibility toward 40 million people West Germany, and they could not gamble on welfare and freedom these people in negotiations with opponent which during 8 years had repeatedly proved that its good faith and even solemn obligations could not be trusted, and whose intentions at this conference completely unknown. We considered it necessary therefore to proceed with utmost caution yet at same time to afford every opportunity for progress to be made if progress possible. We believed that tripartite proposals which had been worked out for free elections and formation of all-German Government contained minimum safeguards necessary yet sufficient flexibility to permit sure and rapid transition to fully sovereign all-German Government if future negotiations with Soviets could be successfully carried out.
We then went carefully through the election and status papers.2 At the end, SPD leaders gave us impression they accepted allied approach to all-German elections as well considered. On other hand, all three were in agreement that Chancellor’s suggestion of separate landtag and volkskammer elections for Soviet Zone was unacceptable as it would amount to voluntary and legal recognition of Pankow and thus of division of Germans themselves. Wehner stated that Germans had been duped once before, in connection with Saar, where French used “free” Landtag elections as indirect [Page 743] means of obtaining what they represent as popular endorsement of separation of Saar from Germany. SPD leaders agreed that occupation powers must agree on and promulgate all-German election law; SPD would categorically refuse deal with DDR on elections except to discuss purely technical issues of implementation but then only as agents of occupation powers following agreement in principle by occupation powers.
On issue powers constituent assembly, SPD leaders initially reiterated party’s opposition to co-existence Bonn and Pankow following all-German elections. However, when it was made clear to them that proposal in assembly would have authority to take over powers of Federal Republic and DDR at own initiative, they withdrew their objections and reserved their position until party could study subject more fully.
In connection with our statement on Paris report on status of all-German Government, Ollenhauer inquired whether such government would be free accept or reject treaties and obligations entered into by Federal Republic or DDR. He was informed that it would be free to do so. Ollenhauer welcomed our assurance that Western powers would fully explore all possibilities German unity in freedom and would not adopt inflexible course. He then said West should realize as most Germans realized that coming conference could not be regarded as one of series of conferences on German unity to be repeated at will, but rather as only chance for long time to come of bringing about German unity. If conference failed, he said, new attempt for unity could not be made for years with any chance of success. He concluded by saying that SPD highly appreciative of opportunity discuss this question with US officials since “Federal Government far less cooperative in this respect.” Ollenhauer, who dominated this discussion in distinction previous ones on four power conference where Wehner has taken lead, said that SPD wishes consult at least once again prior to conference.
In earlier conversation with same SPD leaders, they made following general remarks on subject four power conference.
Ollenhauer stated party leaders believed genuine if gradual change might be taking place in USSR and Kremlin might possibly be prepared make some concessions in order achieve new modus Vivendi with West which would give Soviets period needed to stabilize internal conditions and consolidate new regime. In this connection, he mentioned that a Kiel shipbuilding firm had recently received multimillion dollar order for fishing vessels from Soviets, and this action appeared to be part of general pattern of relaxation of conditions with USSR. As consequence of this situation, Ollenhauer declared, West should go to conference with flexible program and attitude. On German question, he said, while military status of [Page 744] united Germany would be a central issue of conference and should in no account be avoided, it would be serious mistake for West to present EDC to Soviets in conference as sole security device for united Germany. There were many other possibilities such as UN membership for a united Germany which would guarantee security of both Germany and its neighbors. “German people would simply not understand it if conference should break up over Western insistence on EDC as sole possibility for defense of united Germany,” he said. Wehner then commented that it would be victory for USSR if West, especially United States, could be made to appear as guilty as Soviets in maintaining division of Germany. Result would be general European disaffection with both sides, in itself a distinct advantage for Soviets.
Wehner was less optimistic than Ollenhauer on Berlin conference. He felt little progress would be made there because no major Soviet concessions on Germany could be expected until after top-level agreement on more important issues like atomic control and disarmament had been reached. In order, however, to prevent post-conference situation from being worse one than present and in order get something out of conference for Germans even if no agreement on unity possible, Wehner suggested that Foreign Ministers should, as soon as it becomes apparent that conference would fail on major issues, refrain from pushing developments to their logical end in attempt to place blame clearly on one side or other. Instead, West should propose that HICOMers, including Soviets, be Directed to work out program for lessening difficulties arising from division of Germany by series of practical steps which would not directly affect position of occupation powers. Program should include (1) unification of Berlin including freedom for city government to decide which laws (Federal Republic or DDR) should be applied in Berlin, and which offices of both governments be located there, and including revamped Kommandatura without veto rights and severely limited in its powers to interfere; (2) free access to Berlin from Federal Republic and DDR including “land corridor”; (3) steps toward creation of common currency for Federal Republic and DDR; (4) “normalization” of interzonal traffic and trade.
Wehner said that SPD had refrained from attempting make major public issue out of controversy over powers of all-German Government because subject was so highly theoretical and complicated it did not lend itself to public debate. With regard to all-German elections, he said, SPD continues to believe that free elections should be means of carrying out previously reached agreement of occupation powers on powers and status of all-German Government rather than main issue of conference. If four powers could agree on future international status of united Germany, [portion [Page 745] omitted in the source text]. While recent Chancellor–SPD–FDP controversy over powers of constituent assembly seems resolved, views expressed by Ollenhauer and Wehner to effect that real vital issue of conference for Soviets, West and Germans alike, would be status and powers of all-German Government rather than free elections, are, in our opinion, not confined to SPD, but have very wide support.
- Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.↩
- For summaries of these papers, see items 2 and 3 of the memorandum by Fuller, Jan. 5, Document 320.↩