Belgrade Embassy files, lot 56 F 149, “August–December 1953”
No. 147
The Special Liaison Officer to
the Headquarters of Allied Forces in Southern Europe
(Maffitt) to the Counselor of Embassy in
Italy (Durbrow)
Dear Durby: A good deal of heart-searching has been going on here since the situation around Trieste and to the north presented the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities. What would CINCSOUTH do if Tito’s forces entered Zone A, before or after withdrawal of US/UK forces? What if fighting broke out along the border to the north, especially if the originator was not clearly identified as aggressor? In amending AFSOUTH’s EWP to include the possibility of an attack by Yugoslavia on Italy or on Italian troops in Zone A, should a provision be written in for the establishment of a demilitarized zone between Italian and Yugoslav forces and if so, should it contemplate enforcement action against Italy as well as against Yugoslavia? What role would the UN play? What would the legal status of Zone A be after the US/UK had turned it over to Italian administration? In the event of an open Yugoslav attack against such administration, or the US/UK forces in the Zone, would Article 5 of the Treaty technically come into effect, as the British Ambassador to Denmark says the British think (Copenhagen’s 256 of Oct. 26 to the Dept., Rome 31), etc. etc.?
[Page 340]The Commander in Chief says the answer to the first question is simple enough. He would await SACEUR’s instructions. When I suggested that an American national source might give him instructions in his American rather than his NATO capacity, he said that as an American citizen and the senior US military person in this area, he is at the orders of his superior, CINCEUR, and could be ordered to take what action the latter might deem appropriate. He added that Admiral Wright2 thinks that he, as CINCNELM, would probably be the commander who would be called on to act in a purely American capacity if such an occasion should arise. I am inclined to agree with Jerry, since I cannot envisage the US removing Admiral Fechteler from his NATO command when CINCNELM is available and the American forces immediately at his command are naval.
The Commander in Chief’s answer would cover the second question also, although it only begs it.
The rest of the questions have come up in connection with planning, on which I have been devoting considerable time at G–3’s request. The main problem raised in trying to provide for all contingencies in this situation is that you find the UN and NATO could be in opposition. That is, technically the UN Security Council or General Assembly could order or recommend measures for the restoration of peace and security in the affected area which would entail action of some sort against Italy, a signatory to NATO, such as applying force to make it evacuate a security zone X miles deep along the Yugoslav border or restraining it from occupying terrain in Yugoslav territory which is the key to the military defense of Zone A. In reality, it is unlikely the UN would take any decision or make any recommendation which could create additional fighting, but it might very well, in the desire to put out or at least localize the conflagration, call for some action which would require that members, among them members of NATO, or at least to not giving it the assistance it might request from its allies.
In helping to write some of the planning referred to above, I have held that a NATO planner must plan from the NATO point of view. He must first of all seek to keep the Organization intact and to safeguard its members from action by non-members. I realize that under Article 103 of the UN Charter the obligations of the Charter shall prevail over those created by any other international agreement, but it is not for the NATO planner to try to figure out what the UN should do. In other words, he should not get involved in what would happen if the UN asked NATO to put out an Italian-Yugo fire on a strictly impartial basis. He should devise possible [Page 341] measures that will help Italy out and then hope that the members of NATO who are also in UN will see to it that the action called for by the UN will be in harmony with it.
I have no NATO solution to the problem that would be created if Yugoslavia threw the Italians out of Zone A and then sat down. We don’t own the Zone and so have no legal right to give it to anyone or, in fact, to do anything but administer it with the British at the UN’s request. It does therefore not become Italian territory de jure when we hand it over. A penetration of it by Yugoslav forces would therefore presumably not be an attack on the territory of Italy nor, if US/UK troops were not there any longer, would it be an attack on “Occupation forces”. I am not even sure our troops are to be considered as occupation troops within the meaning of NATO.
It follows from this line of thinking that the Yugos would have as much legal right to sit in Zone A as the Italians, and if that is what they were able to do, I am not clear what anyone would do about it. I assume Italy would try to expel them by its own military efforts. It is believed here that Italy can do this if it has the will to fight, because it is better equipped and has greater reserve strength. But if it was successful, it would not stop—militarily, it could not until it had taken the dominating heights, which are inside Yugoslav territory—and would find itself in the technical position of aggressor because the Yugoslavs had not invaded Italian territory and the Italians had invaded Yugoslavia. This would give us something to think about.
The UN approach would be to call for a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops behind national frontiers and possibly beyond, as in parts of Palestine, and out of the F.T.T., and peaceful negotiation for an agreement. I do not know how much attention would be paid this unless teeth were put in it, in which case NATO members, as pointed out above, might have to choose between the UN and NATO, Article 103 notwithstanding.
I write the above more to give you background than to tell you any particular news. It is illuminating to look at the variety of problems which arise for NATO when there is an outbreak of violence in which one of its members is involved, under circumstances such as the present, although it also may be of interest to you to know that there has been one amendment to the EWP recently sent up to SHAPE and that another is cooking, both designed to direct NATO’s thinking toward the issues raised by an attack from another quarter than that originally envisaged by the treaty. It is also interesting to know that the Americans here believe Italy militarily stronger than Yugoslavia and able to defeat Tito in a war if [Page 342] it has the will to fight. Some question seems to exist in connection with that condition.
Yours sincerely,