750G.00/1–454
No. 158
Memorandum of Conversation, by
David G. Nes of the Office of
Western European Affairs
Subject:
- Trieste
Participants:
- Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, American Ambassador to Italy
- Mr. Julius Holmes—EUR
- Mr. Walworth Barbour—EE
- Mr. John Jones—WE
- Mr. William Knight—WE
- Mr. David Nes—WE
Mr. Holmes opened the meeting by bringing Mrs. Luce up to date on recent developments relative to our negotiations on Trieste.1 He said that both the French and Italians were being informed today of our proposed secret meetings with the Yugoslavs and that the preliminary reaction of the French had not been too unfavorable. We were awaiting a report of Mr. Durbrow’s conversation with Zoppi.2
Mr. Holmes then suggested that Mrs. Luce might like to give the group her observations on the Trieste issue. Mrs. Luce said she had several points she would like to make, the first and most important having to do with our tactics in dealing with the Yugoslavs in the secret talks. She thought our greatest chance of success in such a meeting would probably be gained by limiting the initial discussion to those points on which there was general agreement. First of all, we should discuss the city of Trieste, which the Yugoslavs had already conceded to be an “Italian city”. This would encompass provisions for giving the Yugoslavs access to the port and certain economic and trade rights, etc. From the port, discussion should proceed to the necessity of the Italian’s having land access to the city. This would involve the delineation of the coastal strip between the city of Trieste and the Italian frontier. Only when agreement had been reached on these two points would the matter of Italian minorities in Zone B and Slovene minorities in Zone A be taken up.
With regard to financial arrangements connected with the final settlement, Mrs. Luce mentioned that there might be available approximately $8,000,000 in counterpart for use in assisting the port [Page 359] of Trieste to get on its feet and to construct certain additional port facilities. Mr. Holmes asked Mr. Nes to look into the availability of these funds.
Mrs. Luce then summarized briefly the importance of the Trieste issue to Italy. She said that the October 8 decision was the source of Pella’s prestige and was the principal factor enabling the formation of his government. A favorable resolution of the Trieste issue within a reasonable period of time would be very helpful to the center government, but a decision a year from now would have few advantages as far as Italy is concerned. There were two principal reasons why our failure to carry out the October 8 decision had been taken in as good grace as it had been by the Italian people. First, they attributed it to British machinations which had once again done the Italians dirt and, secondly, to the very genuine Italian fear of war with Yugoslavia. Mrs. Luce made it clear that, in her opinion, there could be no Italian ratification of the EDC until the Trieste problem was settled. Furthermore, every week of delay weakened Italy’s position within NATO and her ability and willingness to cooperate in Western defense.
Should no agreement result from our secret talks with the Yugoslavs, Mrs. Luce said she thought we would have to go through with the implementation of the October 8 decision but that, in doing so, we should not employ any dramatic and sudden move but should go forward step by step very slowly, giving the Italians one position in the administration of Zone A at a time. She pointed out that if the turnover of Zone A to the Italians were thus accomplished over a long period of time no one step could be used by the Yugoslavs as justification for hostile action. At the same time, we could not be charged by the Italians with breaking our word on the October 8 decision.
Mr. Holmes pointed out that, even with such a slow step-by-step implementation, we would at some point be faced with the problem of the evacuation of US and UK forces. He asked Mrs. Luce whether she thought, when this crucial point were reached, the Italians would be willing to restrict the entry of their forces to fill the resultant vacuum to the carabinieri. Mrs. Luce said that the carabinieri were, in fact, military forces but she thought the Italians would be willing to give such an assurance. In conclusion, Mrs. Luce said that, were we faced with the $64 question of how to implement October 8, we should under no circumstances endeavor to make some sudden dramatic move nor should we appear to be confused and uncertain.
- For records of other conversations Ambassador Luce had with U.S. officials during her consultations in Washington, see vol. VI, Part 2, pp. 1648 ff.↩
- See telegram 2088 from Rome, infra.↩