Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

747C.00/12–854: Telegram

No. 402
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

secret
priority

New York, December 8, 1954—7 p.m.

Delga 357. Limit distribution. Re: Cyprus. Dixon (UK) met with me this morning to discuss working our joint position on Cyprus. He said that UK preference remained the defeat of any resolution on the question. I said that my instructions were to oppose any substantive resolution and that we would tell people this was the case. We were not able, however, to put pressure on others to defeat a substantive resolution.

Dixon said that there was a very fine balance in voting situation as they now see it. While the announcement of US opposition to a substantive resolution might be enough to bring around some uncertain votes, it remained risky. Voting situation changed from day to day. For example, Pakistanis had now informed UK that they would vote against any Greek resolution and this the UK felt would bring about some change in Arab voting pattern to advantage of UK. On other hand, balance of LA vote was presently running against UK. I said that I could understand LA’s support for UK being more doubtful if the question were one of substance, but this might not be the case if a procedural motion not to discuss the Greek item were put forward. I said that I would ask Washington to authorize me to do some button-holing on a resolution not to discuss; I felt that if that were the UK preference we could be of substantial help.

Dixon said that in view of the fine balance in voting on a substantive resolution and in view of their wish to make this morning’s meeting decisive, he believed he could proceed to work out with US a procedural motion not to discuss and so advise London. He raised the question of whether US could present such a motion at the outset of debate. Since UK was under most stringent instructions not to participate in substantive debate it was important that the procedural motion should be made at outset so that they could be present and participate on that basis.

Crosthwaite¹ suggested US might make the motion by pointing out that we were not taking a position on the merits but taking such action to avoid a divisive issue between Allies. I said that I would raise with the Department whether we could make the motion, but wondered if it would not be better if such a country as Denmark or Pakistan did so and we then went to work in support.

Dixon felt that the planning for a motion not to discuss should be like a military plan, i.e., it should not get to the Greeks that we had this in mind and hence, the work in support of it would have to begin after the motion was made. He asked if in the interim period the UK could say that US “opposes the Greek proposal”. I agreed that they could do this.

Dixon also wished to give further thought to whether a procedural motion should say “decides not to ‘discuss’ or not to ‘consider’”. The use of “not to consider” might appear more like a reversal of the GA decision to inscribe the item and therefore require a two-thirds majority. On the other hand, “not to consider” from the UK standpoint might be better as more far-reaching in substance. I pointed out that the use of “not to discuss” might gather more votes for the very reason that it did not go quite as far as “not to consider” and suggested that the main objective should be to get a very substantial vote. Dixon agreed this was the case.

I would appreciate Department’s views on “discuss” vs “consider” as well as Department’s views on whether US could make the motion. I recommend we do not make it.

I believe I should be authorized to do some lobbying in favor of a resolution not to consider or not to discuss the Cyprus question. This is because it is very much to our advantage not to have the substantive question itself come to a vote. I believe we could justify my doing this by saying that it was in the interests of all three powers concerned to compose this question and not to let them get into intransigent positions. My plan would be to do some buttonholing among our friends here after the motion has been made and to do it on an apparently informal and casual basis.

Lodge

1. P.M. Crosthwaite, British Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.