611.00/10–2453
No. 45
Memorandum by the Special Assistant
to the President (Jackson) to the Staff Secretary in the White
House Office (Minnich)
The Ambassador’s papers1 are returned herewith with a couple of side notes and underscorings.
These are interesting papers and it is encouraging and refreshing that the Ambassadors should have addressed themselves to the problem of psychological warfare, which used to be just an ugly word in striped pants circles. However, I feel that they have gone overboard in certain places. For instance, their statement that America must never conduct any psychological warfare operations except with the approval and support of our allies. Sure, we must coordinate, and get support, and reassure, and play ball, and be just as sweet and cooperative and reasonable as we can be. But every now and then we must feel free to do something in the American interest, even though it is not one hundred per cent acceptable in London, or Paris, or Rome, or wherever.
[Page 103]I would like to strike a note of warning right now on something that may not develop for ten or twenty years. If and when the possibility of liberation does loom for Eastern Europe, we will find that our interests and the British interests in that area, and possibly the German interests, will be diametrically opposed. We must be prepared to have an American position and to follow it through with great firmness. If some variation of the federation concept seems to be the only way to (a) readjust frontiers; (b) create a viable economic industrial and agricultural unit; (c) present a united manpower group of such size to act as a deterrent to some new aggressor, we can be almost sure that Great Britain will be against it because of their old balance of power tradition. If we want peace in Europe, we’d better try it our way for a change. None of the other ways seem to have worked too well.
Another place where the Ambassadors go overboard is their extraordinary statement that, “The East Berlin riots of June 17 and American psychological warfare operations related thereto caused serious difficulties with our principal allies.” In the first place, this sounds as though we had fomented the riots, whereas we know that not even the German secret intelligence suspected that this was in the wind. In the second place, just what did the Ambassadors expect American psychological warfare to do? Tell the rioters to go home and be nice to the Commies?
The above constitutes my five cents’ worth.
- Presumably a reference to Document 43, and to the Principal Conclusions of the Vienna Chiefs of Mission meeting (see footnote 1, supra).↩