Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

864.49/8–1354: Telegram

No. 57
The Minister in Hungary (Ravndal) to the Department of State¹

secret

Budapest, August 13, 1954—7 p.m.

83. From manner in which both East German and Hungarian acceptance US flood and offer developed (Legtel 69²) clear presumption exists that Moscow directive behind both related actions. While hand of Kremlin more obvious in East German case due publicity given regime’s first reactions, evolution of events culminating in Hungarian acceptance, as revealed following, also tends confirm this conclusion:

1. Regime hereby its every action showed its determination from very outset to use flood to build up internal [garble] life of party (Legtel 46³).

2. That government had decided as early as July 23 against classifying flood as disaster and against either soliciting or accepting outside aid openly revealed by Rakosi and Gero (Legtel 36⁴) thinking at this stage evidently based on assumption that as flooded area Hungary comparatively light and as losses to crops relatively small, material gains from any likely foreign aid would probably not be sufficient to warrant give up prestige value to party of overcoming flood danger and damage without assistance.

3. Thus when Dutch offer assistance made July 30, it unequivocally refused on grounds Hungary did not need assistance. US offer July 31 received with statement it would be referred to government, but that Hungary had not thus far needed accept any of several outside offers of aid.

4. Public about-face occurred August 7 when Dutch Minister told Hungary would be happy to receive Dutch offer but would prefer currency to commodities and US informed August 10 that Hungary would accept our offer aid.

Most plausible explanation this adroit reversal in declared policy lies in receipt here of directive from Moscow. Caught in mid-stream in pursuit its post-Geneva objective of convincing peoples West Europe of genuineness its “peaceful co-existence” mask and its protestations about readiness to negotiate all controversies and cooperate in all things, Kremlin seems to have concluded it could ill afford at this time to have people’s Democracies belying truth these professions by their actions. Order therefore sent satellite underlings to reverse their adopted positions regardless loss of face entailed in this action. In formulating decision, Kremlin doubtless also had in mind deleterious effects last US aid offer refusal by a satellite and satellites as well as Russia’s own dwindling larders which could easily support slice of capitalists abundance, particularly if free.

Legation will appreciate receiving Department, Moscow, Berlin comments.

Ravndal

1. Also sent to Berlin and Moscow.
2. Telegram 69, Aug. 10, reported that the Hungarian Government had accepted the U.S. offer for emergency flood relief made on July 31. (864.49/8–1054) Heavy rains during July caused flooding along rivers in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. President Eisenhower issued a statement on July 29, printed in Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 9, 1954, p. 197, offering assistance to all affected areas. The Rumanian Government, noting that the damage suffered was slight, rejected the offer on Aug. 3. (Telegram 26 from Bucharest, Aug. 4; 866.49/8–454) The Czechoslovak Government accepted the offer in a note of Aug. 16, printed in Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 30, 1954, p. 309.
3. Not printed. (864.49/7–2954)
4. Not printed. (864.49/7–2354)